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GLOSSARY
Advocate
The term is defined by Thompson (1995:20) as; 1) ‘a person 
who supports or speaks in favour.’
Communicative Action
The theory of communicative action is described in Habermas 
(1995). According to Habermas (1995:ix), it is linked to ‘moral- 
philosophical, rather than empirical-psychological 
considerations.’ The goal of people who undertake 
communicative action is to reach a common understanding and 
harmony with regard to a situation.
Conventional Level of Moral Development
According to Kohlberg (1981), the conventional level of moral 
development refers to the individual’s adoption of family, groups 
and society’s rules. The rules of the group replace that of the 
parents as a basis of authority and the belief system that has 
been internalized by a child can be considered as a conscience.
Critical Theory
The roots of critical theory lie prior to the Second World War, 
when the Frankfurt School carried out philosophical and social 
investigations that were critical of the culture, economics and 
politics of Western societies. The Frankfurt School developed a 
philosophy called ‘Critical Theory’ that is discussed in Habermas 
(1987:381-2) and could be used to criticize ideology. Critical 
Theory poses questions that relate to the goal of an individual 
with reference to their society. Where there is a dominant social 
system, critical theory is concerned with the emancipation of 
people.
xi
Discourse
Defined by Allen (1990:333) as; ‘a connected series of 
utterances; a te x t... talk, converse.’
Discourse Ethics
As described in chapter seven, according to Habermas 
(1995:65), discourse ethics (‘D’) can be considered as a 
framework for the conduct of moral discourse. Habermas 
identifies discourse ethics as having three principles that will be 
discussed in part two of the thesis, these are:
1) A principle of universalisation, where there is the intention 
to set conditions for impartial judgement.
2) The conditions for practical discourse are identified, from 
which universally valid norms may emerge, that could 
meet the needs and be accepted by the participants.
3) Those who are involved can only achieve a 
consensus when there is free participation.
Health Authority
An administrative body in the National Health Service that is 
involved in the provision and monitoring of patient care.
Ideal Speech Situation
According to Giddens:
‘An ideal speech situation is one in which there are 
no external constraints preventing participants from 
assessing evidence and argument, and in which 
each participant has an equal and open chance of 
entering a discussion.’
Giddens (1985:131)
Lifeworld
Habermas offers the following definition:
‘I can introduce here the concept of the Lebenswelt 
or the Lifeworld, to begin with, as the correlate of 
processes of reaching understanding. Subjects 
acting communicatively always come to an 
understanding in the horizon of a lifeworld. Their 
lifeworld is more or less formed from diffuse, almost 
always unproblematic, background convictions.’
Habermas (1984:70),
Nursing and Midwifery Council
Nursing's professional regulatory body that replaced the 
functions of the United Kingdom Central Council for Nursing, 
Midwifery and Health Visiting and the four National Nursing 
Boards on 1st April 2002. The NMC has published a Code of 
Professional Conduct that came into effect on the 1st June 2002.
Preconventional
Kohlberg (1981) describes the preconventional level of moral 
development that can be applied to children up to the age of 
ten, who are too young to develop their own belief systems. The 
standards used are based on the authority of others for 
example, parents.
Postconventional
For Kohlberg (1981), a person at the postconventional and 
principled level of moral development may wish to make a stand 
with regard to an issue that is based on a personally held 
conviction.
Systems Theory
According to White, systems theory:
‘envisions strategic actions guided by systemic 
imperatives. These imperatives operate through the 
“de-linguistified media” of money and power.’
White (1994:100)
Universalism
Habermas states that:
‘For a norm to be valid, the consequences and side- 
effects that its general observance can be expected 
to have for the satisfaction of the particular interests 
of each person affected must be such that all 
affected can accept them freely.’
Habermas (1995:120)
Validity Claims
Validity claims are necessary conditions for discourse and 
therefore form the basis for the occurrence of proper 
communication. Proper or undistorted communication can be 
considered as language used when speakers can defend all of 
the following four validity claims, as identified by Habermas:
a) That the communication should be comprehensible,
b) based on truth and
c) should reflect the rightness,
d) truthfulness of the content.’
Habermas (1995:58)
ABSTRACT
The aim in this thesis is to form a link between Habermas' work 
on discourse to that of writers on advocacy. There has been a 
demonstrable need for advocacy in differing societies and this is 
apparent when one considers the developments that have 
occurred, for example, concerning the treatment and care of 
patients and clients in the British Health and Social Services. In 
this thesis, instances of client and patient care that are less than 
satisfactory are described and illustrated, as in the Pink case. 
These demonstrate an identified need for patient and client 
support. Also, it is acknowledged that the act of becoming a 
nursing advocate may involve the exposure of the nurse to 
personal risk.
The thesis considers the views of two British and three United 
States writers on advocacy. I have come to the conclusion that 
the USA based perspective, as offered by Sally Gadow (1983), 
can be considered the most convincing. Gadow has been able 
to form a philosophical basis for advocacy that can be applied 
globally. This is founded on the premise that a patient ought to 
be the person making decisions concerning his or her treatment 
and care. Gadow takes the view that the role of the nurse 
advocate ought to involve that of supporting patients, while at 
the same time offering respect with regard to their wishes.
A description of Habermas’ (1995) work on communication and 
discourse ethics, his framework for an evaluation of competing 
norms and communication with reference to relevant theory is 
offered. A link is made between Habermas’ work and that of 
advocacy theorists as Gadow and to my knowledge, this is the 
first time that such a link has been made.
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PART 1 ADVOCACY
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
1 Preview
There have been many headlines in the UK press concerning 
cases of alleged poor care of patients in the NHS. For example, 
The Guardian (27th January 2002) offers a description of an 
elderly patient, Rose Addis, whom, it is alleged, was left for a 
long period of time on an inner London hospital trolley, with a 
lack of attention from staff.
Some of these cases result from a lack of communication 
between health care staff and patients, or their relatives. Others 
may relate to a lack of liaison between staff, or their inability to 
make a stand against colleagues and make their views known. 
Accounts of such instances in the press describe events that 
have had a profound effect on both the staff and patients 
involved. It could be argued that if those who were charged with 
the responsibility for patient care had assumed an effective
l
advocacy role, some of the situations described in the press 
might have been prevented. The aim of this thesis is to form the 
basis for an understanding of such an advocacy role.
2 Definition of Advocacy
The word ‘advocacy’ may be interpreted and understood in 
different ways. Therefore, to arrive at a common understanding 
of the term, it is important that a definition is offered.
Thompson defines advocacy as:
‘Support or argument for a cause, policy etc.’
Thompson (1992:13)
Writers on the topic of advocacy within nursing have indicated 
their differing perspectives. Therefore, having defined 
‘advocacy’ it would be helpful to offer a literature review.
2
3 Literature Review
Having undertaken a review of the available literature on 
advocacy, I have come to a view that the British Advocacy 
perspective, as applied to nursing, is adequately articulated in 
Gates (1994) and Teasdale (1998). Similarly, the North 
American advocacy perspective is represented by references to 
the work of three nurses, Gadow (1983), Kohnke (1982) and 
Curtin (1979).
In support of the above assertion, it can be seen that Johnstone
(1995) makes extensive reference to the above three North 
American perspectives, as does Mallik (1997), in her review of 
literature on advocacy and her (1997), paper on ‘Perceptions of 
Practising Nurses.’ There are similar references in Mallik’s 
(1998) paper, with regard to the nursing elite in the United 
Kingdom, also in Mallik and Rafferty’s (2000), paper on 
‘Diffusion of the Concept of Patient Advocacy.’
A discussion concerning the nature of the relationship between 
the nurse and patient occurs in Morse (1991) and Ramos
3
(1992). The main sources for all these authors are the 
commentators referred to above, i.e. Gates, Teasdale, Gadow, 
Kohnke and Curtin. Similarly, the professional implications for 
nurses of assuming a role as patients’ advocate are explored by 
Grace (2001), Willard (1996), Copp (1986) and also in Snowball
(1996), whose papers refer to the identified North American 
perspectives.
The problems with regard to the nurse undertaking an 
advocate’s role are detailed in Martin (1998), Bird (1994), Hewitt 
(2002), Allmark and Klarzynski (1992), and Woodrow (1997). 
Their references suggest that the majority of the literature on 
advocacy, with regard to nursing, originates either from Britain 
or North America. They often refer to Gates, Teasdale, Gadow, 
Kohnke and Curtin.
I will now consider advocacy with reference to the above 
perspectives. The five chosen authors offer differing accounts of 
advocacy that reflect the differing social philosophies of the 
United States and United Kingdom.
4
For Mallik (1997), the United States perspective reflects this 
society’s acknowledgement of the importance of human rights, 
with reference to the rise in the Civil Rights Movement and its 
citizens awareness of the potential implications of the 
development of medical technology and distrust of experts. 
According to her, the United States perspective is also linked to 
the rise of consumerism, where the citizen as a consumer who 
has paid for his or her care through an insurance plan, expects 
that an adequate level of service should be provided.
The United Kingdom’s perspective differs somewhat, in that the 
National Health Service Act (1947), was based on the 
assumptions that the ‘citizens have a right to basic health care’, 
and ‘the State has a duty to provide health care for all.’ The 
United Kingdom’s National Health Service Act (1947) 
perspective, that ‘citizens have a right to basic health care,’ 
could be considered as similar to the philosophy held by the 
United States, which acknowledges the need for a state health 
care safety net for its citizens. However the main difference 
arises in the duty of the United Kingdom, as a state, ‘to provide 
health care for all,’ as described in the National Health Service
5
Act (1947), a function largely fulfilled in the United States by 
personal insurance.
This is illustrated when one considers the different methods of 
funding of healthcare in the two countries. According to the 
‘Healthcare Market Review/ with reference to the United 
Kingdom:
‘In 2000, total expenditure on the main healthcare 
services of the NHS was estimated at £41.25bn, or 
73.1% of the total UK healthcare services market.’
UK Healthcare Market Review (2000:1)
The Review goes on to state that:
The private healthcare sector ... was estimated to 
account for 25.3% of the total UK healthcare 
market in 2000.’
UK Healthcare Market Review (2000:1)
As a contrast, according to the National Center for Health 
Statistics (2003), in 2000 the United States of America had a 
Public to Private ratio of 35.8%:64.2%, therefore the majority of 
healthcare is provided by the Private Sector.
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The funding of healthcare in the United Kingdom and United 
States has had an influence on the ways in which advocacy has 
developed. In the United States, advocacy rests on the notion of 
the primacy of patients’ rights. The rights of patients are similarly 
considered as important in the United Kingdom. Where a client 
or patient has difficulty in articulating his or her claim to rights as 
for example in the Learning Disability or Mental Health sectors, 
group and advocacy alliance schemes have formed. These 
have the remit of promoting the interests of patients and clients, 
as described by Gates (1994). The underlying aim of these 
groups is the respect of an individual and their claim to rights. 
These bodies should therefore ensure that all patients or clients, 
as individuals, are able to articulate effectively their rights 
claims. At this point in the thesis it would be useful to consider 
what can be assigned as a nursing role.
4 Perceptions of a Nursing Role
When considering advocacy, a nurse’s perception of his or her 
role is an important factor. The link of science to art is discussed 
in Midgley (1980:86), who states that ‘practising any science 
properly is an art.’ With reference to the 'art' of nursing, the role
7
often requires subjective interpretation. Some nurses believe 
that they should concentrate on the patient care that is 
perceived as the basis of nursing. An example of this would be 
helping a patient with personal hygiene to prevent the 
occurrence of complications such as pressure sores. 
Alternatively, many nurses hold a contrasting perspective that is 
based on the idea that nurses should extend their role to 
embrace tasks traditionally undertaken by doctors. For example, 
performing a patient's intravenous cannulation and drug 
prescription. It therefore follows that accepting and undertaking 
such extended roles should allow nurses to build their 
professional confidence. One could claim that advocacy should 
be considered as an important factor in nursing, regardless of 
whether the nursing role is extended or otherwise. Beardshaw 
(1981) offers support for this view that nurses ought to 
undertake advocacy as part of their role.
An integral part of a nursing role, when acting as patient’s 
advocate, is an acceptance that the patient ought to be given an 
opportunity to make decisions concerning his or her treatment 
and life. The nurse should acknowledge that the patient ought to
be able to seek explanation and advice about their treatment. 
Faulder (1985) offers support for this by suggesting that a 
patient should be the person involved in key decision-making 
with reference to his or her life and treatment. This ought to be 
acknowledged by a nurse when undertaking a patient advocate 
role and the nurse should not therefore take on the 
responsibility of making such decisions for a patient.
One should however acknowledge that patients, who wish to 
have support with regard to their decision-making, might 
express their preference that a nurse should be involved in the 
decision-making process. A nurse could offer an explanation of 
terms and concepts in a form that the patient should be able to 
understand, therefore facilitating appropriate decision-making by 
a patient. This can be considered as a contrast to a patient or 
client-having decisions made for him or her by a nurse, which 
would amount to a form of paternalism. The above examples of 
nursing action demonstrate some of the implications for nurses, 
who wish to take on a role as patients' advocate. One should 
therefore consider the implications that such a role can have for 
nurses.
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The nurse should acknowledge that boundaries exist and 
possess a level of self-awareness with regard to the personal 
and professional aspects of his or her life. The personal feelings 
of a nurse may at times differ from the perception of a 
professional duty towards patients, with whom the nurse should 
have an ability to empathize. The nurse should be aware that 
focusing on professional duty as part of a professional role 
might demand a suppression of his or her feelings. This may be 
psychologically detrimental for a nurse and therefore have a 
potential to adversely affect patient care. It should be 
acknowledged that a person, who wishes to undertake an 
advocacy role, could encounter accompanying risks. It is 
therefore important that such a person be aware of such risks.
5 The Presence of Risk
The thesis will seek to identify and explore risks that may be 
involved when a person wishes to take on a role as advocate 
and these have to be taken into account when a person 
considers whether or not to take on such a role. The person who 
is contemplating an advocate’s role should be offered a level of 
training and support with reference to the role and risks that are
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involved. A certain level of understanding by a person wishing to 
act in such a role should lead to him or her being in possession 
of an ability to take appropriate action in given situations. This 
should lead to a minimization of risk to the advocate, his or her 
colleagues and patients.
To understand the role of an advocate, one should possess a 
level of knowledge with regard to advocacy, as linked to a form 
of ethical discourse. To facilitate this, the latter part of the thesis 
will describe the work of Habermas (1995), with regard to the 
conditions required for ethical discourse and this will be applied 
to advocacy.
6 The Link to Habermas
Habermas (1995) has constructed a framework that can be 
used to identify the conditions that are required for an ethical 
discourse and he has created a schema in which statements 
can be tested for their validity and effectiveness. I will offer a 
description of the Pink case study as a clinical example, where 
advocacy became an issue. Habermas’ (1995) principles with
l i
regard to discourse ethics are applied to the Pink case with the 
aim of demonstrating how such an application may help to offer 
a rational basis for the policies and actions of those involved. In 
the same part of the thesis, I have made an application of 
Habermas’ (1995) work on discourse ethics, to Gadow’s (1983) 
perspective of the role of a nurse as advocate. I have also used 
another case study as a means of illustrating some of the points 
that are raised later in the thesis.
7 Preview to Chapter Two
In chapter two I will employ a thematic approach to a discussion 
of advocacy and will refer to the work of five authors, as 
previously identified, who have written extensively on advocacy. 
The first two British authors, Gates (1994) and Teasdale (1998) 
offer views of advocacy that largely reflect the United Kingdom’s 
perspective, which includes the group and collective advocacy 
perspectives. The last three American authors, Gadow (1983), 
Kohnke (1982) and Curtin (1979), as suggested previously, 
reflect the widely held view in the US society that advocacy 
should be based on the rights of the patient or client. These 
authors hold that the role of the nurse is to inform and support
12
the client in any decision that has to be made and they consider 
self and citizen advocacy as being typically the most relevant.
I will argue that Gadow’s (1983) advocacy perspective is able to 
offer the most sound and convincing rationale for the role of a 
nurse as advocate, as her work on ‘existentialist advocacy’ and 
the ‘lived’ and ‘object’ body can be applied internationally to the 
majority of situations that may require advocacy. In my view, this 
provides sufficient justification for preferring Gadow’s (1983) 
perspective.
Having offered an outline of the main content of the thesis, I will 
now follow this with an account of the different forms of 
advocacy, starting with self-advocacy.
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CHAPTER 2 FORMS OF ADVOCACY
1 Self-advocacy
In this chapter I will identify and explore the different forms of 
advocacy and will begin with ‘self-advocacy.’ The five authors 
that I have identified, namely; Gates (1994), Teasdale (1998), 
Gadow (1983), Kohnke (1982) and Curtin (1979) all refer to 
‘self-advocacy’ either in explicit or implicit terms. It is therefore 
important to offer an account of this term. In the UK and USA, 
patients’ rights are considered as important and these are linked 
to self-advocacy. Both societies emphasize the right of an 
individual to make informed decisions that are appropriate to his 
or her needs and welfare. I will begin with an account of self- 
advocacy and the British perspective.
2 Self-advocacy and the British Perspective
Gates (1994) and Teasdale (1998) acknowledge the occurrence 
of self-advocacy, when people are encouraged to speak for 
themselves rather than rely on an advocate to speak for them. 
Teasdale (1998) links this form of advocacy to those who have
14
learning disabilities and recommends that the advocate should 
encourage a patient or client with a learning disability to speak 
for themselves, rather than trying to make decisions on their 
behalf.
Following this principle, for Teasdale (1998) self-advocacy often 
involves the setting up of groups with the aim of representing 
their members. An example of these groups typically includes 
people with learning disabilities who are aided by other people, 
such as the ‘Advocacy Alliance’, described by Sang and O’Brien 
(1984:9-26). This allows for identification of common problems 
and the required support can be made available to enable the 
group members to put forward a collective point of view. The 
groups normally consider their members’ welfare with reference 
to organisational policy that has responsibility of providing a 
certain level of services and care. Teasdale (1998:21) also 
makes a suggestion that the philosophy of self-advocacy could 
be applied to groups other than those with members who have 
learning disabilities, for example, people with mental health 
problems. Therefore, the principle of people forming support
15
groups whose function is to represent the members’ interests 
can be applied in other fields of health care.
Teasdale (1998:37) expresses his preference for self-advocacy 
on the grounds that it promotes the autonomy of a client and 
reduces risk to the advocate. He discusses the point made by 
Dawson and Palmer (1991), that self-advocacy involves people 
expressing their concerns and wishes, while being able to make 
choices and to take responsibility themselves. This can be 
illustrated with reference to self-advocacy and empowerment, as 
discussed in the next section.
3 Self-advocacy and Empowerment
Teasdale (1998) considers how clients can be helped to self­
advocate. An autonomous client ought to be able to make 
decisions with regard to his or her welfare and the advocate’s 
role should reflect the empowerment of the client to achieve this 
aim. Teasdale (1998) observes that there are degrees of 
autonomy and that the client’s autonomy may be restricted due 
to illness, whether physical or psychological. He suggests that
16
the client should be able to learn about their illness and make 
the necessary choices when they are able to do so and their 
wishes should be respected. I will now give an account of a 
practical example of self-advocacy, as offered by Corcoran 
(1994).
3a Corcoran’s Example.
Corcoran (1994) offers a clinical illustration of self-advocacy 
when she describes a case study relating to a woman who 
experienced menopause and faced decisions concerning her 
proposed treatment with oestrogen therapy. There were three 
choices;
a) To take oestrogen alone,
b) to take it as a combination therapy or,
c) not to take any hormones.
The patient was given an explanation concerning the proposed 
treatment. This was accomplished by the nurse referring to the 
gynaecologist, as required, for expertise. Opportunities were
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made for the patient to voice doubts and the patient was then 
able to come to an appropriate decision. The decision made by 
the patient was facilitated by the communication of information 
offered by a nurse who used the consultant gynaecologist’s 
knowledge as required and this enhanced the patient's 
autonomy. Corcoran’s patient-centred emphasis with regard to 
decision-making can be linked to self-advocacy as previously 
described. Having considered the British perspective, I will now 
explore self-advocacy and the North American perspective.
4 The North American Perspective
I will now look at three North American views of self-advocacy, 
as described by Curtin, Kohnke and Gadow.
4a Curtin on Self-advocacy
Curtin (1979) offers support for self-advocacy when she 
suggests that sufficient information ought to be provided by the 
nurse to enable a patient to exercise a choice concerning the 
available treatment options. According to Curtin (1979), the 
nurses’ individualistic view of their patients forms the basis of a
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holistic understanding of the needs of their patients. Nurses 
need to understand the whole of the patient’s background in 
order to appreciate the effect of a physical or psychological 
problem on a patient’s integrity and this is considered as a 
prerequisite for advocacy. There has to be an acknowledgement 
that there is a responsibility on the part of a professional, 
regarding the provision of information to his or her patient 
concerning the options and choices that are available. This 
should enable a nurse to enhance the autonomy of a patient 
with regard to his or her decision-making. I will now turn to 
Kohnke’s (1982) perspective.
4b Kohnke on Self-advocacy
From my reading of Kohnke (1982), her definition of nursing 
refers to the importance of the patients’ autonomy and right to 
self-determination. For her, the nursing role should reflect this 
philosophy; therefore the nurse should act to support the 
autonomy of the patient and in this way, her definition of 
advocacy is linked to self-advocacy.
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Kohnke offers support for self-advocacy when she states that:
The role of advocate is to inform the client and 
then to support him in whatever decision he 
makes.’
Kohnke (1982:2)
According to this definition, the nurse should ensure that the 
patient is adequately informed and supported in their decision­
making.
For Kohnke (1982), an advocate should be able to ensure that a 
patient is fully informed with regard to his or her illness and 
required treatment or care. This implies that the advocate 
should possess a certain level of knowledge concerning a 
patient and their illness, in order for the advocate to offer the 
patient adequate information. Alternatively, that the advocate 
should be able to access knowledge, as required.
According to Kohnke (1982), the client has a right to make 
decisions concerning his or her treatment and care. The amount 
of information offered and the client's consequent level of 
knowledge may influence these. For a client who has received
adequate information about his or her condition, ought to be in a 
favourable position to make decisions about treatment and care. 
However, a person who has received inadequate information 
concerning their options may, through a lack of knowledge, 
make an inappropriate decision. With reference to such a case, 
the advocate should perceive (and by default accept), a sense 
of responsibility.
With reference to the rights of a patient or client, Kohnke (1982) 
suggests that advocacy should be considered in a related 
context, as for example, when the patient requires adequate 
information and support that should allow the patient to make 
appropriate decisions concerning his or her treatment and care. 
Kohnke (1982) acknowledges the need for the provision of a 
certain level of information for the patient who has a right to 
accept or reject this information. This could lead to unforeseen 
consequences, for example, the advocate may be aware that 
his or her patient's decision may not be considered as the right 
one, but ought to be accepted as this is considered as a 
patient's right.
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Kohnke (1982:17) accepts that the client may “wish to know” 
and conversely “not to know”, therefore the role of advocate can 
become a balancing act where the role of advocate can be 
considered as far from clear and potentially open to ambiguity. 
This implies that the advocate should possess a level of 
knowledge concerning the role and its side effects, the nurse 
who undertakes such a role in relation to his or her patient 
should be aware of this. One can now consider Gadow’s (1983) 
perspective of self-advocacy.
4c Gadow on Self-advocacy
Gadow (1983) further develops the idea of self-advocacy when 
she suggests that the advocate should help the patient acquire 
the necessary information and facilitate a patient’s analysis of 
this with reference to their values and beliefs. Gadow (1980b) 
considers that it is important that the advocate ensure the 
patient has the relevant information by requesting, as required, 
that a doctor should to speak to the patient regarding his or her 
diagnosis and treatment. In this way, the advocate should use 
his or her professional knowledge to enable a patient to gain the 
required information. By helping a patient to determine their 
personal values, the advocate should be able to gain a deeper
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understanding of the basis of a patient’s decision and the 
appropriate level of information offered to a patient by an 
advocate should enhance the patient’s understanding. For this 
to occur, there has to be an element of trust between the 
advocate and patient. It would seem pertinent at this stage to 
describe Gadow’s (1983) definition of nursing and her account 
of existential advocacy, as described next.
5 Gadow’s Existential Advocacy Perspective
For Gadow (1983:40), ‘nursing is concerned -  or ought to be -  
with the whole person of the patient.’ According to Gadow’s 
(1983:42) perspective, nursing is seen as a philosophical ideal, 
rather than an ‘empirical construct’ and is ‘distinguished by its 
philosophy of care and not its care functions.’ According to 
Gadow (1980) the development of a philosophy of nursing 
should reflect an enhancement and development of the nursing 
role that should include basic nursing tasks, with an 
accompanying acquisition of the necessary skills.
Gadow (1983:45) proposes that nursing is suited to the concept 
of 'existential advocacy' and considers that this term is
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interchangeable with the term ‘advocacy.’ According to Gadow’s 
definition:
The concept of existential advocacy ... is based 
upon the principle that freedom of self- 
determination is the most fundamental and 
valuable human right, and therefore is a greater 
good than any which healthcare can provide.’
Gadow (1983:45)
The concept of existential advocacy can be readily applied to a 
patient care setting as part of a nursing philosophy. The aim of 
existential advocacy is the integration of the patient’s self and 
body.
Gadow (1980) offers a discussion of a patient’s position in terms 
of communication and the formation of inter-personal 
relationships between nurses and their patients, with reference 
to the values that are held by a patient. Gadow (1980) makes 
the claim that nurses are in frequent and prolonged contact with 
their patients. Therefore they can be considered as occupying a 
favourable position that enables them to combine their 
knowledge and experience, enabling them to perceive a patient 
as a whole person. The focus of nursing, as according to Gadow 
(1983), ought to be directed primarily towards the patient.
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Nurses who are afforded adequate education and resources 
can often reach their full potential, in that they are able to take 
the view that patient-care ought to be considered from a holistic 
perspective, while acknowledging that a patient or client 
normally possesses a level of self-determination. This is 
considered as the ideal prerequisite for existential advocacy, as 
from this base one can then make a deduction that nurses are 
well placed to help a patient with their decision-making, with an 
informed reference to their treatment and well being. In this 
sense, nurses can be considered as occupying a strong position 
with regard to offering patients informed support.
Gadow (1983:45) offers her view of existential advocacy in 
positive and negative terms, as described next. I will now turn to 
her account of Positive Existential Advocacy.
5a Positive Existential Advocacy
With reference to positive existential advocacy, Gadow states:
‘In positive terms, this meaning of advocacy has far 
greater implications for the professional, which 
extend beyond the narrow realm of proscriptions 
into the realm of ideals. The ideal which existential 
advocacy expresses is this: that individuals be 
assisted by nursing to authentically exercise their 
freedom of self-determination. By authentic is meant
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a way of reaching decisions which are truly one’s 
own -  decisions that express that all one believes 
important about oneself and the world, the entire 
complexity of one’s values.’
Gadow (1983:45)
For Gadow (1983) the nursing role with regard to positive 
existential advocacy should involve assisting patients in their 
decision-making, taking into account their individual 
circumstances and needs. For Gadow (1980), this principle 
ought to be upheld, even though this may have a detrimental 
effect on the health of the patient. In positive terms the meaning 
of advocacy has implications for nurses as it goes far beyond 
the planning of basic nursing care. Again, advocacy could be 
applied to an example of a patient who wishes to die, with the 
advocate offering support for the patient’s decision.
According to Gadow’s (1980) view, the term advocacy implies 
that the advocate should respect the right of a client to make 
decisions concerning his or her treatment and welfare. 
Existential advocacy acknowledges the individuality of patients 
as people and this is based on the premise that people possess 
their own complex values. The person who enters a new 
situation may be required to recreate his or her own values as,
26
for example, in relation to admission to hospital. For instance, 
from a health-related existential advocacy point of view, health 
is normally considered as an important human value (although 
of less importance than self-determination). Human values can 
be considered as subjective, for some people health may be 
less important than, as for example, the acquisition of wealth. It 
is proposed that a philosophical foundation is developed from 
where the patient and nurse can enter into a relationship that 
can be freely determined by those who are involved. As a 
contrast to positive existential advocacy, Gadow (1983) offers 
an account of negative existential advocacy.
5b Negative Existential Advocacy
Gadow offers an account of negative existential advocacy:
‘In negative terms, this implies that the right of self- 
determination ought not be infringed even in the 
interest of health. The professional, while obligated 
to act in the patient’s interest, is not permitted to 
define that interest in any way contrary to the 
patient’s definition: it is not the professional but the 
patient who determines what “best interest” shall 
mean.’
Gadow (1983:45)
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This view can be considered as 'negative', in that its rationale is 
based on the idea that the patient, rather than the professional, 
should be the person to define what is in his or her interests as 
he or she has a right to make his or her decisions with regard to 
treatment or welfare. According to this view, the nurse as a 
professional has an obligation to act in the patient’s interest and 
should not seek to define an interest that in any way comes into 
conflict with that of the patient.
An example of negative existential advocacy is an 
acknowledgement of and support offered by an advocate to a 
patient who wishes to die. According to this view, the advocate 
should offer support with regard to the patient’s self- 
determination even though this would lead to eventual death, as 
to do otherwise would infringe the patient’s right to self- 
determination.
According to Gadow (1980), the nurse who is in possession of 
knowledge concerning his or her patient should be able to help 
a patient to think through the meaning of his or her life with 
reference to the patient’s experience of their illness, as
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illustrated next, by Gadow’s (1983) work on the ‘lived’ and 
‘object’ body.
5c The ‘Lived’ and ‘Object’ Body
Gadow (1983:51-55) offers a discussion concerning the nurse’s 
perception of a patient in terms of ‘lived’ and ‘object body’. The 
‘lived’ body for example, refers to the patient’s experience of a 
disease; discomfort in terms of pain, nausea, loss of weight and 
tiredness. It can also refer to the patient’s response to a clinical 
examination by a doctor, in terms of feeling embarrassed about 
intimate areas of the body. For Gadow (1983:51-55), the ‘object 
body’ refers for example, to a nurse’s perception of a patient 
who has a raised body temperature that would require some 
form of medical treatment and nursing care. Similarly, a doctor 
would perceive this person as a patient who requires a medical 
examination and clinical investigations, e.g. an X-ray, which 
should be organised and taken, with the aim of diagnosing an 
illness. The doctor will normally examine and treat many 
patients during a day and consider his or her actions as a 
necessary part of clinical practice and may make scant 
reference to the feelings of the patient. There may be similarities 
in the way that the doctor offers treatment to a patient, as
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compared to the actions of a mechanic who deals with a car that 
malfunctions.
For Gadow (1983:51-55), the patient’s experience of a disease 
in a ‘lived body’, forms the basis for the ‘object body’, that is 
perceived as a dysfunctional organism and she suggests that 
the ‘lived body’ is of greater importance than the ‘object body’. 
For Gadow (1983), the ‘lived body’ of a patient captures the 
patient’s individual experience of a disease.
From the patient’s point of view, the ‘object body’ may not be 
considered as belonging to him or her, as through prescribed 
treatment and care the patient may have psychologically off­
loaded it on to the doctors or nurses, for the ‘object body’ view 
allows the patient to give permission for the doctor or nurse to 
undertake procedures. The health care professionals would 
consider the patient’s ‘object body’ as being similar to that of 
other people who have the same or a similar illness. The 
professionals would therefore take the view that all the patients 
could benefit from an offer of the same treatment, whereas 
when taking into account individual differences, this may not 
necessarily be so. From the ‘lived body’ view, the above
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treatment of people could result in differing individual patient 
experiences and would therefore affect their perception of the 
treatment and care offered.
For a patient, an ‘object body’ that appears well does not 
present a problem, as in health, its natural functions tend to be 
taken for granted and go unnoticed. The ‘object body’ may be 
considered as similar to a mechanical device whose functions 
are taken for granted when it works well, although through the 
effect of illness, the bodily functions may become evident due to 
their absence or malfunction. The patient would typically notice 
the body when something malfunctions and would normally 
seek advice or treatment from health care professionals. This is 
in contrast to the ‘lived body’ that depends on the patient’s 
experience of an illness that may differ through subjectivity, 
depending to the individual concerned. The professional, for 
example a doctor, may give more attention to a patient’s ‘object 
body’ that can be examined and diagnosed than to the ‘lived 
body’, that relates to the patient’s expression of his or her own 
experience. The philosophical differences between the 'lived' 
and 'object' body can lead to conflict.
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According to Gadow (1983), the lived and object bodies are 
understood as being existentially opposed, though not as 
opposites. Gadow (1983:51-55) suggests that when a person is 
well, the ‘lived body’ is linked to how the person feels with 
regard to their general health. She acknowledges the 
importance of the person’s perception of their health. With 
regard to the ‘object body’ the doctor or nurse may view the 
patient as one of many and a health screen would be conducted 
with reference to the normal bodily function indicated by 
reference to a healthy population. With regard to a healthy ‘lived 
body’, the patient may feel well and expect the health screen to 
confirm the feeling, although he or she may feel a level of 
anxiety prior to obtaining the medical results.
The ‘lived body’ is linked to a patient’s experience of incapacity 
such as immobility. The illness may act as a restraint on the 
natural functions of the body and grossly affect the patient’s 
experience of his or her body. With regard to the ‘object body’, a 
doctor or nurse may perceive the patient as making normal 
progress and this may be indicated to the patient. Therefore, in 
this way the 'lived body' can be considered as having been
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influenced by the ‘object body’. There is the potential for the 
occurrence of internal contradictions within a person.
The task for advocacy, in accordance with the wishes of a 
patient, is to ensure an integration of the bodies. The ‘lived 
body’ offers testimony to the patient’s experience of an illness 
and therefore can be considered as an important aspect of the 
person that ought not to be forgotten or omitted. The ‘object 
body’ can be considered as a mechanism that at the same time 
belongs to no one and to everyone, the aim of nursing is to 
enable a patient to integrate the two bodies, to attain their 
fusion. This fusion would reflect the individuality of a patient and 
allow the person to acknowledge him or herself, and to realize 
their self-determination.
With reference to the nurse as a professional, who wishes to 
undertake a role as patient's advocate, Gadow (1983:51), 
suggests that he or she should acknowledge that the advocate 
should participate ... 'as an individual, a complete unity 
unfragmented by exclusion of any part of the self.’ Having 
offered an account of Gadow’s ‘lived’ and ‘object’ body
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perspective, I will now turn to paternalism, a concept that has 
the potential to influence self-advocacy
5d Paternalism
For Gadow (1983:43-44) paternalistic acts normally relate to the 
perceived interests of an individual with an implication that the 
rights and freedom of others may be restricted for their benefit. 
In extreme cases, there may be an existence of some form of 
coercion by others, the aim being to provide some form of good 
that has typically not been desired by a person, when this has 
the aim of offering some form of benefit. Paternalism can be 
considered in strong or weak forms, as described next.
According to Dworkin:
‘A strong paternalist believes that people may be 
mistaken or confused about their ends and it is 
legitimate to interfere to prevent them from 
achieving those ends.’
Dworkin (2002:6)
Strong paternalism relates to the violation of moral rules with 
regard to an individual’s aim or end concerning the right to self- 
determination. An example of this is an assumption made by a 
nurse that due to their state of mental or physical health, a
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patient would be unable to use information to make health and 
welfare decisions. The nurse’s rationale would be that other 
more competent people should therefore make decisions on 
behalf of the patient. The beneficent / non-maleficent based 
rationale for this rests on the perception that the nurse should 
not allow the patient to become worried by facts and make 
inappropriate decisions. This paternalistic act will result in the 
overriding of a patient’s autonomy.
With regard to weak paternalism, Dworkin states that:
‘A weak paternalist believes that it is legitimate to 
interfere with the means that agents choose to 
achieve their ends, if those means are likely to 
defeat those ends.’
Dworkin (2002:6)
Weak paternalism need not violate a moral rule of self- 
determination for it is linked to the nurse's respect for his or her 
patient. Using this principle, the nurse would seek to enable the 
above patient to exercise self-determination by the provision of 
sufficient basic information that should enable the patient to 
make decisions with regard to his or her health and welfare. The 
nurse’s intention would be to act in support of the patient’s 
autonomy with regard to their decision-making. By undertaking
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this action, although the nurse has influenced the delivery of 
information to the patient for beneficent reasons, the autonomy 
of this patient would not be overridden.
As a contrast, one can now offer a consideration as to how 
paternalism may break a moral rule. For Gadow (1980), the 
single moral rule that is broken by strong paternalism involves 
an acceptance of some form of coercion, where coercion is 
identified as an act of forcing individuals to submit to the action 
of others; for example, when a nurse informs a patient that he or 
she must have a bath at a particular time.
Those who emphasize that they are using paternalism to assist 
a patient may offer a positive defence. According to this view a 
nurse, who has a good level of knowledge about her patient, 
may perceive that she is the person best placed to make a 
professional judgement with regard to her patient’s treatment 
and care. In the context of a patient’s bath, the nurse may 
believe that he or she is the person best able to judge the 
interests of the patient in the context of a requirement for a basic 
level of hygiene and the available facilities that are on the ward 
at a time that a nurse wishes the patient to take a bath.
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In contrast to strong paternalism, the patients’ advocate 
normally does not wish to make decisions on behalf of a patient 
and is motivated merely to facilitate the patient’s decision- 
making. This can be considered as approaching a 
philosophically closer position to a weak concept of paternalism; 
where the supporter of the patient seeks to identify the needs 
and preferences of their patient, rather than make an 
assumption that a professional is considered as the best person 
to judge what ought to occur in the interests of the patient. A 
further view of advocacy refers to Curtin’s (1979) perspective of 
advocacy as a natural role.
6 Advocacy as Natural
Curtin (1979) proposes that advocacy can be considered as a 
natural role that anyone should be able to undertake. It is 
related to the idea that advocacy be viewed as a natural 
occurrence, as for example, parents who offer support and 
protection for their children. Similarly, the role of a nurse through 
the adopted role of caring for a patient could be conceived as 
embracing the role as patient's advocate. In this sense, Curtin 
(1979) suggests that advocacy ought to be considered as part 
of a nursing role.
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Curtin proposes the following definition of nursing:
The end or purpose of nursing is the welfare of 
other human beings. This end is not a scientific end, 
but rather a moral end. That is, it involves our 
relationship with other human beings.’ ... Therefore 
nursing is a moral art’, she makes the observation 
th a t... ‘Nursing science serves this art.’
Curtin (1979:2)
According to this view, nursing involves the pursuit of 
relationships with other human beings. For Curtin, the 
relationship between nurses and patients should embrace the 
aim of promoting good health and has to be considered in the 
context of communication between nurse and patient, the level 
of information offered to the patient.
For Curtin (1979), nurses are considered as favourably placed 
among health care professionals, in that they are in a position to 
view people from a patient-centred perspective. Nurses are able 
to view their patients as human beings with different needs, as 
they spend a lot of time with patients and are able to gauge their 
progress. This enables the nurse to gain knowledge of a patient 
and their values and can be linked to Kohnke’s (1982) 
perspective of advocacy, as an act of ‘loving and caring’.
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6a Kohnke’s Perspective of Advocacy
From Kohnke’s (1982) perspective, advocacy is considered as
an act of ‘loving and caring’, according to her:
‘Loving and caring are not automatic; they involve 
an act of free will, a choice of a way to behave and 
to see ourselves in relation to others. Some say that 
loving and caring require a self-imposed discipline; 
others say that they result from a natural gift. But as 
is true of all disciplines and gifts, one must learn 
how to use them, not only for the sake of others but 
also for one’s own sake.’
Kohnke (1982: viii)
Kohnke’s (1982) reference to ‘loving and caring’ may appear to 
be rather paternalistic in nature. However, her use of the term 
ought to be considered in the context of her view regarding the 
previously described role of an advocate, which emphasizes 
support for decisions that are made by a patient. For Kohnke 
(1982), the basic requirement for a person undertaking an 
advocate's role rests on their motivation to offer support for a 
patient. With reference to a supporting role, an advocate should 
be able to understand and empathise with the patient and it is 
in this context that Kohnke appears to use the terms ‘love and 
care’.
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With reference to her interpretation of loving and caring as a 
‘natural gift’, Kohnke (1982:viii) suggests that we are not born 
with ability to love and care, for if the ability to love and care 
were inborn; it would be common to all humans. The point is 
made that individuals need to make choices with regard to their 
self-perception and behaviour towards each other. According to 
Kohnke (1982), people take on a role as advocate because of 
an experience that they have had with others, it may also be 
acquired through the process of learning as it is considered a 
valuable and right thing to do. Kohnke (1982) suggests that the 
act of loving and caring are not automatic and universal, they 
have to be learned. For Kohnke (1982), part of the learning 
process relates to ‘value clarification’, described in the following 
section.
6b Value Clarification
Kohnke (1982) considers value clarification, when the advocate 
seeks to explore the values held by a patient that can be used 
to form the basis of a rational action, an emphasis should be 
placed on the patient's perspective. A patient who has been 
given adequate and accurate information should be in a position 
to make decisions concerning his or her welfare and treatment
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and he or she is more likely to believe a person who offers 
sufficient accurate information.
Kohnke's (1982) notion of value clarification refers to an 
exploration of the patient's values by an advocate, rather than 
merely describing a situation and exploring the available options 
with the patient. The advocate does not normally seek to attack 
the decision itself, however, by making a reference to the values 
of a patient, the advocate may undermine the decision making 
process. For example, the patient may fear pain and an 
emphasis by the advocate on the painful nature of a procedure 
may persuade the patient to refuse the investigation or 
treatment.
For Kohnke (1982), the advocate may use value clarification as 
a basis from where a rationale could be formed. The application 
of value clarification by an advocate would relate to an 
assumption that through experience and training, they have a 
superior knowledge to that of the patient and would be in a 
position to provide an effective explanation with regard to the 
patient’s illness and treatment. This may lead an advocate to 
judge that a patient should make a decision with regard to their
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treatment and welfare. However, there is an emphasis by 
Kohnke (1982) that the prime consideration ought not to rest on 
whether the patient makes a decision that complies with the 
advocate’s judgement. She also suggests that the advocate 
should be aware there is a possibility that he or she may affect a 
patient’s decision-making process, with the aim of preventing 
such action.
Kohnke (1982) suggests that value clarification and subtle 
manipulation are similar in concept, with an implication that 
when acting as an advocate and seeking to clarify a patient's 
values, one should be aware of the danger of subtle 
manipulation. She offers support for the idea that the advocate 
should fully inform the patient concerning their problem, likely 
treatment, possible outcomes and available options and an 
emphasis is placed on the need for a full discussion between 
the advocate and patient. Value clarification, as a concept, 
concerns the advocate’s relationship with a patient in terms of 
acknowledging and identifying their values that enables the 
patient to be offered an adequate level of support.
42
Gadow (1980) also suggests that the general concept of 
advocacy refers to the notion of one person helping another to 
clarify their preferences. In this context, the term advocate could 
be applied to a nurse who helps a patient to think through their 
decision and the term 'advocacy' refers to the assistance of a 
patient to exercise their freedom to make a decision that 
accurately reflects their interests. In order to gauge accurately 
the interests of patients, it would be useful to consider their 
wants and needs.
6c Wants and Needs
Teasdale offers a basis from where the ‘wants’ and ‘needs’ of a 
client can be considered:
‘ ... the starting point for all forms of advocacy is 
what individuals ‘want’ as opposed to what they are 
thought to ‘need.’ This distinction places clients at 
the centre of the advocacy process. In contrast, the 
word ‘need’ carries the connotation of outsiders 
deciding what is right for clients.’
Teasdale (1998:39)
Teasdale's (1998) aim is to look at the different types of wants 
that clients may have and how they may be expressed and to 
offer some practical advice concerning assessment of these.
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The discussion includes advice with regard to assessment of 
wants and contains suggestions for the avoidance of certain 
situations. This is intended as advice for those who wish to take 
on the role of advocate. Written examples of advocacy are used 
to illustrate the relevant points and an emphasis is placed on the 
aim of defining advocacy based on wants, rather than the 
perceived needs of clients. It would be helpful, at this point, to 
look at instrumental and expressive needs.
6d Instrumental and Expressive Needs 
Teasdale (1998:22) identifies an individual’s needs in 
instrumental and expressive terms. Instrumental needs are 
those that relate to the practicalities of everyday life as for 
example, financial support and access to health care. 
Expressive needs are those that are more personal for example, 
concerning friendship, security and love. These principles have 
been applied through the establishment of an independent 
advocacy movement in the United Kingdom that has specific 
emphasis on areas like learning disability and mental health. 
Teasdale (1998) links this to a discussion of the British 
perspective of ‘independent advocacy’. I will now offer a
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description of the difference and similarities between needs and 
wants.
The perceived needs of clients tend to have a firmer basis than 
those of wants, as needs are often acknowledged as formed 
from some sort of physical or psychological requirement by a 
client. Some examples offered, are the perceived need for pain 
relief, or a patient’s apparent need for counselling following a 
traumatic psychological episode. By contrast, wants are 
sometimes related to the wishes of a patient that may be 
transitory and based on a preference or whim. However at other 
times, wants may have a firm physiological or psychological 
basis as for example, the requirement for food or the formation 
of some form of interpersonal relationship. At these times, the 
potential occurs for the merging of wants and needs. Having 
considered the potential wants and needs of a client, I will offer 
a description of Teasdale’s account of Citizen or Independent 
Advocacy.
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7 Citizen or Independent Advocacy
Teasdale (1998) considers the terms ‘citizen’ and ‘independent’ 
advocacy as interchangeable.
With reference to citizen advocacy, according to Teasdale:
‘Citizen advocacy originated in the USA, emerging 
from their strong libertarian tradition with its 
emphasis on the rights of the individual. In the UK it 
is more frequently termed independent advocacy.’
Teasdale (1998:22)
He offers the suggestion that any person acting as citizen 
advocate should be neutral and should not receive payment. 
The aim of this is to give an advocate verifiable independence, 
to enable him or her to speak up for people who, for whatever 
reason, are unable to speak for themselves. For Teasdale 
(1998), people have differing needs, which ought to be 
acknowledged by a person acting as an advocate.
Teasdale (1998:105-112) refers to situations where problems 
may arise through a lack or break in communication. Although 
these problems are relatively easy to overcome, the differing 
perceptions can lead to the development of confrontation 
between the client and the service provider. The junior
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professional as a newly qualified nurse, may find difficulty in 
offering the client effective representation owing to the 
professional's lack of experience, credibility and power within an 
organisation. The use of an independent advocate may help in 
these situations. This should allow the junior professional to 
register his or her concerns with the advocate and at the same 
time shelter him or her from potential conflict with an 
organisation as an employer.
It would seem appropriate, when considering Teasdale’s (1998) 
UK perspective of advocacy, to start with his account of 
independent advocacy.
The independent advocate would normally be independent of an 
organization caring for a client and would not have the 
employee or associated professional obligations. Reference is 
made to how the type of adopted advocacy may have an effect 
and the consequences that ought to be considered prior to an 
assumption of such a role. For example, will the advocate seek 
to inform and support a mentally competent client or will the role 
involve the advocate giving a voice to a client that finds it hard to 
speak and be heard? There are limitations concerning
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independent advocacy and these are discussed in Teasdale 
(1998).
He discusses the parameters of effective independent 
advocacy, including the referral of clients to an independent 
advocate who should have a certain level of experience. This 
may occur in different ways, for example, the client may seek 
self-referral, or be referred by someone other than the client, or 
the client’s need for advocacy may originate from the presence 
of a problem that requires some form of support. Confidentiality 
should be maintained with regard to a referral and it is 
acknowledged that the client has the right to refuse the offer of 
advocacy.
Teasdale (1998) holds that an advocate should be an adult with 
sufficient experience, for example, as identified in the 
Lincolnshire Link, described in Teasdale (1998:105-111). The 
advocate should be able to act in the interests of the client, in 
accordance with their wishes and the person should be kept 
informed. The advocate should also carry out the client’s 
instructions, be impartial and be able to maintain confidentiality.
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Teasdale (1998) also offers a practical application of 
independent advocacy, as described next.
The concept of independent advocacy is discussed in the terms 
of the British National Health Service, where the structures may 
make it difficult for the advocate to gain access to those who 
have influence and power. The funding of an independent 
advocacy service may be problematic, for example, when 
finance originates from a body like the National Health Service, 
where there may be a perceived conflict of interest. There could 
be an expectation that an independent advocate should not act 
or encourage any action against the funding organisation, for 
such an action could lead to the threat of sanctions (for 
example, the potential for withdrawal of financial support). The 
alternative of voluntary funding rests on the continuing good will 
of people who are asked to donate a portion of their wealth. This 
form of funding does not offer a security of tenure as it may 
fluctuate, owing to the ability of individuals to provide a 
donation. Teasdale (1998) offers an application of citizen 
advocacy to the ‘Lincolnshire Link’ (Teasdale 1998:105-111), as 
illustrated.
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A requirement for advocacy was identified by parents of children 
with learning disabilities in Lincolnshire where the parents 
wanted more independent forward planning and support than 
the local social services were willing to provide. The Link’ 
sought charitable status and was able to provide a generic 
service for these people. It is at this point that Teasdale (1998) 
applies independent (or citizen) advocacy to The Link’.
The role of independent or citizen advocacy normally involves a 
one-to-one relationship between the advocate and the client. 
For this view of advocacy to be effective, there is a need to 
establish a long-term relationship between the advocate and 
client. The advocate’s aim is to help the client promote his or her 
view and if necessary, to speak for the person. The advocate’s 
loyalty normally rests with the client and he/she is motivated to 
offer a vigorous defence with respect to the person's rights. This 
occurs in the case of the Citizen Advocacy Lincolnshire Link 
where the advocates are volunteers from the local community.
With reference to independent advocacy bodies such as The 
Lincolnshire Link’, there is an emphasis by the advocate on the 
need to promote client support through the formation of a
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partnership. The form of this partnership depends on the nature 
and development of the relationship between advocate and 
client. It is normally desirable that the relationship should be 
voluntary, long-term and formed on a basis of trust. The 
independent body should also be aware of the needs of an 
organization that has a responsibility for a client's care and a 
relationship ought to develop between the independent 
advocate and organization, with the aim of facilitating effective 
communication. The professionals involved may become 
defensive, for they could perceive the involvement of the 
independent advocate as an implied criticism of their role. For 
example, in the case of nurses where part of their role could be 
perceived as acting in the client’s interests and where such a 
role may be interpreted by the nurses as being part of their 
professional obligation to act as advocate.
The independent advocate can check that a basic level of care 
is provided and that professional standards are not 
compromised. In this respect he or she could be considered as 
occupying a strong position, as he / she will not have an 
employment contract that may require the employee to voice 
concerns to the employer in preference to the media. Having
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given an account of Citizen or Independent Advocacy, I will now 
turn to Collective and Group Advocacy.
8 Collective and Group Advocacy
For Teasdale (1998:21-38), collective advocacy is sometimes 
referred to as ‘class advocacy’ and involves organizing a group 
of people to campaign for a cause. Examples of these groups 
are 'MENCAP' and ‘MIND’ (Teasdale 1998:23); these are major 
charities working with vulnerable people with the aim of 
improving their quality of life. The aim of these bodies through 
publicity is to have an effect on social policy. Other 
organizations such as 'Public Concern at Work' (Teasdale 
1998:15) may draw attention to their cause through the use of 
whistle blowing, as described later in the thesis.
Teasdale (1998) describes a related concept as group 
advocacy. This refers to an advocate acting on behalf of groups 
of people rather than for an individual. An example of this is 
given with regard to a children’s nurse acting to prevent closure 
of a children’s ward during the Christmas period, the enactment 
of this form of advocacy may cause a problem for the hospital 
authority wishing to close the ward for financial reasons. This
52
demonstrates that group advocacy is likely to occur over issues 
of substance and this could be related to the power that is held 
and exercised by the organizations and individuals concerned.
A further example relates to the observations of Sang and 
O’Brien (1984), who offer an example of The Advocacy 
Alliance’ as such a body that offers advocacy for people with 
learning disabilities. This enables a potentially vulnerable patient 
or client to make known their preferences so that decisions 
made, can accurately reflect the needs of a client. In this way, 
the ‘Advocacy Alliance’, as described by Sang and O’Brien 
(1984), can act to empower the client. It would seem appropriate 
to look at power and advocacy.
8a Power and Advocacy
Teasdale (1998) does not offer an overt definition of nursing. 
Instead, Malin and Teasdale (1991:657-658) refer to ‘caring’ 
and ‘empowerment’ involved in the role of nursing. For 
Teasdale (1998) ‘power’ is an important aspect of his definition 
of advocacy.
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Teasdale offers a definition of advocacy in the following terms:
‘Advocacy is about power. It means influencing 
those who have power on behalf of those who do 
not. The dictionary definition of an advocate is 
one who pleads, intercedes or speaks for another.
In other words, advocacy is required when people 
feel vulnerable and powerless.’
Teasdale (1998:1)
He offers a discussion with regard to the need for nurses to 
consider patient advocacy as part of their role, as nurses can 
help patients to understand their problems. The patients could 
be provided with a level of knowledge that would empower them, 
when making decisions concerning their welfare. Therefore for 
Teasdale, the act of advocacy is perceived as an important part 
of the nursing role.
According to Teasdale’s (1998) definition of advocacy, he 
makes the link between advocacy and power. This has occurred 
because advocacy is often discussed in terms of power 
relationships between people and is related to collective or 
group advocacy. According to Teasdale (1998), the role of 
advocate is based on a premise that a person who makes the 
choice to act as an advocate, as for example a nurse, who is 
able to offer support to a weaker party, as a patient. The doctor
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may be perceived as a representative of a powerful party, the
medical establishment.
Handy (1985) proposes five different types of power. These are:
(1) 'Physical': referring to the use of physical power or 
coercion; it is normally an unacceptable use of 
power. Physical power also includes verbal 
aggression, for example, the employment of a 
hectoring tone to overcome an opposition.
(2) 'Resource power', where this refers to the 
possession of a resource that can be useful in the 
influence of others. The person who has access to 
the resources has the power to offer or withhold 
them and this can range from allowing the use of a 
telephone to the sanction of resources such as 
finance.
(3) 'Power of position' which is linked to 'resource power' 
and refers to the position that individuals hold within 
an organisation or hierarchy. A person at a senior
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level in the organisation may have access and 
control of resources that might be of use to the 
advocate.
(4) Fourth, 'expert power' refers to the power of
expertise or specialist experience where a small
difference in expert power between people can give
power to one person over another. For example, the 
nurse’s knowledge of the ward routine confers power 
towards the nurse rather than the patient who does 
not normally know the routine.
(5) 'Personal power' refers to personality and charisma 
and it can be linked to position power and the 
character of those who have power in an 
organisation. When considering ‘power’, there is a 
need to consider the relationships between people 
with different levels of power.
Teasdale (1998) discusses the potential occurrence of a power 
imbalance between patients and doctors. It is acknowledged 
that a healthy person has little need for an advocate in their lives
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and that most people are able to cope well with their affairs. 
However, when admission to hospital is required, an imbalance 
of power normally occurs between the patient and health care 
staff. This may be caused by the presence of illness in a patient, 
who may experience a loss of control over their body. For 
example, the patient's loss of consciousness has implications 
for a patient's ability to communicate, or the presence of a 
physically debilitating disease, causing the patient to be 
dependent on other people. Owing to their physical or 
psychological needs, patients normally voluntarily place 
themselves in the care of others, such as nurses.
Due to a patient’s dependence and lack of knowledge 
concerning the health care system, he or she can be considered 
as having an ability to exert less power than the nurse. Patients 
may expect that they should assume a passive role with regard 
to health care professionals and this could be particularly 
prevalent in areas that practice institutionalised care. The 
physiological dependence and psychological expectation of a 
patient can allow the imbalance of power between the health 
care professional and patient to go unchallenged. There are 
examples of established hospital customs constructed by staff,
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patients are often unwilling to criticize professional practice on 
the grounds that the professional must have a good reason for 
what they are doing. This could be reflected by the view held by 
the professional staff, that patients possess insufficient 
knowledge from which to launch an effective criticism of the 
professional and health care organisation. A case can be made 
that an effective response to a patient's lack of empowerment 
should be an encouragement and empowerment to self­
advocate. Having discussed the forms of advocacy I will now 
offer a summary of the chapter.
9 Summary
In chapter two, I have made reference to the differing forms of 
advocacy, namely, self-advocacy, Gadow’s existential 
advocacy, Curtin’s advocacy as a natural role, citizen or 
independent and collective or group advocacy. The common 
theme concerning these forms of advocacy relates to an 
acknowledgement that for clients or patients requiring health 
care to have an effective voice, there is a requirement for some 
form of advocacy. The type of advocacy required is dependent 
on the abilities and needs of the clients or patients and ranges
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from self-advocacy, relating to a patient’s self-determination to 
group or collective advocacy, that may be required by people 
with mental health problems or learning difficulties. In chapter 
three I will consider some professional issues that relate to 
advocacy.
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CHAPTER 3 PROFESSIONAL ISSUES
1 Should a Nurse Take on an Advocacy Role?
The argument that professionals, such as nurses, ought to take 
on an advocacy role has implications for the relationship of 
healthcare professionals with their clients. The act of advocacy 
by the professional tends to be personalized to a particular 
individual or to specific issues that may affect a client. The nurse 
can make the case that he or she is knowledgeable about the 
healthcare system and is likely to be able to communicate with 
influential people. The nurse should also be in the position to 
offer an appropriate and effective response. He or she may 
perceive an obligation to help a patient where required and this 
may be considered as an integral part of a nurse / patient 
relationship. Nurses and patients can be considered as natural 
allies, in that both can be viewed as having less power than 
doctors in the health care system and the patients may feel less 
intimidated by nurses than by doctors.
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1 a Support for an Advocacy Role
All of the five nursing perspectives offer support for an advocacy 
role. According to Gates (1994), nurses spend a large 
proportion of their time with people and are therefore in a 
favourable position to act as an advocate on behalf of their 
patients. Gates (1994) offers the following definition of 
‘advocacy’ that can be readily applied to nursing, as:
The process of befriending and, where necessary, 
representing a patient, client, partner or protege in 
all matters where the nurse’s help is needed, in 
order to protect the rights or promote the interests of 
that person. The practice of advocacy must be 
undertaken in a true partnership, where the nurses 
see these partners as friends and therefore afford 
them the same care and love as they would to any 
of their own friends or relatives.’
Gates (1994:2)
From the above definitions, one can suggest that Gates offers 
support for the concept of advocacy.
Gadow’s (1980) offer of support for an advocacy role is based 
on the fact that a nurse is intimately involved in the twenty-four 
hour care of his or her patients, placing him or her in a strong
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position with regard to the role of patient’s advocate. According 
to Gadow (1980) the nurse occupies a position, where he or she 
can get to know the patient well and to ensure that necessary 
information is given, so that a patient can make decisions 
concerning their treatment.
According to Gadow (1980) the nurse, acting as an advocate, 
ought to form a participative relationship with a patient, with the 
intention of identifying and fully understanding the patient’s 
illness in terms of personal meaning, experience and effect. For 
Gadow (1980), a patient’s self-determination is based on the 
right to do what he or she wishes, so that the patient rather than 
a health care professional makes the decision. As previously 
suggested, Gadow (1980) emphasizes the importance of a 
patient’s self-determination, where this person’s understanding 
of an illness and associated investigations may influence their 
decision concerning the available treatments and their side 
effects. For Gadow (1980), the patient's experience of an illness 
ought to be a major factor in any consideration with regard to 
advocacy.
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According to Gadow (1980), the role of a nurse should include 
that of acting as patient's advocate and advocacy should be 
therefore normally be considered as an ‘existential’ element of a 
nursing role. For her, the role of the nurse should relate to the 
patient’s needs as an individual and she offers the suggestion 
that the role of a nurse as advocate should reflect this 
philosophy. A nurse, who is able to offer a patient information 
and support concerning decisions to be made with regard to his 
or her treatment, may enact this.
Gadow (1980), distinguishes existential advocacy from other 
concepts of advocacy, i.e., that of paternalism and patient’s 
rights. She accepts that, with reference to paternalism and 
advocacy, conflict may occur in health care. For her, the nurse 
must try to reconcile nursing’s traditional support of the patient 
with the expectation by others that nurses should work as 
partners in medicine. This concerns the role of the nurse with 
reference to the view held, that care of patients should be 
comprehensive and personalized. The emphasis is on patient- 
centred care and this is considered as a contrast to a 
concentration on the dysfunction of an organ or system within a 
person as can occur when a patient is labelled according to their
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illness. The view of individualized nursing embraces the intimate 
physical care that is offered, involving the activities that the 
patient would normally carry out for him or herself and the nurse 
may be the first person other than the patient to carry out such 
care. Gadow (1980) considers the nurse as the person among 
the identified health care personnel who is able to view a patient 
as a human being with individual strengths, 
physical/psychological traits and this is seen as a precondition 
for advocacy.
According to Gadow (1980), the philosophical foundation of 
positive existential advocacy is considered as applicable to any 
situation and is regarded as a pre-requisite to the free 
determination of a nurse-patient relationship and the form that 
this relationship should take. Existential advocacy can help 
people to gain a clear understanding about what they want; it 
can also help to clarify the values of those involved in situations 
and to aid decision-making.
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1 b Problems With the Advocacy Role 
Some problems have been identified with regard to an 
advocacy role. Gates’ interpretation of an advocacy role 
appears to represent a potentially large commitment by the 
nurse, in terms of time and emotion and this could be 
considered as unrealistic when one considers the workload of a 
nurse; for example, when working in an acute adult nursing 
area.
Gates (1994), acknowledges that this represents a heavy 
commitment for a nurse, when he suggests that:
‘Because of the commitments of such a partnership 
it may be necessary for a nurse to seek the 
assistance of an independent advocate. Such 
assistance should be sought when the demands of 
professional or employer / employee roles prevent 
nurses from affording their patients the requisite 
degree of care or commitment.’
Gates (1994:2-3)
With regard to nursing professionalism and accountability, 
Gates (1994) offers a discussion of the implications of a nurse’s 
advocacy role and he makes an observation that in some 
situations nurses ought to take on an advocacy role. He
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however qualifies this by acknowledging that they should be 
aware of the possible consequences and tensions that may 
arise from such a role and suggests that nurses ought not to be 
placed under pressure to accept this role when it could cause a 
conflict of interest and, or distress.
1c Gates’ Four Principles
Gates (1994) expands on the above, when he identifies four 
principles that a nurse ought to consider when deciding whether 
to undertake the role of advocate. These are:
a) ‘Accept that it may not always be appropriate for the 
nurse to act as advocate.’
Gates (1994:82)
One of the reasons offered by Gates (1994:66-7) for the 
inappropriateness of a nurse acting as a patient’s advocate, is 
that nurses are normally employees of a hospital or other 
organisation and may not be able to be independent of the 
organisation’s interests.
There may also be some dissonance between the nurse and the 
patients in his or her care, for the two parties may come from
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different socio-economic backgrounds and the nurse may even, 
for some reason, take a personal dislike to his or her patient. 
Gates (1994) offers a description of some ethical dilemmas that 
may have an effect on a decision made by a person, with regard 
to whether or not he or she should act as a patient’s advocate.
If a nurse makes a decision not to act as an advocate, this may 
come into conflict with his or her intent to act in a caring manner 
towards a patient. Although the nurse would not wish to actively 
harm a patient, the act of refraining from undertaking the role of 
an advocate could result in the patient’s welfare being 
compromised. Gates (1994:37-41) acknowledges that bodies 
other than nurses may be better placed to act as advocates on 
behalf of clients or patients.
Gates (1994) considers the potential effect of an advocacy role 
on a nurse and this is described in b), when he suggests that 
one should:
b) ‘Recognize that should the nurses act as advocates 
they are likely to experience, with some intensity, a 
range of emotional responses to complex and 
difficult situations.’
Gates (1994:82)
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Gates (1994) acknowledges that a nurse who wishes to take on 
the role of patients’ advocate should be aware of the possible 
emotional effects that this can bring. Gates (1994) accepts the 
importance of adequate preparation for this role.
Gates (1994) offers the suggestion that there ought to be 
support for the advocate, as identified in (c), when he suggests 
that an advocate should:
c) ‘Be prepared to discuss feelings experienced with 
trusted colleagues, or seek professional counselling 
for support.’
Gates (1994:82)
It is important that a person who wishes to act as an advocate 
should know that support is available with the aim that such a 
role can be strengthened.
Gates (1994) notes that the nurse may not always wish, or be 
able to undertake an advocacy role and should be able to 
indicate when this is so. He or she should be able to refer the 
client or patient to an advocacy organisation who may be more 
suited and able to take on the role, as identified in d) where 
Gates (1994) suggests one ought to:
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d) ‘Recognize that there is no need to be fearful about 
or ashamed of not defending a patient’s rights in 
person. The nurse must learn, instead, to refer the 
patient to an independent advocate or advocacy 
scheme, should difficulties be experienced.’
Gates (1994:82)
Having identified Gates’ four principles, with regard to nurses 
taking on the role of advocate with regard to their patients, an 
argument related to the concept of advocacy can be made on 
the basis that the notion of advocacy can be considered as 
questionable, will now be discussed.
1 d The Coherence of Advocacy
Allmark and Klarzynski (1992) hold the view that ‘advocacy’ can 
be considered as a questionable notion and nurses may, 
regardless of the requirement of their patients, practise 
advocacy. Such patients are considered by the authors to be 
pawns in a professional power game that occurs between the 
nurse and doctor. The nurse's employer may hold a perception 
that the nurse lacks the power, knowledge and skills that are 
required of an effective advocate. From this base it can be 
deduced that the nurse as a professional, may find it difficult to 
maintain an objective stance when acting as advocate. There
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will be an obligation by the nurse to work within certain rules and 
regulations set by the employer that may have an effect on the 
nurse's advocacy role. In this sense the nurse cannot be 
considered as neutral, for there is the potential that there may 
be an unwitting collusion by the nurse with the employer’s 
policies regarding the care of and communication with patients. 
This is based on the fact that the nurse is employed by the 
same organization that has a responsibility for the client’s health 
care. There ought also to be a consideration with regard to the 
time limit that a nurse can spend on forming a relationship with a 
client, as this can restrict the nurse’s ability to act as an effective 
advocate. Teasdale (1998) offers a contrasting view to that of 
Allmark and Klarzynski (1992) and this is identified as the 
'middle position', as described next.
1e The Middle Position
Teasdale, et al (1998:24) points to a middle position with 
reference to nurses and their role as patient’s advocate where 
he accepts that the nurse’s role as advocate is linked to 
possession of power. The personal qualities of the nurse, such 
as determination and the ability to tolerate uncertainty, are 
considered as important and there is a requirement for the nurse
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to attain a certain level of knowledge and skill with regard to 
advocacy. Nurses, through a motivation to care, are often willing 
to adopt a role as an advocate without a careful consideration of 
the consequences. The use of advocacy agencies that are 
independent of the employer and are considered as neutral 
ought to be entertained. The effectiveness of advocacy can be 
related to the amount of power delegated from the patient and 
employer to the nurse. Having discussed differing views of 
advocacy, Teasdale (1998) is able to offer a description of a 
way forward.
Teasdale (1998) suggests that the fact that advocacy is 
required by clients, demonstrates that society is far from 
perfect. The need for advocacy by sections of people, for 
example, those with learning disabilities, the elderly and those 
with mental health problems, serves as an indicator that the 
provision of services by society are sometimes inappropriate or, 
at the very least, less than adequate. A power difference may 
be present between clients, their relatives, carers, the health 
care professionals and those who run the services and it is 
accepted that the person who voluntarily acts as an advocate 
may have to consider the potential risks that are involved.
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1f Further Negative Factors
Teasdale (1998) acknowledges that there are risks associated 
with the role of advocate, and that these risks relate to the 
potential for the occurrence of conflict between professionals, 
for example, doctors or nurses and their patients. With reference 
to whistle blowing and the professional, there is the potential risk 
to a career (as illustrated by the Pink case-study in part two of 
the thesis). Many health professions, including nurses, have 
codes of conduct that are designed to protect the patient's 
interests. The code may be also used to protect the 
professional, who holds the belief that he or she has a duty to 
act as 'whistle blower' in the interests of his or her patients. 
Proposals were made by the 1997-2001 Labour Government to 
give employees certain 'whistle blowing' powers in the public 
interest. This concerned, for example, the presence of a 
dangerous practice that could not be reversed or modified by an 
appeal to the management of an organization.
According to Teasdale (1998), there are different degrees of 
risk. For example, a low-level risk could relate to communication 
between health care professionals. A high level risk may relate 
to a nurse’s perception of the need to act as a whistle-blower on
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behalf of a group of elderly patients, while at the same time 
risking his or her position as an employee (as described in the 
Pink case-study). The nurse who is employed and at the same 
time wishes to undertake the role of advocate would normally 
have a degree of obligation toward her employer, who is 
charged with the responsibility of providing patient care. The 
nurse cannot therefore be considered as wholly independent of 
her employing organization, as in the case of an independent 
advocate. Therefore, before the nurse is able to accept a role as 
advocate, he or she should consider how the attendant risks of 
advocacy could be reduced, as described next.
Teasdale (1998) proposes that the advocate should attempt to 
forecast the possible occurrence of risk that may cloud the 
advocate’s judgement concerning the issues that are involved. 
Teasdale (1998) offers a suggestion that an advocate ought to 
adopt an assertive and non-aggressive approach with the aim of 
facilitating an effective handling of a difficult situation. He also 
makes the point that he or she ought to forecast the possible 
risks prior to deciding to take on an advocate's role. An example 
can be given of a patient having an unreasonable expectation of 
the health service, as for instance, that the service should
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provide a twenty-four hour companion service for one patient in 
a NHS ward. Teasdale (1998) offers suggestions for steps that 
can be taken to assess and then facilitate a reduction of such 
risks.
Teasdale (1998:14) makes reference to the act of whistle 
blowing, where it is thought that the continuation of an action or 
policy may result in individual harm. The advocate may feel that 
it is necessary to stop a policy or action and, if unable to do so, 
may be faced with the dilemma as whether or not to place the 
information in the public domain, by going to the media. There 
may be a contractual constraint on such an action, for example, 
a contract of employment. This may be used as a basis for the 
discipline and dismissal of an advocate who may be subjected 
to intimidation from colleagues and threats from management 
concerning possible redeployment and promotion prospects. 
Such an act of ‘whistle-blowing’ is related to a professional 
person’s level of conduct and accountability, as illustrated by 
reference to the Pink case, described later in the thesis.
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With reference to Gadow’s existential advocacy perspective, the 
practice of existential advocacy involves the application of 
resources that are at the disposal of the professional, as nurses, 
and these are directed towards the patient with the aim of 
meeting their needs. There should be an emphasis on the 
requirement of a nurse to view a patient from a holistic 
perspective, with the aim of designing appropriate care, the 
nurse is perceived as normally the best person in the health 
care system to deal with the patient. The nature of nursing care, 
as a sustained and intimate occurrence, offers an opportunity for 
the employment of a nurse’s repertoire of skills and abilities. I 
will now offer a consideration of the differences that may occur 
in the Professional-Patient relationship.
2 Professional-Patient Relationships
Gadow (1980) identifies three main areas where differences can 
occur in the professional-patient relationship. These are: 1) the 
focus: 2) the intensity of the situation and: 3) the perspectives 
held by both people.
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The focus refers to the patient’s perception of their 
problem and effects that this has on his or her life. 
The patient’s view is necessarily self-orientated, as 
he or she will obviously be the person most closely 
involved. In contrast, the focus of the professional is 
normally away from the self, for the professional 
would typically be interested in the patient’s welfare, 
rather than his or her own.
The intensity of the situation refers to the immediacy 
of the problem and the distress that can be caused 
by it. As previously suggested, the patient is the 
person most affected by the symptoms of a disease 
and the possible side effects of treatment. The 
professional typically feels a sense of urgency but 
does not experience the problem first hand. 
However the professional may demonstrate a level 
of concern and should be able to reflect on how to 
alleviate the patient’s distress.
With reference to the different perspectives held by 
the patient and professional, the patient is
personally involved with the disease through their 
experience. The professional is externally involved, 
through caring and there may be a level of 
emotional involvement with regard to the patient.
The differences with regard to the above three areas with 
reference to the relationship between the patient and the nurse 
concern three areas regarding:
a) The ‘focus’; in terms of a patient this refers to his or 
her experience of illness, for example, pain and the 
patient’s psychological concern regarding an illness 
and its effects. This may lead to the patient having 
to concentrate on his or her illness at the expense of 
other everyday activities. The nurse at work 
however, has an obligation to concentrate on the 
care of his or her patients and to set aside personal 
problems.
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With regard to:
b) The ‘intensity’; the patient may experience a lot of
pain as part of his or her illness; this would lead to a 
requirement by the patient for some form of 
analgesia. The nurse would not be able to feel the 
patient’s pain, but should be able to appreciate how 
much pain the patient is likely to suffer and be in a 
position to offer analgesia as pain relief, also to 
show empathy towards the patient.
The related idea of:
c) ‘Different perspectives’ refers to the internal
experience of the patient who is most directly
involved with the illness and this is a contrast to the 
external perception of the nurse. The patient often 
acknowledges that the nurse is willing and able to 
give care that should benefit the patient. The nurse 
may be affected by the condition of the patient, for 
example, when the patient’s death is predicted.
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An acknowledgement of the above three points can be 
considered as desirable, when one considers the differences in 
the nurse-patient relationship, as the development of this 
relationship occurs. For Gadow (1983), this is considered as an 
important basis for the occurrence of advocacy as she lays an 
emphasis on nurses valuing and offering their patients respect 
and this is developed with reference to ‘existential advocacy’. 
Having previously considered the differences in the 
professional-patient relationship. I will now consider the factors 
that ought to be considered by an advocate.
3 Points to be Considered
Teasdale (1998) offers both an encouragement and a warning 
to those who wish act as patient’s advocate. Teasdale (1998) 
acknowledges that institutions charged with the responsibility of 
providing health care may act to disempower their clients. He 
accepts that although unintentional, this may still occur and also 
warns of the potential occurrence of personal and professional 
costs for the nurse who accepts an advocate’s role. He 
acknowledges that the nurse may incur employment costs, 
where a potential for promotion may be reduced. The nurse may 
also experience stress as a result of his or her perception of the
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situation and role in relation to the client for example, he or she 
may suffer internal conflict when the issue concerns a patient for 
which he or she has nursing responsibility.
Gates (1994) acknowledges, as described earlier in this chapter, 
that tensions may occur between a person taking on the role of 
advocate and working as a nurse and that the two roles may be 
mutually exclusive. This may lead to role strain due to the 
different demands made on the nurse by organizational bodies 
such as the employer, the Nursing and Midwifery Council (NMC) 
and individuals such as patients, their relatives and nursing 
colleagues. This may lead to a nurse acknowledging that it may 
not be possible or desirable to take on such a role, for in doing 
so, the nurse may incur personal costs. The possibility of role 
strain has to be considered when one makes a decision whether 
or not to act as an advocate.
Turning to Kohnke’s (1982:9) perspective, there are three levels 
of advocacy; the first refers to the role of a patient and self- 
advocacy; the second, to the advocate acting in support of a 
patient or client. The third level of advocacy refers to the larger 
community, of which the advocate is part. This level of advocacy
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can be interpreted as meaning any action that the advocate may 
wish to take with the aim of giving voice to and supporting 
concerns of people in the community. For example, The 
Advocacy Alliance, as described by Sang and O’Brien (1984), 
can be applied to vulnerable groups such as elderly or people 
with mental health problems that are living in the community. 
Alternatively, the role could relate to the ability of an advocate to 
make a case, where the advocate is a professional person with 
good communicative skills who is likely to obtain the required 
result. This has implications for the professional who takes on 
the role of advocate as a nurse and is related to the advocate's 
action role.
4 An Action Role
According to Kohnke (1982), the advocate should engage in an 
action role to support a patient’s decision. There is an 
acknowledgement that this role does not require that the 
advocate should approve of the patient’s decision. The patient 
should be made aware that he might experience pressure from 
others to change decisions that he may not wish to change. It 
should be made clear to the patient that he or she should not
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give in to those pressures unless he or she wishes. The 
consequences for the advocate may relate to the possible 
interference in the actions of others, who are trying to lessen the 
patient’s confidence in his own ability to make decisions.
5 Internal Contradictions
As a professional the nurse may possess internal contradictions 
and according to Gadow (1980), the two contradictions that 
obstruct self-determination in health care for nurses, are the 
differences between a practitioner’s personal and professional 
involvement in patient care. The personal involvement of a 
practitioner as for example, a nurse, refers to his or her 
individual belief and feelings toward a patient and the care that 
is planned. The professional aspects of nursing relate to a 
specific code of behaviour and standards that are expected. A 
nurse may experience internal contradictions with regard to the 
welfare and care of a patient that could be related to the nurse’s 
personal preferences and professional obligations. This could 
affect the nurse’s ability to make decisions and therefore must 
consequently have an effect on a patient. The prerequisite of a 
successful adoption and application of existential advocacy by 
nurses rests on the basis that any internal contradictions
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relating to personal and professional issues concerning the 
nurse have to be overcome. The existence of internal 
contradiction can lead to an alienation of the self and personal 
confusion, this may result in the nurse becoming engrossed in 
personal and professional considerations concerning the care of 
the patient and may potentially affect this care. As intimated 
previously, the personal and professional considerations that a 
nurse has to acknowledge, do not always rest comfortably with 
each other.
Gadow (1980) perceives the potential for an occurrence of a 
dichotomy between the nurse and his or her patient; the 
professions normally emphasize that their members should 
behave in a particular manner towards patients and normally 
personal relationships between nurses and patients are 
discouraged and regarded as unprofessional. From a traditional 
point of view the personal and professional roles are aspects 
that a practitioner should keep segregated. There is an 
emphasis on the professional avoiding personal interactions; 
this relates to the professional’s expression of personal feelings 
or values when working with a patient whose lifestyle the 
professional as an individual does not approve. From this point
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of view, it is suggested by Gadow (1983) that professional 
individuals can be considered as interchangeable, in that all of 
these people should be able to articulate a professional 
response to situations that would normally lead to a lack of 
expression of their individuality.
A further view articulates an idea, that the role of a professional 
is one of many that is normally undertaken by people in their 
lives, for a person normally exhibits different facets of 
personhood according to the assumption of a specific role. It 
can be said that professionals exhibit some personal behaviour 
through the mere articulation of their role. This could be 
interpreted with reference to the professional’s abilities in 
relation to that role, as for example; the humanity demonstrated 
by a professional whose role includes a management function. 
Having considered some of the tensions that can occur between 
a nurse's personal and professional role, I will now consider the 
differences of perspectives held by the nurse as a professional 
and that of a patient.
For Gadow (1980), the difference in personal perspectives 
between that of the nurse and patient relate to the body rather
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than emotion. The patient personally experiences his or her 
body and the associated perceptions that arise from it and this 
leads to the formation of subjective perceptions, whereas the 
nurse as an outsider normally experiences the body of a patient 
from an objective and scientific point of view.
6 A Practical Application
Gadow (1980) offers a description of a patient's gynaecological 
examination. From the patient’s lay perspective, the examination 
is intensely personal and related to the patient's notion of 
privacy, therefore any attempt to examine this area of the body 
may be perceived by the patient as an invasion of privacy. The 
nurse's professional perspective would normally account for a 
patient's examination as a necessary clinical procedure; the 
nurse would typically take an impersonal view of the patient’s 
body during examination that is based on a view that this 
represents a malfunctioning structure. The nurse would also 
typically consider the patient’s embarrassment as a natural 
consequence of such a clinical examination and scant attempt 
may be made to lessen the patient’s embarrassment, apart from 
the normally acknowledged convention of maintaining the 
patient's modesty by concealing the appropriate parts of the
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body. Further embarrassment that may be experienced by a 
patient would typically be considered as normal during this type 
of procedure and the nurse could assure the patient of the 
routine nature of such an examination. As previously described, 
the patient may experience a contradiction between his or her 
own personal perception and feelings towards his or her body 
and that of the professional undertaking the examination. It 
would seem pertinent at this stage to offer a discussion as to 
what is meant by 'private', (as applied to the patient), and 'public' 
(as applied to the nurse).
Gadow (1983:51) links the nurse's experience concerning the 
potential for his or her personal and professional involvement 
with the patient, to a separation of the patient’s body into 
'private' and 'public'. The 'private' concept of the body refers to 
the personal knowledge and experiences of a patient and the 
'public' concept relates to the public facets of the body. An 
assumption has been made, that the nurse’s personal 
involvement with her patient could affect her function as a 
professional. There has also been an acknowledgement that the 
patient’s subjective view of the body could act as a contradiction 
with regard to a clinical perspective of a body as an object.
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The nurse may view the patient from an objective perspective, 
even though the nurse holds a perception of a patient as a 
person. For example, the nurse could perceive Mrs Jones, the 
patient in her care, as a person. However, from a nursing 
perspective, the operation that Mrs Jones requires may reduce 
her to the woman who is the fourth patient on the operating 
theatre list for an abdominal operation. The nurses’ view of their 
patients in professional and objective terms, rather than their 
perception of the patient as a person, can be linked to the 
resources, nature and organization of the Health Service. 
Typically, this has an effect on the amount of time that nurses 
are able to spend with their patients. This is also linked to the 
expectations that nurses make of themselves and others, 
through their appeal to the code of conduct (NMC 2002), which 
acts as a regulatory influence with regard to their role. Should a 
nurse exhibit over-familiar behaviour towards a patient, this 
may be perceived as crossing the line that divides professional 
from personal relationships that can be difficult to identify, 
leading to a discussion concerning a professional's access to 
the body of a patient. I will now consider the case that can be 
made for and against a nurse acting as patients’ advocate.
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7 The Arguments Regarding Advocacy
There are arguments for and against the nurse taking on a 
patient’s advocate role and some of these will be discussed 
next.
7a The Case For Patient Advocacy
As previously described, all the authors make the point that they 
consider patient advocacy should be an integral part of the 
nurse’s role and there are three reasons for this. First, with regard 
to the work of Gates (1994) and Teasdale (1998), the United 
Kingdom Central Council for Nursing and Midwifery (latterly 
replaced by the Nursing and Midwifery Council), offers support for 
the role of the nurse as patient’s advocate. The members of the 
Council have formulated a Code of Conduct (2002, see appendix 
2) that normally reflects the moral beliefs with regard to the role of 
the nurse as a patient’s supporter and carer, that are typically 
held by a nurse as an individual, and also nursing as a 
profession.
Second, the nurse, when caring for patient typically possesses 
knowledge of the health care system, its function and normally 
has a good clinical knowledge of patients in his or her care. This
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enables the nurse to facilitate an effective interpretation and 
clarification of information by the nurse for his or her patient and 
this can be considered as forming a sound basis for an advocacy 
role.
The third reason refers to the fact that a nurse can be considered 
as removed from his or her patient’s relatives and therefore can 
maintain a level of impartiality and objectivity with regard to both 
the patient and relatives. These reasons offer a sound basis from 
where the case can be made for nurses taking on a role as 
patient’s advocate. In contrast, I will now take this opportunity to 
consider the case that can be made against nurses taking on the 
role as patient’s advocate.
7b The Case Against Patient Advocacy
There are three reasons that can be identified with regard to
nurses declining to accept a patient advocacy role.
First, the nurse may lack a personal moral obligation to act on a 
patient’s behalf as for example, when a nurse is caring for a 
patient who has problems that the nurse considers as self- 
inflicted as in a suicide attempt, or a patient who has HIV due to
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unprotected sexual intercourse. This could be linked to a nurse’s 
lack of knowledge concerning these problems that may lead a 
nurse to stereotype his or her patients negatively, based on a 
lack of understanding with regard to the cause of a patient’s 
social behaviour and lifestyle. The relatives and friends of a 
patient may have a better understanding of these factors and 
therefore may occupy a stronger position than that of the nurse, 
with regard to acting as patient’s advocate.
Second, the nurse is normally employed and therefore cannot 
be considered as neutral, for the nurse would have certain moral 
and legal obligations to her employer. One such obligation could 
be that the nurse should make known her concerns with regard 
to patient care only to his or her employer, rather than 
publicising them in the press. This would have implications for 
the nurse who considers that it has become necessary to 
‘whistle-blow’ after attempts to use the conventional channels of 
communication with his or her employer have failed.
Third, when undertaking the role of advocate, the nurse runs a 
personal and professional risk in terms of disciplinary and 
promotional consequences. For example, when a nurse
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perceives that there is a need to ‘whistle-blow’ regarding the 
resources that are available for patient care and standards of 
nursing care that can be offered. The nurse who attempts to 
‘whistle-blow’ may risk an adverse reaction from an employer at 
a professional and personal level, for example, being passed 
over for promotion and having his or her place of work in the 
clinical areas moved with the aim that the nurse should leave 
employment in that organisation. A further risk relates to the 
assumption of a nurse’s rescuing role of a patient coupled with 
an associated risk of paternalism. Similarly, when he or she is 
caring for a non-competent patient, the nurse ought also to 
consider whether an advocacy role is appropriate. Such a 
patient would not normally be able to articulate his or her 
preferences, decisions and therefore the nurse acting as 
advocate could not ensure the absence of paternalism with 
regard to any decision that is made, whatever the nurse’s 
motivation. It would seem pertinent at this stage to offer a 
discussion of the advocacy role.
7c A Discussion of an Advocacy Role
The underlying justification for the assumption by a nurse of an
advocate’s role has been previously identified and has
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implications for the nursing role. If a nurse does not take on the 
responsibility of acting as patients’ advocate, this may be left to 
others who may consider such an action as part of their role, as 
for example, doctors and administrators. These people may not 
possess a nurse’s breadth of knowledge concerning the patient 
and his or her care. The nurse typically possesses a certain 
level of skill in dealing with people, including an ability to sense 
when patients may want to know every detail about their illness 
and when it may be sensible to leave such information to a later 
and more pertinent time. In this way the nurse’s actions may 
lessen the risk of strong paternalism and help to create the 
conditions where the interests of the patient can be adequately 
represented.
The rationale offered for the nurse’s reluctance in assuming the 
role of patient’s advocate has been previously described. The 
negative reasons are considered as an insufficient basis on 
which to claim that nurses ought not to take on the role of 
advocacy, as safeguards can be put in place to overcome them 
and adequate responses can be made in defence of the nurse 
acting as an advocate. The reasons and rationale for nurses 
assuming an advocacy role are in my view, sound and ought to
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outweigh the reasons for not taking on such a role. One way of 
calculating whether, in certain circumstances it is appropriate to 
act as advocate, is to use an ‘Advocacy Flow Chart’ as 
described in Teasdale (1998).
8 The Advocacy Flow Chart
Teasdale (1998:33) describes an advocacy flow chart, as 
illustrated in Appendix 1. This can be used to indicate a client’s 
need for advocacy and the decisions that have to be made by 
the potential advocate. It has been constructed with reference to 
an analysis of one hundred and fifty critical incidents as cited by 
health care professionals from their clinical practice. The first 
consideration relates to the client’s ability to identify his own 
wants, if he is able and the question is raised as to whether the 
advocate supports the client’s wants. If the client is unable to 
identify his wants, the chart indicates whether the advocate can 
assume the client’s wants. If the client is unable to express their 
preferences and the potential advocate is unable to ascertain 
the client’s wants and is also unwilling to take risk by assuming 
an advocate’s role, a suggestion is made that the potential 
advocate ought to offer some form of help other than that of 
advocacy. If the potential advocate offers support with regard to
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the client’s wants and is willing to risk advocacy and perceives 
that the client, with help, can make decisions (self-advocate), 
the chart suggests that empowerment of the client ought to 
occur. It is proposed that in the absence of self-advocacy the 
help of an external advocate should be sought. The advocacy 
flow chart embraces the relationship between the advocate and 
client or patient and therefore has, at a certain level, to take into 
account the ethical considerations with regard to advocacy.
9 Summary
Chapter three refers to some professional issues that concern 
the role of advocate and the professional nurse-patient 
relationship. Some positive and negative points are identified 
and explored concerning an advocate’s role. The content of the 
chapter indicates that a nurse should consider the professional 
issues when contemplating whether or not to take on a role as 
an advocate. A clinical application of Gadow’s perspective on 
advocacy is identified, demonstrating the relevance of her ideas 
and the use of an Advocacy Flow Chart is described, where one 
can consider a situation that may require advocacy and assess 
whether or not one should take on a role as advocate. In the
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next chapter, I will consider the strengths and weaknesses of 
the five authors’ positions on advocacy.
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CHAPTER 4 AN EVALUATION OF THE FIVE VIEWS
I will now consider the strengths and weaknesses of the five 
authors’ views of advocacy.
1 Gates’ View
There are two strengths with regard to Gates’ (1994) 
perspective. The first concerns his thoughtful and balanced 
account of the general principles of advocacy that he is able to 
apply to nursing. He cites many illustrations of advocacy, for 
example, with reference to clients who have a learning disability; 
these are used to identify a need for someone to assume an 
advocacy role for a vulnerable client. Gates (1994:41) suggests 
that the successes of advocacy schemes are due to 
commitment, good organization, independent funding and 
effective communication. Gates (1994) also offers a definition, 
description and discussion of advocacy and can therefore be 
considered as a useful nursing resource.
The second strength concerns his acknowledgement that 
advocacy has to be considered in context of a situation that 
exists in the nurses’ place of work and that there is the potential
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for an advocate to incur personal costs. The complexity of 
organizations such as hospitals and the expectation of the 
different people that come in contact with the nurse can 
complicate an advocate's role. In order to offer clarification, 
Gates (1994) has provided an account of advocacy and has 
drawn attention to some of the problems that can occur when 
nurses take an advocacy role. There is a criticism that can be 
made with regard to Gates' (1994) views of advocacy, as 
described next.
From my reading of Gates, (1994) there is one identified 
weakness in his account of advocacy, when he allows for the 
view that nurses may not always be considered as the best 
people to take on the role of advocate on behalf of their 
patients. It could be argued that a person who does not have 
any formal employee links to the organization should be the 
person to assume the role of advocate. However, Gates (1994) 
neglects to suggest that such a 'citizen advocate' or 
'independent' person (as described in Gates, 1994:6) may 
possess and have less access to knowledge than that normally 
held by a nurse. This does not seem to be adequately discussed 
in his book and can be considered as a serious weakness.
97
Having identified this criticism, I will now consider Gates' (1994) 
response. Gates (1994) would suggest that one should also 
consider whether nurses who are employed by an organisation 
and charged with responsibility of caring for a patient or client, 
could run the risk of being viewed as being too close to such a 
body. In this context, an independent advocate could be 
considered as a more appropriate person. The issue concerning 
such an advocate's depth of knowledge could be challenged on 
the basis that an independent advocate should be able to 
support a patient or client, irrespective of their level of technical 
healthcare knowledge. Therefore, the advocate should be free 
of potential influence from a healthcare organisation, as for 
example, an employing hospital. I will now turn to Teasdale’s 
(1998) account.
2 Teasdale’s View
There are four strengths in Teasdale's (1998) account of 
advocacy. First, he is able to demonstrate an understanding of 
the complexity of the term 'advocacy'. He describes how the 
three different views of advocacy, namely; self-advocacy, citizen 
advocacy and collective advocacy may be applied to care
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related situations as they arise, his theory therefore provides a 
firm academic basis for his book. Second, in common with the 
other four theorists, he stresses the importance of respecting 
the preferences of patients. Third, Teasdale (1998) 
acknowledges the existence of power relationships between the 
professional carer, as a nurse or doctor and his or her patient. 
Fourth, he acknowledges the presence of risk that may be 
associated with advocacy and offers suggestions as to how 
these may be minimised. Having described the strengths of 
Teasdale’s (1998) account of advocacy, I will now identify a 
criticism of his work.
There is one criticism that can be made of Teasdale's (1998) 
book and this refers to a problem concerning the nature of his 
interpretation of 'self-advocacy'. Thompson (1995:20) defines 
the term 'advocate' as, 'A person who supports or speaks in 
favour.’ For Teasdale (1998) the concept of 'self-advocacy' is 
interpreted as the empowerment of a patient that is achieved by 
ensuring that he or she has adequate information to make an 
informed decision with regard to the available. The patient ought 
to be therefore normally in a position to express his or her 
preferences concerning treatment or care. It would therefore
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follow that if the patient were able to make an informed decision 
concerning his treatment and welfare, he would not need an 
advocate. Should the patient require information concerning his 
treatment or welfare, he should be able to obtain this directly 
from the appropriate professional or access help from an 
external source. Therefore, with regard to a patient who is able 
to make the necessary decisions concerning his welfare, the 
term 'self-advocacy' could be considered as a contradiction, with 
a potential that its use could lead to confusion.
This criticism of Teasdale’s (1998) account of advocacy invites a 
defence of his position. A justification of Teasdale’s (1998) 
position could be made on the basis that an attempt to redefine 
the term self-advocacy as a form of patient or client autonomy, 
with regard to informed decision-making, would amount to an 
exercise in semantics. A patient acting as a self-advocate is 
normally offered the necessary information to enable him or her 
to make a decision. The title assigned to this patient, whether it 
is 'self-advocate' or other can be considered as immaterial; the 
crucial factor being that the patient is able to make informed 
decisions regarding his or her welfare. I will now consider 
Gadow’s (1983) perspective.
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3 Gadow’s View
The fundamental strength in Gadow’s (1983) account of 
advocacy rests on her ability to offer a firm academic basis for 
Advocacy. This is accomplished in terms of a), her emphasis on 
allowing a patient to practise self-determination and b), her 
conception of the ‘lived’ and ‘object’ body. With reference to a 
patient’s self-determination, (a) Gadow’s (1983) work on 
existential advocacy relates to the freedom of people as patients 
to self-determine their lives in terms of their preferences 
concerning treatment and care. The emphasis for Gadow (1983) 
is a requirement that nurses should offer their patients adequate 
information with the aim of providing a basis that allows the 
patient to make an appropriate decision. Gadow (1983) 
rationalizes correctly, that the patient is the person who has the 
illness and therefore is best placed to make decisions 
concerning her treatment and care. With regard to Gadow's 
(1980) theoretical framework, she places similar emphasis to 
that of other authors on advocacy, namely the importance of a 
patient’s self-determination.
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With reference to her conception of the ‘lived’ and ’object’ body, 
Gadow (1980) is able to give a firm rational basis for a patient’s 
personal experience of their disease and linked to the possible 
treatment by a nurse, of a patient as one a class of people with 
a particular disease. In this way she can offer an adequate 
explanation for the relationships that occur between the patient 
and the professional carer.
Therefore, according to Gadow (1983), the nurse should 
attempt to understand and empathize with the patient with the 
aim of appreciating their social and medical background and 
acknowledging the importance of the patient’s experience. 
Gadow (1983) refers to the ‘lived’ body where a nurse ought to 
seek to understand the patient’s experience of an illness, 
thereby allowing the nurse a certain level of insight with regard 
to the patient’s problems and consequent experience. This, for 
Gadow (1983), forms the basis of advocacy. Although Gadow’s 
(1983) perspective with regard to advocacy can be considered 
as applicable to the sentient patient, there is a problem with 
regard to patients who are non-sentient or silent. One ought to 
question the way in which a nurse could gain information about
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the preferences of such patients and this is discussed in further 
in the third criticism that I offer, with regard to Gadow’s account 
of advocacy.
Gadow’s (1983) work on the ‘lived’ and ‘object’ body, 
distinguishes her apart from other authors, who do not offer this 
philosophical basis for their work. Gadow’s (1980), work has 
obvious application to the role of a nurse. The strength of 
Gadow’s (1980) position with regard to her conception of 
advocacy ought to be considered with an acknowledgement that 
there are three weaknesses that have been identified in her 
account, as described in the next paragraph.
There are three weaknesses in Gadow’s (1983) account of 
advocacy. The first criticism of her approach to advocacy 
concerns the role of nurse as patient's advocate. The 
development of complex interpersonal relationships between a 
nurse and patient can be influenced by many factors as for 
example; the past experience of individuals may affect each 
party's perception of the other, having the potential to adversely 
affect patient care. Gadow’s (1983:51) does not appear to 
adequately take into account that nurses as human beings may
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find difficulty in relating to some patients, when she rejects the 
professional, private distinction with regard to the advocacy role.
A second criticism refers to the available resources (particularly 
when one applies this to the British National Health Service), 
which are allocated for health care. Due to advances in health 
technology and the need to undertake certain clinical 
procedures on a day care basis, the nurse may work in an area 
where there is a high turnover of patients. He or she may not be 
able to perform an adequate assessment of patients and 
adequately grasp the underlying factors that may be affecting 
patients. From this point of view, and due to the structure and 
organization of the nurse’s working environment, he or she may 
not be able to see the patient from a holistic point of view. A lack 
of available nursing time may mean that the nurse will not be 
able to fully discover a patient's problems. It follows therefore, 
that the nurse may not be fully aware of the need to assume the 
role of patient's advocate. The nurse's lack of knowledge 
concerning his or her patient, may lead to an inadequate 
appreciation of the possible consequences of an advocacy role. 
In this context, the nurse may not be perceived as best placed 
to fulfil a role as patients’ advocate, for a person who works
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within an inadequately financed and organized system could 
find that they are unable to give an adequate level of patient 
care.
A third criticism of Gadow (1983) refers to her emphasis on 
patient autonomy. Gadow's stress on the importance of patient 
autonomy may be appropriate for those wishing to act as nurse 
advocates for patients in a society, as in the UK or USA. 
However a question could be raised with regard to Gadow's 
conception of advocacy, when applied to the provision of 
healthcare in societies other than the USA. Those societies may 
embrace a health care philosophy that differs from societies run 
on the USA model, placing less of an emphasis on the 
importance of acknowledging a patient's autonomy.
The criticism of Gadow’s (1983) emphasis on patient autonomy 
can also be applied to silent patients, e.g. those who are 
unconscious, or are at an advanced stage of Alzheimer’s 
Disease. Her emphasis on patient autonomy is applied to the 
drafting of ‘advanced directives’ and the accumulated 
knowledge of the patient held by a person who has been close
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to the patient (Gadow 1989:357-358). However, she is unable 
to offer an adequate explanation as to how the nurse can 
gauge effectively the wishes of a silent patient, relying instead 
on the nurse’s subjective interpretation of a silent patient’s 
wishes, by placing herself in the patient’s position. Due to the 
presence of an obvious communication barrier, this does not 
provide an adequate explanation as to how a nurse can act as 
an effective advocate for a silent patient. However, according to 
Gadow (1989: 541), this is considered in a more positive light, 
as ... ‘the essential basis for a moral commitment to advocacy.’
Gadow (1983) is able to offer a defence for her case, that the 
nurse has a professional responsibility to ensure that adequate 
resources are made available for patient care (as in the case of 
Graham Pink).
With regard to the first criticism, Gadow (1983) would refer to 
the fact that the nurse should consider him or herself as a 
professional person and that their behaviour should reflect this. 
Gadow (1983) would expect that the nurse should set aside 
personal prejudices and disregard patient information that 
cannot be supported. The nurse should also take into account
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that a person, in their role as patient, is normally considered as 
unwell and that this may have an effect on his or her behaviour.
Gadow’s (1983) response to the second criticism would refer to 
the nursing problem of giving sufficient and good, appropriate 
nursing care under such circumstances. She would recommend 
that nurses should use their professional judgement to 
communicate with management with regard to the requirement 
for more funding and this should allow the provision of the 
funding required for adequate nursing of patients. Gadow 
(1983) would hold the view that it is the responsibility of the 
nurse in such circumstances to take a stand with the aim of 
securing more funding to adequately finance patient care.
With reference to third criticism of Gadow with regard to patient 
autonomy, one could respond that Gadow’s (1983) approach to 
advocacy could be applied in those differing types of society. 
For Gadow (1983), the wishes of a patient are considered as 
paramount and consequently, any advocate should consider 
the requirements and wishes of the patient as of prime
107
importance. On this basis, Gadows (1983) account of advocacy 
ought to be considered as defensible.
With reference to the criticism concerning silent and non- 
competent patients, Gadow’s (1989) emphasis on a nurse’s 
moral commitment to advocacy ought to be considered as an 
aspect of care within the nursing role. When one considers 
advocacy as a part of a caring role, Gadows (1989) 
recommendation that nurses should try to gauge the patients’ 
preferences seems to be a demonstration of a desirable moral 
commitment to advocacy. It now seems appropriate to consider 
Kohnke’s (1982) perspective.
4 Kohnke’s View
There are two strengths in Kohnke’s (1982) account of 
advocacy. The first concerns her view that this application of 
advocacy to nursing can be considered as a complex and 
demanding role. For her, the concept of advocacy is based on a 
patient's requirement for a certain level of information. The role 
of an advocate is perceived as that of informing and supporting
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a patient or client and there is a discussion as to how far this 
support should be carried.
With regard to the second strength in Kohnke’s (1982) account 
of advocacy, she acknowledges that in respect to nursing, there 
may be competing professional obligations. For example, the 
general management responsibilities of a G grade nurse would 
influence the time available for the practice of nursing care. 
Having considered some of the strengths of Kohnke's (1982) 
view, the next paragraph will identify some of the weaknesses in 
her view.
There are two weaknesses in Kohnke’s (1982) account of 
advocacy. These relate to; first, ’informing, supporting’ and 
advocacy; second, her definition of 'loving and caring'. The first 
weakness that will be explored concerns Kohnke's (1982) notion 
of ‘informing and supporting.’
With reference to the first weakness, one should consider in 
what sense advocacy relates to Kohnke’s (1982:8) ideas of 
‘informing and supporting’. She seems to make a general
109
assumption that the majority of advocacy involves a person who 
is willing to act as a patient’s mouthpiece, where the role of 
advocate involves that of acting as a form of communication 
conduit. This is based on an assumption that most patients are 
able to think rationally, to express their preferences and can be 
regarded as competent. One can question whether all 
competent people know what they do and do not want. Also the 
notion that the advocate should inform and support a patient 
cannot be applied to patients who are mentally incompetent, for 
example, where patients have Alzheimer’s disease. In such 
cases, this form of advocacy can be considered as 
inappropriate.
With regard to the second weakness, Kohnke's (1982:vii) 
definition of the 'loving and caring' as an interpersonal 
relationship is based on individual choice and free will and does 
not adequately define the meaning of the term. This can lead to 
a subjective interpretation of 'loving and caring’ that may depend 
on the motivation and perception of the individuals involved. For 
example, a nurse may perceive that to make an inquiry about a 
patient's social circumstance is considered as the right and 
caring thing to do. The patient may however, perceive the same
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inquiry as a form of interference in his or her personal affairs. 
With reference to this example, Kohnke (1982) offers an 
inadequate justification for 'loving and caring' and she is unable 
to identify whether it is a natural occurrence or self-imposed 
discipline.
In the light of these criticisms, I will now offer a defence of her 
position. Kohnke’s reply to the first criticism concerning her 
stance on ‘informing and supporting’ can be considered as 
relating to an exercise in semantics. She would offer support for 
the principle (identified by the other four writers), that a patient 
should be the person to make decisions concerning his or her 
treatment, welfare and that an advocate’s role should be 
interpreted as ensuring that a patient has sufficient information 
to enable him or her to make decisions. For Kohnke (1982), this 
would be considered as the fundamental principle. However, as 
previously identified, any act of informing and supporting a non- 
sentient patient seems to be inappropriate.
Kohnke’s (1982:viii) view with regard to 'loving and caring’ 
reflects the fact that there is insufficient knowledge concerning 
the origin and development (whether natural or learned), of this
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behaviour by one person toward another. She accepts that 
'loving and caring' may have a personal effect on the advocate 
but emphasises that an advocate, when caring for another 
person, should place this in context with that of a desire to care. 
For Kohnke (1982) the act of ‘loving and caring’ represents an 
important part of the advocate's role as a carer and 
acknowledges that such a person normally has a desire to 
perform a social duty. In this respect, the act of advocacy ought 
to be considered as a creditable act that ought to be pursued. 
Finally I will consider Curtin’s (1979) perspective.
5 Curtin’s View
There are two strengths in Curtin’s account. The first strength 
with regard to her version of advocacy refers to the fact that 
nurses are normally in contact with their patients and should 
therefore possess a level of knowledge with regard to their 
patient’s treatment and care. The second strength relates to the 
nurse being normally conversant with the structure of the health 
service and therefore possessing an awareness of the power 
relationships that exist between the health care professionals
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and their patients. On the basis of this view, Curtin (1979) 
deduces that nurses are favourably placed with regard to 
offering patients support in terms of ensuring that their rights are 
both acknowledged and supported. Having considered the 
strengths of Curtin’s (1979) view of advocacy, I will now offer a 
discussion of the two identified weaknesses.
Curtin (1979) holds many ideas with regard to advocacy that are 
similar to the later work of Gadow (1980), whose perspective 
has been described in chapter four. However there are two 
criticisms that can be made of Curtin’s (1979) paper on 
advocacy.
The first criticism of Curtin's (1979) position, refers to her 
assertion that advocacy occurs as a natural process. The 
natural role of advocate could be applied to areas other than 
nursing as for example, a mother acting as an advocate for her 
child. However, in a relationship that is more complicated as for 
example, with reference to a nurse and patient, the role of 
advocate could become more demanding. This can be 
considered as arising due to the nature of the nurse - patient 
relationship and the expected nursing, professional, employee
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and caring roles. In this context therefore, the role of advocate 
ought to be considered as a learned, acquired and skilled role 
rather than that based on natural caring instinct as for example, 
in a m other-child  relationship.
A second criticism concerns Curtin's (1979) distinction between 
human and patient's rights. Curtin (1979) makes a clear 
distinction between the concept of human and patients’ rights 
that ought to be acknowledged by a nursing advocate. 
According to Curtin’s (1979) view, patients have special needs 
that differ from those identified by an appeal to basic human 
rights. For her, the human rights model would be considered as 
inadequate with regard to meeting all of the patient’s 
requirements; therefore a special category of rights is required 
to be articulated with the aim of addressing the needs of a 
patient.
One can question the necessity of such a clear distinction 
between human and patient rights. Curtin’s (1979) distinction 
between human and patient’s rights seems to be unnecessary 
since the suggested extra patient’s rights could simply be added 
on to what is normally considered as human rights. The patient
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has rights because he is human, not because he is a patient. 
Having described her position with regard to advocacy, one can 
now offer a defence of Curtin’s (1979) position.
For Curtin (1979), advocacy is considered as an integral and 
vital part of the nursing role, for she refers to the concept of 
advocacy and patient's common humanity and rights. In this 
context, the nurse is perceived as an ideal person to take on a 
role as advocate, on the basis that the relationship she forms 
with a patient would enable her to assess the need for patient 
advocacy and support the patient’s choices. For Curtin (1979) 
the rights of patients, regardless of their origin (as human or a 
special category of patient’s rights), ought to be accorded 
respect.
6 Summary
During chapter four, I have identified and discussed the 
strengths and weaknesses of the five authors’ views of 
advocacy. These views hold common ground on certain
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aspects of advocacy and differ on others. In chapter five, these 
similarities and differences will be explored.
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CHAPTER 5 THE FIVE POSITIONS 
1 Introduction
In the previous chapters of the thesis, I have undertaken a 
literature review and critical assessment of the five nursing 
perspectives concerning an application of advocacy to the 
health care of patients. The themes relating to advocacy, with 
reference to the views of Gates (1994) and Teasdale (1998), 
(from the British perspective) and the views of three nursing 
theorists from the United States of America, namely those of 
Gadow (1983), Kohnke (1982) and Curtin (1979) have been 
described and discussed. This has enabled me to identify the 
North American and British perspectives of advocacy.
As previously suggested, the Americans, identified as Gadow 
(1983), Kohnke (1982) and Curtin (1979), consider that 
decisions ought to be taken at all times by the patients. From 
this perspective, the role of advocate should reflect this 
philosophy by concentrating on the empowerment of the patient 
by ensuring the patient's access to information and providing the 
patient with encouragement, as necessary.
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As a contrast, the British view of advocacy as described by 
Gates (1994), offers a broader definition of advocacy than that 
of the Americans, including more involvement by the advocate 
with regard to offering their patients’ information and support. 
The British Perspective also allows for a possible role of a third 
party, in pleading and defending the cause of patients as for 
example, described in independent advocacy.
The British version of advocacy, as described in Gates (1994) 
and Teasdale (1998) suggests that the advocate should have a 
role with regard to the patient’s decision making and this should 
not, as in the American version, be left entirely with the client. 
Teasdale (1998:32) offers support for the different types of 
advocacy, on the grounds that the form of advocacy 
implemented should depend on the patient's needs and also 
whether he or she is in a position to receive information and 
make the necessary decisions concerning treatment. Teasdale 
(1998) also acknowledges that some patients may not be able 
to make these decisions. Where situations occur that inhibit the 
patient’s ability to make decisions, he acknowledges that there 
may be a need for the enactment of Collective or Group 
advocacy.
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The British accounts of advocacy, as illustrated in this thesis, 
can be considered as more flexible than those of the 
Americans. The Americans could identify that the British view 
would potentially allow for the occurrence of paternalism, with 
regard to the perceived needs and desires of the patients who 
are mentally incompetent or silent. From the British point of 
view, the American Health Care System lays emphasis on the 
right of an individual to make decisions concerning his/her 
welfare and this system should acknowledge the silent patient’s 
need for legal representation with regard to his/her interests. 
This could cause a financial burden for the patient and a 
consequence of this philosophy could result in the escalation of 
the cost of medical treatment due to the need for doctors to 
prescribe exhaustive tests to prove the legitimacy of their 
treatment. Having identified the American and British advocacy 
perspectives, it would now seem pertinent to briefly identify the 
similarities and differences of the five previously described 
advocacy accounts offered by Gates (1994), Teasdale (1998), 
Gadow (1983), Kohnke (1982) and Curtin (1979).
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2 The Positions of the Five Authors
Some interesting and instructive similarities and differences are 
perceived when reviewing the stance of the five authors with 
regard to advocacy. Although there is a general agreement 
between the writers that nurses should, as part of their 
professional role, be able to act as an advocate, each of the 
authors offers a slightly different approach with regard to their 
discussion of advocacy.
2a The Similarities
Essentially, all the authors come to the conclusion that patients 
who are competent should be the people considered as having 
an ability to make decisions concerning their treatment and 
welfare. However, one has to acknowledge that there are 
differences of emphasis that occur in the authors' approach to 
the nursing advocate and these will be identified here.
Gadow’s (1983) perspective offers a strong case for a nurse 
taking on an advocacy role, as for her the nurse should embrace 
this role as part of a holistic approach to patient care. Indeed, 
based on the development of a professional relationship that 
typically includes a level of trust by the patient, the nurse is
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perceived by Gadow (1983) as the obvious candidate for such a 
role. Similarly, Curtin (1979) offers a strong case for the nurse 
advocate role with the rationale that nurses ought to accept this 
role because it is the right thing to do from a human rights and 
humanitarian point of view. She also acknowledges some of the 
problems that the nurse may encounter when undertaking such 
a role. A weaker interpretation is offered by Kohnke (1982), for 
whom the importance of advocacy is linked to patient centred 
care. This is not afforded the level of importance, as perceived 
by Gadow (1983). For Kohnke (1982), there is an 
acknowledgement of the risks that are inherent in the role of the 
nurse as patient’s advocate and she offers a detailed account of 
the problems that nurses may encounter when undertaking such 
a role. Having considered similarities with regard to the views of 
the five authors, it would now be pertinent to consider the 
differences.
2b The Differences
The major difference in the five authors’ approach to advocacy 
rests on Gadow’s (1983:51-55) conception of the ‘lived’ and 
‘object’ body. This distinction allows Gadow (1983), as 
described previously, to acknowledge that from a ‘lived’ body
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perspective, patients are able directly to experience the effect of 
a disease in terms of pain and discomfort. Other examples 
include nausea and the potential for embarrassment due to the 
body’s production of flatus as a consequence of a disease, or as 
an effect caused by a medical investigation of a patient’s body, 
as in the case of a ‘Barium Enema’.
In contrast, the ‘object’ body, as identified previously, refers to 
the perception of the patient’s body by a health care 
professional as a nurse or doctor who may view the patient’s 
disease in a similar way that a mechanic would perceive a 
machine as having a mechanical fault.
From the above distinction made by Gadow (1983), concerning 
the ‘lived’ and ‘object’ bodies, she is able to discuss the 
application of this distinction to the roles of the patient and 
health care professional. At one stage she is also able to offer a 
discussion with regard to an effect of these two concepts on a 
person, if a health care professional were to become a patient 
and in this way is able to illustrate the articulation that could 
occur between the ‘lived’ and ‘object’ body perspectives.
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3 Preference for Gadow’s Perspective
With reference to the five authors’ accounts of advocacy, I have 
come to the conclusion that of these authors, Gadow (1983), 
offers the most convincing account. Gadow’s (1983) view with 
regard to patient advocacy is linked to her philosophical 
perspective that patients possess ‘object’ and ‘lived’ bodies. 
(The latter allows the perception that each patient ought to be 
considered as an individual with a particular set of experiences, 
feelings and perceptions).
As will be demonstrated later in the thesis, Gadow’s (1983) 
above philosophical perspective has a resonance with 
Habermas’ (1987) concept of ‘system’ and ‘lifeworld’. It is on this 
basis, that Gadow’s account of advocacy sets her apart from the 
four other accounts and this is the rationale for suggesting that 
her account ought to be considered as the most applicable to 
Habermas’ (1987) perspective.
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One ought to acknowledge that Gadow's (1983) emphasis on 
the primacy of a client or patient and her assertion that the 
advocate should support the patient’s right to be fully informed 
and to make decisions concerning his of her treatment and care, 
can be considered as sound and creditable. Her philosophy may 
be regarded as a universal guiding principle that nurses ought to 
adopt, when working in the health care systems in the United 
Kingdom, United States and other societies.
The criticisms levelled against Gadow (1983), concerning the 
number of patients that the nurse has an obligation to care for 
and countering the fact that the nurse may not agree with the 
patients’ illnesses and care, can be overcome if a society 
provides adequate funding for its health care system and if the 
nurse acknowledges his or her professional obligation to act in 
the interest of the patient. Having identified Gadow’s (1983) 
perspective on advocacy, as the most convincing, I will now 
offer a summary of chapter five.
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4 Summary
In this chapter I have offered a discussion concerning the British 
and North American perspectives of advocacy. The similarities 
and differences of the five authors’ positions on advocacy are 
identified and I have offered a rationale for selecting Gadow’s 
position as offering the most convincing account of advocacy 
that is based on a sound philosophical approach that can be 
applied to the work of Habermas.
In part two, chapter six, I will describe Habermas’ (1987) theory 
with reference to system and lifeworld and will apply this to 
advocacy with reference to the Pink case. I will then offer a 
discussion of advocacy and make the case for an extension of 
advocacy theory with a view of creating a proposal that should 
help nurses to acknowledge the potential for their role as 
patient’s advocate.
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PART 2 HABERMAS’ PERSPECTIVE AND 
ITS APPLICATION
Preview
In part two, I will describe Habermas’ perspective and will apply 
his work to that of Gadow, nursing and healthcare. Habermas 
(1995) has developed a clear philosophical framework relating 
to communication that can be applied to advocacy. As described 
in chapter seven, Habermas (1995:93) has constructed a 
method by which competing norms can be fairly and impartially 
judged, using the principle of universalization (‘U’). He also 
offers a practical application of discourse ethics identified as 
(‘D’). Habermas’ (1987) concepts of ‘system’ and ‘lifeworld’ are 
described in chapter six and later in the thesis, these notions are 
applied to the NHS and advocacy.
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CHAPTER 6 SYSTEM AND LIFEWORLD
1 ‘System’ and ‘Lifeworld’
Habermas (1987) has written extensively on the ‘lifeworld’ and 
its importance as a philosophical concept. When considering the 
‘lifeworld’, one ought also to look at the ‘system’ and its 
relationship to the ‘lifeworld’. Habermas offers an important 
suggestion:
‘ ... that we conceive of societies simultaneously 
as systems and lifeworlds.’
Habermas (1987:118)
For Habermas (1987), a system and lifeworld ought normally to 
be considered as linked and interdependent. It would be 
pertinent at this point, to offer a definition of what is meant by 
the term ‘system’.
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2 System
Habermas, offers a definition of living systems when he states 
that:
‘Living systems are understood as open systems, 
which maintain themselves vis-a-vis an unstable 
and hypercomplex environment through 
interchange processes across their boundaries.’
Habermas (1987:151)
According to this definition, the presence and continuation of a 
system is dependent on its ability to survive and flourish in a 
changing environment, as can be observed in a complex social 
structure. For example, in an advanced Western Democracy 
where there is a need to form and maintain communication and 
trade links with other states.
According to White systems theory:
‘envisions strategic actions guided by systemic 
imperatives. These imperatives operate through 
the “de-linguistified media” of money and power.’
White (1994:100)
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For Habermas (1987), the concept of ‘system’, with reference to 
money and power can be applied at a national level, where a 
society initially forms, with the consequent development of an 
economic and monetary system. With reference to money, such 
a society is typically based on the capitalist system; where a 
society has a common interest in maintaining trade relationships 
with other societies, as for example, by trading with the 
European Union and then joining the Union at a suitable time. 
Such an economic relationship may form the basis of a mutually 
beneficial trade agreement
The membership of the Union may also enhance the power and 
status of a small nation and this may form part of the reason for 
a nation’s wish to join such a partnership. Power relationships 
between societies may also be demonstrated through an 
international perspective, where the presence of a rogue state 
may lead to war, as for example, the Iraq war of 2003, where 
the ruling regime was changed.
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According to White’s interpretation of Habermas’ (1987) 
thinking, White states that:
‘A system becomes more rational as its 
complexity increases; that is, as its range of 
adaptation to environmental changes is
enhanced.’
White (1994:104)
For White, this leads to the development of an increasingly 
complex and diverse set of social structures in a society, which 
in turn facilitates material production that is considered as 
desirable in a capitalist economy.
As an alternative to the capitalist system, a society may be 
founded and formed on the basis of some form of religious 
belief. Indeed, the capitalist and spiritual examples of society 
are often interlinked, for example, with reference to the English 
society that is typically considered as Christian and represented 
by the Church of England, while at the same time embracing a 
capitalist economic system.
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In contrast to a social system, the economic aspect within a 
society is considered by Habermas (1987:169) as a ‘subsystem’ 
that relates to ‘adaptation’, in terms of regulating a society’s 
economic activity. Similarly, according to Habermas (1987:169), 
the administrative subsystem is linked to ‘goal attainment’, with 
reference to the formation of policy and decision-making in a 
society by bodies such as The Civil Service’, whose role is to 
plan and run the day-to-day services that allow the successful 
function of a society. An example of these services in Britain 
would be the National Health Service, funded by National 
Insurance and public taxation that the Government has a 
responsibility to apply, collect and distribute as required.
A society and its associated systems, therefore, normally form 
an essential support and reference point to those who live and 
work in the society. People who live in a society are in an 
interaction with a society and its systems. For example, the 
general public may use and hold a high regard for the National 
Health Service, while at the same time perceive the need to 
engage with the economic system through work and a weekly 
need to shop and pay bills. This form of interaction normally
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leads to the presence of systems and subsystems that have a 
positive or negative effect on an individual and their lifeworld.
3 Lifeworld
A further influence on people is described by Habermas as the 
‘lifeworld’. Habermas offers a definition of the ‘lifeworld’, when 
he states:
‘I can introduce here the concept of the 
Lebenswelt or the Lifeworld, to begin with, as the 
correlate of processes of reaching understanding.
Subjects acting communicatively always come to 
an understanding in the horizon of a lifeworld.
Their lifeworld is more or less formed from 
diffuse, almost always unproblematic, 
background convictions.’
Habermas (1984:70),
Habermas offers an expansion of his definition when he states 
that;
‘ ... the lifeworld appears as a reservoir of taken- 
for-granteds, of unshaken convictions that 
participants in communication draw upon in 
cooperative processes of interpretation.’
Habermas (1987:124)
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According to Habermas (1987), the lifeworld ought to be 
considered as a form of backdrop, presupposed in 
communicative action. For Habermas (1984:xvii), the lifeworlds 
of people are formed on three levels, namely: the structural 
components of culture, society and the person. The 
reproduction of the lifeworld occurs through cultural 
reproduction, social integration and socialization that depend on 
communicative action, namely understanding, coordination and 
sociation.
According to Habermas (1987:63), communication is the 
method through which we transmit and reproduce our lifeworld. 
The transmitters are identified as: cultural reproduction, through 
which cultural traditions and meanings are conveyed down the 
generations; social integration, when we are typically able to 
recognise the norms of cooperation and interaction; and 
socialization, through which we acquire individual and collective 
identities.
By our ability to transmit and reproduce the lifeworld, 
succeeding generations are able to learn from accumulated
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collective experience, which should prevent the generations 
from endlessly repeating the experience. According to
Outhwaite (1996:191), this experience is a ‘concrete historical 
form of life or the conduct of an individual life.’ A physical
example of this would be knowledge about the following of
night by day. Further, a socially related example of this is the 
normally accepted value that is placed on human life. There is 
an inherent danger in this method of communication, that 
information may be changed or lost.
Habermas (1995) offers a related illustration, with regard to 
communicative action, as described later in this part of the 
thesis, when he states:
The actor stands face to face with that
situationally relevant segment of the lifeworld that 
impinges on him as a problem, a problem he 
must resolve through his own efforts. But in 
another sense, the actor is carried or supported 
from behind, as it were, by a lifeworld that not 
only forms the context for the process of reaching 
understanding but also furnishes resources for it.’
Habermas (1995:135)
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With regard to contemporary medical social application, as 
illustrated in Social Trends (2003:61), the lifeworld can be linked 
to the social factors that have an effect on a doctor and patient. 
For example, with reference to Social Trends (2003:61), where 
the doctor may typically experience an economically 
advantageous upbringing, having taken advantage of the 
opportunities that were afforded to him or her as a child and 
linked to parental encouragement. According to Social Trends 
(2003:61), seventy four percent of children whose parents are 
‘Higher Professional’ in socio-economic terms attain five or 
more GCSE’s at grades A-C.
As a child, the doctor would typically have attended schools that 
enabled him or her to go to university to read medicine and then 
engage in a medically based ‘expert culture’, as described by 
Cooke (1994:17). As a contrast, a patient may have had a 
poorer upbringing, for example, the parents may have a socio­
economic classification of a ‘routine’ occupation (Social Trends 
2003:61) and attended schools that typically did not envisage 
that their children would normally go to university, leading to a 
lack of educational and other social opportunities. According to
135
Social Trends (2003:61) twenty nine percent of children of 
‘routine’ occupation parents attain five or more GCSE’s at 
grades A-C.
A general point can be made that the lifeworld background of 
an individual would therefore have an influence on their 
perception of a society and the values that they hold personally. 
For example, the experience and perception held by the 
majority of the British population of the importance of the 
National Health Service. This relates to the public's willingness 
to pay increased taxes, with the proviso that the money is spent 
directly on this service. Similarly, an individual's socialisation 
with respect of a requirement to work for a sufficient payment, 
would embrace the values of a capitalist society. An individual 
who has been socialised in this form of society, where this 
would have been considered as the norm, would have learnt 
this.
The ‘cultural structure’, as identified by Dews (1999), is 
normally passed down socially through the generations and the
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citizens may largely take this for granted. This typically leads to 
shared understanding, for example, the need to earn a living, 
the normally accepted assigned gender role and this may be 
difficult to influence or change (a notable exception, in relation 
to gender role would be the rise of the women’s suffrage 
movement). This could lead to a constraint being placed on the 
beliefs and actions of individuals. Therefore the individual’s 
perceptions and beliefs would be influenced by the lifeworld.
For Habermas (1987:145), the lifeworld is linked to 
communicative action between people and the goal of forming a 
consensus that is based on the formation of a better argument. 
This should occur in a society that acknowledges the 
importance of freedom of expression. However, a society that is 
based on an ideology other than that of a freedom of expression 
may use power at its disposal to frustrate attempts by its 
citizens to form a consensus; especially, a consensus that 
challenges the ideological basis of such a society.
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Habermas (1984) gives an example of the link between the 
lifeworld and communicative action, as described later in this 
part of the thesis, when he states that:
The idea of the lifeworld is introduced as a 
necessary complement to the concept of 
communicative action. It links that concept firmly to 
the concept of society; and by directing our 
attention to the “context forming horizon” of social 
action ...
Habermas (1984:xxv)
With reference to interpersonal communication Habermas goes 
on to state that:
Through this communicative practice they 
assure themselves at the same time of their 
common life relations, of an intersubjectively 
shared lifeworld. The lifeworld is bounded by the 
totality of interpretations presupposed by the 
members as background knowledge.’
Habermas (1984:13)
Therefore, according to Habermas (1984), the lifeworld partly 
determines the life experience of an individual. Habermas 
makes the point that people typically share certain aspects of 
their lifeworld, depending on the knowledge and experience
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gained by previous generations and the current media. 
Therefore, the presence of the Royal Family and British Society 
is typically regarded as a form of normality in our society. 
However, when a disagreement arises, for example, with 
reference to the 2003 Iraq War, any formal disagreement may 
reflect the personally held beliefs and personality of an 
individual. For example, a person who holds that it is morally 
wrong to go to war may not do anything about it, whereas, 
another person who holds the same belief may feel obliged to 
join a protest.
4 The Articulation of System and Lifeworld
As suggested previously, for Habermas (1987:153), the 
concepts of system and lifeworld ought to be considered with 
reference to each other. To explain these concepts, I will offer 
the following illustration. A strong connection of systems to 
lifeworld can occur when the system develops from the 
lifeworld, as for example, the development of a village based 
system that would accurately reflect the lifeworld of its 
inhabitants.
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This forms an uncomplicated social system that is composed of 
simple social structures. In this context, the people living in a 
village would know the person who is in charge and may have 
been brought up and educated with them. The village would 
have economic sources, as (e.g. money lenders) and locally 
owned shops. The simple system and lifeworlds of the 
population and those in charge of the village would be very 
similar and the different parties would be able to relate easily to 
the perspectives that are held by others.
As a contrast, a system and lifeworld may diverge. I will now 
offer an example of a complicated social system and structure, 
as that of an advanced and largely city dwelling capitalist 
society. For economic reasons, the city people would have 
individually differing lifeworlds and they may not be able to 
agree a consensus. The diverse institutions may have 
developed specialised subsystems, having their headquarters 
in another city or country. Therefore, the city dweller may 
typically deal with people who do not have an interest in, or 
appreciate his or her lifeworld. The dweller would be treated as
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a ‘customer’ rather than a known individual and would be 
subject to the normal rules of the organisation.
For Habermas (1987:153-154), there is an acknowledged 
potential for the development of a tension between the lifeworld 
and subsystems, leading to their eventual separation and 
‘uncoupling’. According to Outhwaite:
‘As new systems emerge, notably states and 
market economies, they become increasingly 
detached from the social structures through 
which social integration takes place.’
Outhwaite (1994:88)
An explanation is offered by Habermas (1987) when he 
acknowledges that a system may develop at the expense of a 
lifeworld, which can become provincial ...
‘In a differentiated social system the lifeworld 
seems to shrink to a sub-system.’
Habermas (1987:173)
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The uncoupling that may occur between the system, 
subsystems and lifeworld, as described in Outhwaite (1994:90) 
means that the cultural structure as experienced by a person 
could differ from the system and subsystems that form the 
norms of a society. For example, the development of the 
cultural ‘hippy’ movement in the nineteen sixties, with the 
implicit questioning of capitalist values and society’s authority, 
sat uneasily with the notion, at that time, that it was considered 
as the norm to function within an economic system and to act 
within the law. With reference to the above ‘hippy’ example, the 
uncoupling of system and lifeworld can explain the need for the 
development and application of critical theory, as described by 
Habermas (1987:374-403). Furthermore, the uncoupling of 
system and lifeworld, as according to Habermas (1987:173), 
can be applied to the relationship between the health service 
and a patient. The health service may consider that its waiting 
list system ought to be considered as fair. The patient who has 
a long wait for treatment, however, may consider such a system 
as impersonal and unfair, with very little opportunity for redress.
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5 Summary
In chapter six, I have described and discussed Habermas’ 
(1987) perspective on ‘system’ and ‘lifeworld’ and these 
concepts have been applied to his (1987) work on 
‘communicative action’. Habermas’ (1987) perspective of the 
‘system’ and ‘lifeworld’ seems to have particular relevance to 
the National Health Service and as a basis for discussion of 
advocacy. These topics will be discussed at a later stage in the 
thesis, for a further medical and nursing application of system 
and lifeworld is made at a later stage, in this part of the thesis. 
In the next chapter, I will turn to Habermas’ perspective on 
critical and other theories.
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CHAPTER 7 CRITICAL AND OTHER THEORIES
1 Preview
In this chapter I will offer a summary of Habermas’ (1995) 
perspective with regard to discourse ethics. He has created a 
framework in which the conditions for discourse are identified 
and against which the validity and effectiveness of a discourse 
may be tested. The framework can be used on occasions when 
disagreement could occur and it should enable the participants 
in discourse to agree a fair and equitable solution that ought to 
be acceptable to those involved.
Habermas' (1995) aim is to determine the conditions, where an 
individual or group can accept valid norms in discourse that are 
acceptable to all. For Habermas (1995), for a norm to be held 
as valid and according to the principle of ‘U’, people should be 
able to agree to the consequences. The norm ought to be 
justified through a discussion and in so doing, through the 
application of 'U', they would be able to judge whether the norm 
is valid and fair to all. With reference to the related principle of 
‘D ’, according to Habermas (1995), a norm can be achieved
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through the use of discourse ethics (‘D’) that is proposed as a 
procedure for the conduct of practical discourse. An important 
part of Habermas’ (1987) work relates to critical theory.
2 Critical Theory
Jurgen Habermas (1995) is a philosopher who has drawn his 
ideas from the ‘Frankfurt School’. He has undertaken a 
substantial amount of work on Critical Theory. Therefore, it 
would seem appropriate at this point in the thesis to offer an 
account of the basis of Critical Theory.
Held makes an observation that:
‘Critical theory, it should be emphasised, does not 
form a unity; it does not mean the same thing to all 
its adherents’.
Held (1980:14)
Held (1980) illustrates this point when he offers an account of 
critical theory with reference to a variety of different 
philosophical perspectives, for example, those held by Marcuse 
(1941) and Adorno (1974).
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According to White (1995:4), the roots of critical theory lie prior 
to the Second World War when the Frankfurt School carried out 
philosophical and social investigations that were critical of the 
culture, economics and politics of Western societies. White 
(1995:4) identifies that the Frankfurt School was formed by a 
group of philosophers who, during the late 1920’s, founded the 
Institute of Social Research in Frankfurt. When Hitler came to 
power, he closed the Institute and the School was subsequently 
relocated to the USA.
According to White (1995:4), the Frankfurt School developed a 
philosophy called ‘Critical Theory’, that could be used to criticize 
ideology. Critical theory poses questions that relate to an 
individual's goal with reference to their society and where there 
is a dominant social system and is concerned with the 
emancipation of people. With regard to systems and lifeworld as 
previously described, Habermas (1987:734-403) accepts that 
people should look critically at systems and society; critical 
theory could then be used for example, to criticize the 
philosophical base and function of any society; as for example, 
a communist or fascist state. Habermas (1987:374-403) offers
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support for the idea that critical theory relies on an interpretation 
of man’s history, leading to an understanding of life and it can 
also be used to consider how social policy is formed. One can 
also use it to consider the conditions that exist, or are necessary 
for communication.
Habermas (1987:374-403) harbours a concern that for critical 
theory to be considered as effective, it has to have practical 
application. Habermas (1987) argues that critical theory is no 
longer needed to show the social content of philosophical 
theories, rather, it can be used to co-operate with philosophy in 
the study of a rational approach to a discussion of social issues, 
based on logic and reason. From the Habermasian (1987) 
perspective, critical theory can be used to study, give 
recommendations for and possibly offer answers to social 
problems.
Habermas' (1987) discussion of critical theory can be applied to 
the health service, its patients and employees; e.g. doctors and 
nurses. Further application of critical theory to nursing is made 
by Browne (2000) and Mill et al, (2001). In order to make
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effective use of critical theory, it would be necessary to consider 
the historical development of the Health Service. For example, 
consider the development of health care based on an 
individual’s ability to pay and the different types of facilities 
offered from poor law to private hospitals. Also, one must 
consider the growth and development of the professions within 
the health care system, for example, medicine and nursing.
The critical theory perspective, according to Habermas (1987), 
can be used to consider the development of a health service, for 
example, when this allows the domination of individuals and 
groups. White, (1978) refers to other instances with regard to 
the historical development of power by a Board of Governors’ 
chairman in a hospital and the nursing matron, who was 
answerable to the chairman. The domination of nursing and the 
expectation of subservience of nursing to the medical profession 
have been well documented; many nurses at that time 
considered that they could not question the instructions of 
doctors.
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White (1978) acknowledges that the historical development of 
nursing with reference to other professional groups and the 
health care system has, in general, had an effect on the 
perception of nursing held by nurses, other health care 
professionals and the public. This has led to nursing being 
traditionally considered as a female dominated vocation that is 
less powerful than either the doctors or hospital management. 
Nursing therefore, has had to work hard to challenge long held 
assumptions concerning its caring role and has also to 
acknowledge the current need to develop an effective advocacy 
role with regard to the patients.
Browne (2000:44), links critical theory to the ‘emancipation of 
nursing’ by encouraging nurses to read and apply theory. Mill, et 
al (2001) also acknowledges that critical theory can be used to 
link nursing theory to practice. Mill, et al (2001) and Browne’s 
(2000) ideas of empowering nurses by encouraging their 
scholarship, can be applied to others in the health service, who 
are considering whether to undertake an advocacy role. Critical 
theory embraces the ideal that individuals in the health service 
should feel that they are able to speak freely, as for example
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when an individual, as a member of staff, should be able to 
comment on the levels of nursing in the clinical areas. This can 
be applied to a nurse who wishes to undertake an advocacy role 
on behalf of patients, for the nurse should be able to feel that he 
or she is able to speak on behalf of his or her patients as 
required, even though this may mean criticizing the health 
service. According to Browne (2000) and Mill et al (2001), the 
informed nurse's intention would be that improvements in 
patient care should be made and the relevant resources 
accessed and the provision of this would be considered as part 
of the nursing role.
Although Browne (2000:46-7) suggests that ‘there is no 
disagreement about nursing’s fundamental commitment to a 
greater social good’, she makes an important criticism of 
nursing’s application of critical theory, when she suggests that 
there can be an uncritical reliance on critical theory that may 
lead to a ‘privileging of the collective over the individual and 
general over particular knowledge.’
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An example of an application of critical theory to a nursing role 
is given in the description of the Pink case study, as described 
later in the thesis. In this example, Graham Pink, a charge 
nurse, chose to take on the role of advocate on behalf of his 
elderly patients, who were largely unable to speak for 
themselves.
Having offered an outline of critical theory, the suggestion can 
be posited that it does not offer instant solutions; instead it 
offers a way of resolving conflict. The presence of conflict refers 
to behaviour and communication between people and this can 
be linked to the moral development of an individual.
3 Psychological and Moral Development
I will start this stage of the thesis by identifying what is meant by 
the term ‘morality’, (which can be considered as basis for a 
discussion of Kohlberg’s (1981) moral development). Glover 
offers his perspective on ‘morality’, when he states that:
There is no general agreement how the word 
‘morality’ should be used. Some people think of 
morality as a set of rules laid down by God. Others 
think of it as a set of socially imposed rules with the 
function of reducing conflict in society. Others say it
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is a set of principles about how we ought to live that 
apply to everyone impartially, or which can be 
defended by appealing to the interests of people in 
general.’
Glover (1988:22).
Having described Glover’s perspective on ‘morality’, I will now 
offer a related description of Kohlberg’s (1981) three levels of 
moral development as identified in the next section, which can 
be considered as a prerequisite for an individual's development 
of a sense of morality.
Personal moral values are determined in part, by the make-up of 
an individual. They are also subjected to influence and 
acquisition during childhood from the family, and later from 
school, friends, the neighbourhood and media. The process of 
socialization that exposes the person to the differing 
perspectives held by others in society has an effect on a 
person's moral values. The work of Kohlberg proposes three 
levels of human development, containing six stages, as 
described by Kohlberg (1981).
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For Kohlberg, the first level of moral development is the 
preconventional level and corresponds to stages one and two. 
The second level is the conventional level, corresponding to 
stages three and four and the third level is the postconventional 
or principled level, corresponding to stages five and six where a 
person may wish to make a personal stand with regard to an 
issue. To expand further:
a) Stage one of the preconventional level relates to 
the egocentric view, referring to obedience with 
respect to rules and authority. Relationships are 
formed between parent and child that may include 
the need by the parent to exert control with regard 
to the child, by use of rewards and sanctions, as for 
example, the use of praise and punishment, where 
punishment leads to fear of authority.
b) Stage two refers to individual purpose and 
exchange. This stage relates to an individual doing 
what is considered as beneficial to oneself, while 
acknowledging that other people have to be taken
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into account. There is a separation of the 
individual’s point of view from that of others.
c) The third stage relates to the conventional level, for 
example as in adulthood. Here there is mutual 
acknowledgment and expectation for the need to 
conform and the perspective of an individual is 
linked to that of others.
d) The fourth moral stage refers to the development of 
a social system and conscience. The individual is 
aware of the potential effect of his action on others 
and the need to make a contribution and he or she 
is also able to appreciate the view of those in the 
system.
e) Stage five relates to an acknowledgment of prior 
rights, social contract and utility and there is an 
acknowledgment of both the legal and moral points 
of view, although an individual may experience
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difficulty in integrating them. At this level, contracts 
that are formed between individuals are freely 
entered into and there is a concern that the actions 
ought to be lawful and considered as beneficial to a 
group. This post-conventional or principled level 
could refer to a person wishing to make a stand 
with regard to an issue that is based on their 
conviction.
f) Stage six refers to the recognition of morality and 
development of universal ethical principles, where 
the individual has perceived the validity of 
principles, such as justice and become committed 
to them. A person is offered respect and seen as 
an end rather than a means.
Having described the human levels of moral development, as 
according to Kohlberg, one can now identify Habermas' (1995) 
view with reference to the basis of communicative action 
between people and the development of individual moral 
consciousness, where there may be a presence of internal
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moral conflict. The moral values held by a person can be 
considered as the foundation of any communicative action and 
for Habermas (1995), Kohlberg’s level six is considered as the 
most morally desirable.
Having made the link between personal moral values and 
communication, it seems pertinent at this stage to take this link 
a stage further, by offering a description of the theory of 
communicative action.
4 Communicative Action
Habermas (1995:ix, 100) offers a description of the theory of 
communicative action as linked to moral-philosophical, rather 
than empirical-psychological considerations. The goal with 
regard to a situation is to reach a common understanding and 
harmony. The participants engage in a search for mutual 
understanding by considering and offering the relevant 
arguments that could lead to the formation of a consensus.
To evaluate social processes, Habermas (1984:42) appeals to 
the theory of communicative action, for example, with reference 
to ‘the ideal speech situation’, as described later in this chapter
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and in Habermas (1984:42). The aim is to form a consensus 
and obtain open and equal access to communication, although 
this ought to be placed in the context of the surrounding social 
environment, for example, with reference to a type of society, 
where there may be inequality and / or repression.
An illustration of communicative action as a form of consensual 
action could take the form of a discussion and an agreement 
concerning a policy. For example, the criteria used to treat 
cancer patients, which may differ from the criteria used with 
regard to patients who require non life threatening general 
surgical procedures. Habermas (1995:100) offers a suggestion 
with regard to the aim of ‘reaching an understanding’. He 
proposes that an agreement should be reached between two 
people on the basis of a claim that is considered as valid and as 
acceptable to both parties. The aim is to provide valid and 
convincing reasons that are able to withstand critical scrutiny. 
However it ought to be acknowledged that although those 
involved in communicative action may reach an understanding, 
this does not necessarily mean that they will reach an 
agreement. For example, there may be an acknowledgment by
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those involved, that a disagreement has occurred due to a 
rejection of what the other says.
The participants who undertake communicative action may not 
necessarily wish to search for an understanding or consensus, 
as for example, when one person wishes to kill another. The 
only understanding that occurs would relate to an 
acknowledgement that one person has the intention of harming 
another. One can now consider what is meant by rational 
communicative action, as described next.
Rational communicative action between individuals 
presupposes that a person has a level of communicative 
competence that can be demonstrated through the use of basic 
communication. Habermas (1995) offers a discussion regarding 
the basis of communication between people and this can be 
linked to practical issues that are reflected in the notion of 
discourse ethics as a specialist and practical form of 
communicative action, which could be useful when one 
considers nursing.
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A practical application with regard to communicative action 
between patient and nurse, may relate to the patient wishing to 
know more about his or her diagnosis. For example, this may 
take the form of a discussion between the nurse and his or her 
patient concerning the diagnosis of a malignancy, where a 
discussion may relate to empirical evidence, with reference to 
an X-ray that has been previously been prescribed for a patient 
by a doctor. The patient would normally perceive a nurse as 
giving information based on truth, especially if this relates to 
information that has been previously given by a doctor. 
Communicative action can be considered in contrast to strategic 
action, when the truthfulness of the communication may be 
affected by strategic action, as described in the following 
paragraph.
According to (Habermas, 1995), this occurs where a person is 
primarily motivated to influence the behaviour of another, for 
self-interested reasons. According to him, strategic action is 
oriented towards punishment and reward, where he states:
‘In strategic action one actor seeks to influence the 
behaviour of another by the means of the threat of 
sanctions or the prospect of gratification in order to
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cause the interaction to continue as the first actor 
desires.’
Habermas (1995:58).
With reference to strategic action, influences that are unrelated 
to the argument can be introduced with the aim of influencing 
the other participants towards a certain outcome. The strategic 
actor may use a form of manipulation to attain an end; the 
action is linked to the use of sanctions and rewards as a means 
of achieving ends. It would be useful at this point to expand 
upon the distinction between strategic and communicative 
action.
This distinction is able to provide a framework for the 
interpretation of social phenomena. Communicative and 
strategic action can both be considered as forms of 
communication that are at times interchangeable. This is 
illustrated when a political discussion occurs with the aim of 
forming a consensus, while at the same time there is an 
acknowledgment that the act of attaining a political consensus 
may be of benefit to those involved.
160
The employment of communicative and strategic action for 
Habermas (1995), would relate to the situation at hand and the 
moral judgement of those who are undertaking discourse. A 
person who is truthful and honest would normally try to reach an 
agreement through a valid discourse that would normally 
include negotiation and co-operation. Another person may be 
aware of the potential for personal benefit and through a 
motivation of greed, seek to achieve a result that would be of 
benefit to him or her. Although it is useful to consider 
communication with reference to the distinction between 
strategic and communicative action, it would be helpful at this 
stage, to consider communication relating to co-operation and 
consensus.
Communicative action may also occur when there is an 
expectation of co-operation and consensus and it could be used 
to support validity claims rather than the manipulation of others, 
as in the case of strategic action. For example, communicative 
action occurs between relatives who have a genuine concern 
regarding the care of a physically dependent elderly person. 
Through communicative action, the elderly patient's relatives 
may not be able to reach an agreement concerning the care of
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the person, without regard to a consideration of cost or financial 
benefit. There is an emphasis on mutual recognition and 
reciprocation, where the relatives seek to cooperate for altruistic 
reasons and come to a consensual agreement that the elderly 
relative should be cared for, rather than being left to look after 
him or herself. The application of strategic action in this case, 
would allow the relatives to be concerned about the potential 
financial rewards that may become available on the elderly 
person’s death and this would be a factor that the relatives may 
take into consideration. Strategic and communicative action can 
provide a framework for the interpretation of social phenomena. 
Having described communicative and strategic action, one 
should now consider the four validity claims that are the 
necessary conditions for discourse.
5 The Four Validity Claims
Turning now to validity claims, these form a basis for the 
occurrence of undistorted communication that can be 
considered as language to be used, when speaker’s claims are 
constrained by the following four validity claims. These are 
identified by Habermas as:
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a) That the communication should be comprehensible
b) based on truth and
c) should reflect the rightness and,
d) truthfulness of the content.’
Habermas (1995:58)
I will consider first the condition that the communication should
be comprehensible between the involved parties:
a) This presupposes that the parties involved have an 
ability to comprehend and undertake 
communication. For example, during a 
communication that may occur between doctor and 
patient, when a doctor should use language that 
the patient is able to understand.
b) For Habermas (1995, pp. 59-60), the truth claim 
refers to the ‘existence of a states of affairs.’ Truth 
is considered as factual with reference to the 
nature of a society and the notion that a discourse 
or communication is based on truth, can be 
perceived as important in that it is considered as a
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key concept in any communication. Any attempt to 
distort the truth may indicate the existence of a type 
of society for example, fascist, as in Nazi Germany, 
when the truth may be manipulated for political 
reasons. A lack of truth and a consequent lack of 
credibility of a communication may result in the 
premature closure of discourse. For example, a 
citizen in Nazi Germany may decline to read the 
press due to the lack of valid truth in the news 
reports.
There is a requirement that the content of a truth claim should 
not mislead and this can relate to the mass media for example, 
with reference to market forces, where the owner could have an 
affect on the way that issues are reported in a paper. The truth 
claim is a basic claim that relates to the content of speech, in 
terms of whether it contains verifiable information that is based 
on truth. The communication may contain empirical information 
for example; the information may be based on concrete 
indisputable evidence that can be proved.
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A communication’s empirical foundation strengthens the basis 
on which a claim can be considered as valid and Habermas 
(1995) proposes that an acknowledged valid communication 
ought at the same time to be truthful. It can be inferred from 
Habermas' (1995) work that for a person to be considered as 
truthful they ought to speak sincerely and believe in the content 
of their communication. This can be considered as a necessary 
prerequisite of this form of communication, as validity claims are 
the central planks upon which discourse ethics are based.
Therefore, the credibility of any communication rests on whether 
it is based on a verifiable truth, or what is believed to be the 
truth. Alternatively, should a communication be based on 
anything other than the truth, as for example a lie, or a cynical 
manipulation of the truth, there would be a loss of credibility and 
belief in the communicant by the person who is receiving the 
information.
I will now consider the rightness validity claim, when a nurse 
may be considered as occupying a position where a judgement 
can be made, as to the rightness of a validity claim. This forms
165
a basis of a communication that may occur between a doctor 
and patient, as described in ‘c’:
c) A crucial point made by Habermas’ (1995:60), 
concerns the term 'rightness of actions', that refers 
to the ‘observance of norms’ that can be 
considered as forming a basis for the moral 
justification of a claim. The rightness of actions is 
taken as referring to the content of the norms and 
whether the norms can be considered as 
defensible.
The above can be linked to social values and the rightness 
claim therefore implies a link to personal relationships, the 
social world and the effects that this can have on 
communication. A nurse may judge that the patient may not be 
able psychologically to make use of objective information that is 
offered and that the truth may do the patient more harm than 
good. The claim to rightness can be applied when the nurse’s 
assessment of the patient leads him or her to a perception that 
there is a need for information and ensures that the information 
is given in such a way that it would not cause the patient harm.
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The distinction between truth and rightness can be described as 
follows. Truth claims are descriptive and correspond to objective 
states of affairs that are normally measurable and factual. In 
contrast, claims to rightness relate to normative ideas, i.e. when 
a discussion occurs with regard to ‘what ought to be,’ hence 
they apply to the sphere of moral discourse. An example will 
now be offered of a truth claim that forms the basis of a 
discourse.
There is an example in the context of nursing which illustrate a 
discourse based on truth claim, where truth claims are linked to 
information that is verifiable and factual. For example, the 
number of times that a patient has had his surgical dressing 
changed during a day. Also, the constraints of working with 
inadequate staffing levels, (as described later in the Pink case,) 
can be linked to whether patients are being neglected through 
the use of measurable criteria; for example, whether patients in 
bed are being left in their excreta.
Turning to the rightness claim, this would refer to nurses and 
doctors monitoring such a situation. The norm for them would 
be that patients should be offered hygiene facilities and a
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change of personal clothing and bed linen to solve the problem 
immediately and then offer regular toilet facilities to prevent the 
occurrence of this problem in the first instance. This would 
require the provision of a sufficient number of nursing staff and 
should prevent the harm to patients for example, psychological 
harm of embarrassment and physical harm with regard to the 
risk of the patient developing pressure sores.
The nurse may take the view that a patient should be offered a 
certain amount of truth-based information that could be 
perceived by the nurse as relating to the patient’s experience of 
life that could be considered as a benefit to the patient, in that 
the information should not worry the person. This can be 
considered as a contrast to the description of empirically based 
truth claims as described in 'b':
d) According to Habermas (1995:59-61), the claims to 
truthfulness differ from the claims to truth, for the 
reference to the concept of truthfulness can be 
considered as being related to the behaviour of a 
person. The claim to truthfulness can be used to 
reveal the character of the participants in
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communication and their relationships to others 
that may influence the communication.
I will now briefly consider the difference between the terms ‘true’ 
and ‘truthful’ as referred to by Habermas (1995). A ‘true’ 
communication is normally based on objective evidence that is 
acquired first-hand. In contrast, a ‘truthful’ communication 
concerns information that is passed on and is based on the 
communicator acquiring information that he believes to be true, 
although the description of a situation may be second hand and 
difficult to verify.
For Habermas (1984), only the second and third validity claims 
of truth and rightness can be defended in discourse, for with 
regard to the ‘truth’, a speaker should be able to convince the 
listener as to the content of the speech. Similarly, ‘rightness’ is 
linked to justification when the speaker should be able to offer a 
justification for the claims that are made.
In a clinically applied context, the four validity claims have 
implications for communication between nurses, doctors and
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patients. A nurse may suggest to a doctor, that he or she should 
simplify the information that is given to a patient and leave out 
some of the potentially distressing elements. A clinically applied 
example could be given, of a nurse who is caring for a patient 
with a malignancy; when a communicative action should be 
constrained by validity claim (a), that refers to a communication 
concerning the patient’s diagnosis being comprehensible and 
offered in terms that the patient can understand. Validity claim 
(b) refers to truth, where the communication with a patient for 
example, should be based on the available medical evidence 
and the extent of the disease. The validity claim (c), of rightness, 
can relate to a doctor’s assessment of the psychological state of 
the patient. This would indicate whether the patient would be 
able to cope with a full discussion concerning the illness, or 
whether the patient would benefit from a simplified version 
based on the truth.
The majority of health care professionals, as doctors and 
nurses, would agree that a patient should be offered information 
concerning their illness. The validity claim of truthfulness (d) can 
be applied to the level and amount of information that is given 
by a doctor to a patient and this may be influenced by the
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doctor’s knowledge of a patient’s ability to understand and make 
constructive use of information. For example, the doctor may 
calculate that too much information may cause the patient 
undue worry and that the person should be offered a reduced 
and manageable amount of information (which could include 
truth being minimised). From a doctor’s point of view, this should 
prevent the patient experiencing a high level distress, as for 
example, with reference to a diagnosis of cancer. Some doctors 
may even calculate that it would be preferable to lie to a patient 
on the grounds that the truth would cause the patient 
unnecessary harm.
All the validity claims have the potential to act as constraints on 
communication between a doctor, patient and nurse. The 
patient’s perception of his or her diagnosis may have an effect 
on the professional judgement of doctors and nurses. This may 
concern the level and quantity of clinical information that is 
offered to a patient and the ability of such a patient to make 
constructive use of the information, as opposed to being 
frightened by it. A balance has to be achieved where the patient 
is given sufficient information that is described in a sensitive 
manner, with the aim of creating a level of understanding that
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enables the patient to make an appropriate decision. The nurse 
may then be able to clarify any points that the patient does not 
understand and offer the patient information that would be 
considered as useful.
6 Discourse Ethics 'D'
As described in the Glossary, for Habermas (1995), discourse 
ethics (‘D’) can be considered as a framework for the conduct of 
moral discourse. Habermas (1995) identifies discourse ethics as 
having three principles, these are:
1) A principle of universalization, (which will be 
described later in this chapter), where there is the 
intention to set conditions for impartial judgment.
2) The conditions for practical discourse, (defined as 
'D\ as described below) are identified, from which 
universally valid norms may emerge, that could 
meet the needs and be accepted by the 
participants.
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3) Later in this chapter, the suggestion is made that 
those who are involved can only achieve a 
consensus when there is free participation.
Habermas (1995:65)
With reference to the second principle, Habermas offers a 
definition of discourse ethics as:
‘(D) Only those norms can claim to be valid that 
meet (or could meet) with the approval of all 
affected in their capacity as participants in a 
practical discourse.’
Habermas (1995:66)
Discourse ethics facilitates the democratisation of a discussion 
and offers a set of guidelines that can be used. It sets out the 
rational basis of a conversation or argument and can be 
considered as a formalized version of communicative action, as 
described previously in this chapter. Habermas goes on to state 
that:
The principle of discourse ethics ... already 
presupposes that we can justify our choice of a 
norm’.
Habermas (1995:66)
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(For example, one should not harm others).
Discourse ethics involves communication within and across 
communities between those who are able to do so. For 
Habermas (1995), discourse ethics ought to have a firm, logical 
and rational base, from where argument can occur and 
decisions can be made. He perceives that there is a necessity 
for a dialogue between people and for the identification of social 
norms, although there ought to be an acknowledgement that a 
dialogue also presupposes norms. An ideal conversation occurs 
when the participants in a discussion hold a reasoned and firm 
position, based on a belief that something is right.
Habermas (1995) acknowledges that moral claims are 
normative and not descriptive. According to him, discourse 
ethics enables us to express our moral intuitions and allows the 
participants to develop a normative, generally accepted 
consensus, for example, with reference to a generalised interest 
in a right to life, or a more specific interest that concerns the 
acceptance of a particular lifestyle.
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I will now describe the elements of discourse ethics. Habermas’ 
(1995) ‘programmatic justification of discourse ethics’ requires 
four components (1) - (4) respectively:
1) ‘A definition of a universalization principle that 
functions as a rule of argumentation.’
(Habermas, 1995:96).
2) The identification of pragmatic presuppositions of 
argumentation that are inescapable and have a 
normative content.’
(Habermas, 1995:96).
3) The explicit statement of that normative content 
(e.g., in the form discourse rules).’
(Habermas, 1995:97)
4) ‘Proof that a relation of material implication holds 
between steps (3) and (1) in the connection with the 
idea of the justification of norms.’
(Habermas, 1995:97)
With regard to number one, for Habermas (1995) the rule of 
argumentation is constrained by ‘U’ or the principle of 
universalization, as will be defined later in this chapter. With 
reference to potential influences on communication, the type of
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society that people live in will influence an individual’s ability to 
express their thoughts freely and without constraint. It ought to 
be acknowledged though, that any communication may involve 
an argument, the identified consequences of which ought to be 
acceptable to those involved in the communication. In an ideal 
situation, a democratic society ought to facilitate individual 
expression based on the force of the better argument.
With reference to number two, the people who wish to 
undertake a form of discourse should be aware of the nature 
and implication of what they are going to argue. They should 
also be aware of the background issues and be able to consider 
the points for and against an issue, while bearing in mind the 
type of conclusion that ought to occur.
According Habermas (1995), the use of discourse rules in moral 
argumentation offers a means where a conflict can be resolved 
through those involved reaching a consensus. This would 
involve the participants in acknowledging that it is considered as 
the convention and right that one should listen to the points 
made in an argument before offering a response and that those 
involved in argumentation ought to speak and listen in turn
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without interruption. It is through the constructive use of 
discourse rules of argumentation that a conflict can be 
prevented or if necessary, resolved.
With regard to number three and as described in the last 
paragraph, the rules of discourse provide a framework where 
those involved in argumentation have an opportunity to 
undertake effective and consensual communication. Adherence 
to the principle of non-contradiction by people involved in 
discourse would imply that the participants are serious and 
sincere in their intention to argue, where the issue can be 
discussed dispassionately and effectively through the 
employment of discourse rules.
The statement in number (4) relates to components (3) -  (1), 
where, according to (3), a statement of discourse rules may be 
considered in relation to the mental competence, motivation and 
sincerity of those involved. The definition of the principle of 
universalization (as described later), as a rule of argumentation 
in (1) would enable those involved in communication to accept 
the consequences, if they were to perceive that the interests of 
those involved were taken into account. This may act as a
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constraint on (3), where the rules of discourse should ensure 
those that participate in the discourse have a genuine interest in 
the subject.
The rules of discourse ethics can be applied to clinical 
situations, where those involved, as doctors, nurses and 
patients, have a certain level of interest and motivation to 
communicate with each other and the potential effect of 
discourse on other people ought to be acknowledged. Those 
involved in discourse should also be aware of the implications of 
their communication that ought to be conducted on an impartial 
and consensual basis. According to Habermas, a key feature of 
discourse ethics is that:
‘Discourse ethics does not set up substantive 
orientations. Instead, it establishes a procedure 
based on presuppositions and is designed to 
guarantee the impartiality of judging.’
(Habermas 1995:122).
Therefore, Habermas (1995) does not perceive that discourse 
ethics should act as an influence on its participants. Discourse 
ethics ought to be considered as a neutral procedure that ought
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to be followed with the aim that at some point in the discourse, 
the participants can come to some form of judgement and 
agreement.
Habermas (1995) suggests that discourse ethics can be 
considered as a framework from where a discussion or 
argument that lacks a hidden agenda can occur with regard to 
issues that may concern a policy or action, that ought to be 
taken in response to a given set of circumstances. This is in 
contrast to the perceived aim of discourse that it should facilitate 
discussion and produce arguments that are based on the norms 
that can be justified as for example, in a group or society. The 
previous discussion of discourse ethics enables me at this point 
to introduce moral discourse.
7 The Rules of Moral Discourse
The rules of a moral discourse, according to Alexy (1978), as 
referred to by Habermas (1995: 89), require rule (3.1):
“Every subject with the competence to speak and 
act is allowed to take part in a discourse”.
Alexy (1978:40)
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Similarly, Alexy (1978) suggests rule (3.2):
a) “Everyone is allowed to question any assertion
whatever”. And:
b) “Everyone is allowed to introduce any assertion 
whatever into a discourse”,
c) “Everyone is allowed to express his attitudes, 
desires and needs”.
Alexy (1978:40)
Alexy (1978) also suggests rule (3.3):
“No speaker may be prevented, by internal or 
external coercion, from exercising his rights laid 
down in (3.1) and (3.2)”.
Alexy (1978:40)
In this way, moral discourse facilitates the setting of a high 
standard of national consensus, for example, with regard to 
issues as crime. Habermas (1995) makes the point that 
moralities are able to take into account the weaknesses of 
others. The principles of solidarity and justice that I refer to as 
(a) and (b) respectively, can be considered as applicable, for 
principle:
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‘a’), offers equal respect and dignity to individuals 
and ...
‘b’), acts to protect the interpersonal relations of 
the individual that are required for the 
individual to survive.
Habermas (1995:200)
Sometimes, the content of human communication is concerned 
with conduct that is based on the perceived moral claim that a 
person is right or wrong. Claims to normative rightness should 
be strengthened, if the content of the discourse were based on 
the perception that the pursuit of an action or policy is made on 
an assumption that this will relate to an agreement reached by 
all involved. There is a requirement that people should 
endeavour to offer a coherent argument; this applies to ethical 
issues that are perceived by the participants as important. For 
Habermas (1995:200), the issues are discussed with the 
discourse participants’ reference to their perception of what is 
held as morally right, and individuals communicating through 
discussion and argument are able to achieve this. 
Communication between people relates to the 'Ideal Speech 
Situation' and this is considered in the next section.
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8 The Ideal Speech Situation’
One should note at this stage of the thesis, that although 
Habermas (1979 and 1984) has made limited references to the 
‘Ideal Speech Situation’, other philosophical commentators as 
Giddens (1985), have written extensively about the framework 
and regard the 'Ideal Speech Situation' as a central plank of 
Habermas’ (1984) thinking. I shall follow them with regard to 
their thinking and acknowledge the 'Ideal Speech Situation' as 
an important part of Habermas’ (1984) theoretical apparatus.
I will begin with Giddens (1985), who describes the conditions 
that are required for an ideal speech situation, where he states:
‘A claim to truth ... is an assertion that any other 
person able to weigh the evidence would reach the 
same conclusion as the individual making that 
claim. This in turn means that the notion of truth is 
tied to presumptions about the circumstances in 
which it is possible for arguments to be assessed in 
such a way that (1) all pertinent evidence could be 
brought into play, and (2) nothing apart from 
logical, reasoned argument is involved in an 
ensuing consensus. It is these circumstances 
which Habermas (1984) calls an ideal speech 
situation.’
Giddens (1985:131)
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Therefore, as previously described in the Glossary, with 
reference to Giddens (1985):
‘An ideal speech situation is one in which there are 
no external constraints preventing participants from 
assessing evidence and argument, and in which 
each participant has an equal and open chance of 
entering into discussion/
Giddens (1985:131)
Habermas (1984) forms a link between the previously discussed 
validity claims and discourse ethics to the 'Ideal Speech 
Situation'. Habermas offers the following description:
‘Only in theoretical, practical and explicative 
discourse do the participants have to start from the 
(often counterfactual) presupposition that the 
conditions for an ideal speech situation are 
satisfied to a sufficient degree of approximation.’
Habermas (1984:42).
Habermas’ (1984:42) work on the 'Ideal Speech Situation’ has 
been identified an ideal framework with regard to the conditions 
for speech that are based on validity claims. Stress is laid on 
the importance of attaining a consensus of opinion and 
therefore, the views that are held by individuals and groups may
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differ from those in power and this could lead to potential 
criticism of a body or system.
The ‘Ideal Speech Situation’ can be used as a framework, 
where it can demonstrate weakness of communication within 
institutions and it is able to provide an objective basis for a 
consideration of critical theory. The 'Ideal Speech Situation' as 
a framework, can be used to assess structures and processes, 
for example, free speech and the extent that this falls short in a 
democracy. According to Giddens (1985:131), the 'Ideal Speech 
Situation' “is inherent in the nature of language”. The framework 
is acknowledged by the participants as having the right to an 
open and equal access (as opposed to restricted access) and 
unrestricted communication throughout discourse. The 
participants should be motivated to understand a topic through 
their discussion and a discourse should ensure that participants 
are able to attain a genuine consensus, based on the 
acknowledged importance of a forming a better argument that 
can be considered as acceptable to all.
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The participants should not possess an ulterior motive, for the 
aim of Habermas’ (1984:42) ‘Ideal Speech Situation’ is, that the 
force of the better argument should prevail. The 'Ideal Speech 
Situation' for Habermas (1979:90), is considered as a ‘critical 
principle’ and as a ‘procedural criterion’ that can be used with 
the aim of resolving disputes and attaining a consensus. It 
should be considered as a way to foster communicative 
rationality that serves to underpin a critical principle and can be 
used to form a basis for problem solving. Through the medium 
of a constructive discussion or argument, an agreement can be 
reached that is acceptable to those involved, thus providing a 
genuine consensus (as opposed to a false consensus, which 
may be obtained through, for example, some form of restricted 
access).
The notion of an 'Ideal Speech Situation’ surely forms the basis 
of a strong argument for the applicability of discourse ethics. 
The four discourse validity claims, as previously described, 
serve to underpin Habermas’ (1984:42) ‘ideal speech situation’, 
for the validity of a discourse is based on the communication 
being comprehensible, based on truth, rightness and on the
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observance of truthfulness and norms. These factors should be 
considered with reference to the motivation and behaviour of 
those involved.
Habermas’ (1984:42) ‘ideal speech situation’ can be considered 
as a framework that can be applied to advocacy. This 
framework can be used with reference to a patient who is 
unable, or finds difficulty in participating in a form of discourse. 
For example, as a result of a speech defect, or with reference to 
their communication with a doctor, that ought to result in their 
being able to access a nurse who is able to speak on the 
patient's behalf. A nurse should also promote the perspective 
that the patient would wish to be expressed, if he were able to 
do so; for example, on a medical ward round, where a nurse 
could articulate the patient's wishes.
According to Habermas (1995), discourse ethics can be seen as 
a way to facilitate a forum for moral argumentation, where 
individual positions can be justified and where the participants 
can work towards an agreement, even though an overall benefit 
may not be maximized. He suggests that the procedure of
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discourse ethics not only concerns a formation of an arena 
where specific problems can be discussed, it also enables the 
result of a discourse to have an influence on other people who 
are involved in communication on a similar subject. Therefore, in 
this way, one discourse may affect the outcome of another.
Moral argumentation normally occurs when the validity of a 
norm is challenged and moreover, the formulation and 
application of a social policy relates to the norms of a society 
and that of its citizens. These norms generally relate to the 
universal values and beliefs held by people in and outside the 
society and it would therefore seem pertinent at this point to 
describe what is meant by the term 'Universalism'.
9 Universalism
Habermas (1995) introduces the philosophical tool of ‘IT or 
‘Universalism’ as a way of evaluating competing norms. A 
discourse conducted as according to this principle should make 
an agreement possible, when the interests of everyone are 
taken into account and are considered as acceptable to all. The
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term ‘Universalization’ or ‘U’ is linked to valid norms. Habermas
offers a definition of ‘U’ as:
‘All affected can accept the consequences and the 
side effects its general observance can be 
anticipated to have for the satisfaction of 
everyone’s interests (and the consequences are 
preferred to those of known alternative possibilities 
for regulation).
Habermas (1995:65)
Or as Habermas later states:
‘For a norm to be valid, the consequences and 
side-effects that its general observance can be 
expected to have for the satisfaction of the 
particular interests of each person affected must be 
such that all affected can accept them freely.’
Habermas (1995:120)
According to the principle of Universalization, a framework is 
proposed where moral discussion / decision making can occur 
in an environment that is free of constraints, where everyone 
would come to the same decision and a universal agreement 
should have been achieved. It is linked to the universal 
exchange of perspectives, which means that a person is 
required to consider the perspective of others and this idea can
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be applied to people continually checking each other’s 
perspectives, as in the concept of ideal role-taking.
People can employ ‘U’ as a tool for establishing a legitimate 
norm and this enables a distinction to be drawn between 
individual claims. To give an example, with regard to the 
contribution of an individual to a society through taxation and 
national insurance, the majority of people would support the use 
of a system based on the ability to pay by those who have a 
certain level of wealth. By doing so they are able to support the 
idea that the state should provide a certain level of public 
service, for example, with reference to the care of older people. 
Those who are unable to afford the required payment would not 
have to make a contribution to the services, even though they 
have the right to unrestricted access to the nationally provided 
services.
'U' can be applied to communication between nurses, when 
nurses endeavour to understand each other’s perspective; an 
example of this could be with reference to who should be 
acknowledged as a registered nurse by the Nursing and 
Midwifery Council. This demonstrates the principle that the
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acceptance of a norm by those affected, is a requirement of the 
principle of Universalization.
Although some claims can be met through the deployment of 
‘U \ others cannot; as for example, where claims contain 
antagonistic, irreconcilable elements. It may be considered as 
impossible that the consequences could be considered as 
acceptable, as there may be too many differences between the 
people involved. In this case, people may come to an 
agreement to disagree. The purpose of ‘U’ is to draw a 
distinction between the claims that are and are not considered 
as acceptable.
Using the principle of V \  there may be an attempt through 
discussion, to include individual divergent beliefs and claims 
with the aim of reaching a view that are acceptable to those 
involved. For example, the libertarian idea supported by Nozick 
(1974), that people ought seek to work with the aim of self- 
finance, rather than relying on State finance for support may be 
acceptable to all those involved in discourse on the topic. There 
may be disagreement between those involved in discourse, with 
regard to the extent to which self-reliance is required and this
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could be accommodated through an acceptance by members 
that there are times when people hold different opinions that 
may lead to disagreement. This may lead to an agreement by 
those involved to disagree on a particular view. The principle of 
Universalism can be linked to Kohlberg's theory of moral 
development, as described in the next paragraph.
10 Universalism and Moral Development
Universalism or ‘U’ can be linked to stage six of Kohlberg’s 
(1981) theory of moral development, where an individual is able 
to acknowledge morality and the development of ethical 
principles. This accords with Habermas’ (1995) stance with 
regard to ‘U’, that allows for the presence of a framework from 
which a discussion may lead to an agreement concerning a 
decision that could be considered as acceptable to all involved.
With reference to Habermas’ (1995) framework, both ‘U’ and 
Kohlberg's stage six can be considered as formal and 
substantive principles that may be used when thinking about an 
issue. For example, in the Pink case with regard to the need for 
an increase in staffing levels, Kohlberg’s stage six would 
encompass a respect for patients as persons that require a
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certain level of care. The provision of staffing levels would 
reflect this and staffing the unit with a sufficient amount of 
nurses would be considered as the right thing to do.
Similarly, Habermas’ (1995) ‘U’ would facilitate a framework 
where in, an absence of constraints those who are charged with 
the responsibility of calculating the need for a level of staffing 
should be able to come to an agreement that ought to be 
acceptable to all. Such an agreement could be that the required 
finance should be made available so that such an increase can 
be afforded. These concerns can be linked to moral discourse, 
as discussed in the next paragraph.
I will offer a description of moral discourse, where this can be 
considered as an all-embracing term arising from Habermas’ 
description of moral intuition. For Habermas:
‘Moral intuitions are intuitions that instruct us on 
how best to behave in situations where it is in our 
power to counteract the extreme vulnerability of 
others by being thoughtful and considerate.’
Habermas (1995:199)
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This illustrates that a moral intuition informs us with regard to 
behaviour in certain situations and can be used to form the 
basis of a moral discourse that is able to give a voice to these 
moral intuitions. According to White (1971:61), moral 
pronouncements serve as a forum where questions can be 
posed; it does not necessarily provide the answers. This leads 
to the next topic, that of Universalism as a bridging principle to 
discourse ethics.
With regard to Universalism (‘U’), this is viewed by Habermas 
(1995) as a bridging principle to discourse ethics (‘D’), in terms of 
linking a general hypothesis to particular observations. Practical 
discourse can be considered as a way of linking an individual to 
a public forum. This offers support to individual interests, while at 
the same time allowing him or her to be isolated. For Habermas 
(1995), rules of discourse are inescapable; they are not 
considered as conventions that can be broken.
Habermas (1995) also considers ‘U’ as a further normative 
constraint for those involved in discourse, ‘D \ Therefore ‘D’ is 
constrained by ‘U’ and those involved in a related discourse
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ought to take into account the effects on people and the 
consequences that would follow, a knowledge of a discourse's 
outcome has historically affected many of the world’s decision 
makers. This confirms the notion that communication has to be 
considered with reference to the effect that it will have on other 
people. I will now identify criticism that can be made of 
Habermas’ work.
11 Criticism of Habermas
Having considered the views of Habermas (1995) in this chapter, 
it would be useful at this point to articulate four weaknesses that 
can be observed with regard to Habermas’ work.
With reference to Pellizoni (2001:69), the first objection 
concerns a requirement for ideal conditions with regard to the 
occurrence of a dialogue, which may be at a distance from a 
concrete situation. This can be interpreted as a criticism of 
Habermas’ ‘Ideal Speech Situation.’ In a nursing context, this 
may be illustrated by a practical concern, relating to the time 
that is available for the occurrence of communication. For 
example, in regard to the action that ought to be taken for the
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welfare of a patient in a clinical emergency, where a previous 
directive or decision has not been made, and there could be a 
lack of time available to canvass the views of interested parties 
and to come to a decision.
According to Pellizoni (2001:69), this objection is weak, on the 
basis that Habermas’ theory ought to be considered as ‘a 
regulatory ideal, a benchmark against which the existing 
institutions or the reformist projects can be measured.’ An 
allowance could also be made that, in such a situation, the 
nurse should employ his or her professional judgment. 
Habermas’ theory ought to be therefore considered as an ideal 
that one ought to work towards.
The second objection, as according to Pellizoni (2001:69), 
‘concerns the distinction between moral and ethical issues.’ 
Where ‘moral questions can be viewed as particular cases of 
ethical ones.’ When employing this perspective, our individual 
‘good’ may be considered from the perspective of a broader 
collective, for example, humanity. This can be applied to
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medical ethical issues, such as euthanasia, where the actions 
aimed at benefiting an individual, due to their circumstances, 
could be at odds with wider social values. Pellizoni (2001:82) 
cites an example of this, when he refers to Habermas’ (1991 
and 1992) approaches to abortion, where Habermas (1991) 
‘considers abortion to be an ethical issue and then (1992) a 
moral one.’ This, for Pellizoni, is considered as contradictory. 
This objection is identified by Pellizoni as an example, of what 
Habermas (1996a) would refer to as a ‘collision of discourses.’
Habermas (1987) would counter this by acknowledging that 
there would be an occurrence of a conflict of values, however, a 
fair and acceptable solution should be found, through an 
application of Habermas’ approach to discourse ethics. This 
would create the necessary conditions for such a discourse to 
occur.
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Pellizoni’s third objection refers to the idea that
‘non-strategic agreement only occurs when the 
parties reach consensus on the reasons for choice.’
He then poses the question: To what extent is a 
strategic compromise the only possible outcome of 
a discussion in which the parties are unable to 
define a common reason?’
Pellizoni (2001:69)
For Pellizoni (2001:69-70) ‘Intractable controversies’, where the 
parties have different strongly held beliefs can often lead to a 
dispute where the parties emphasize different facts or 
interpretations, so that each party seeks to refute the evidence 
as offered by the other party.
Habermas (1987) would counter this objection on the basis that 
the parties involved in a dispute should be able to facilitate a 
discussion where they should be able to reach a consensual 
agreement. Habermas would acknowledge that this may 
involve a protracted discussion, however, the aim of obtaining a 
consensus that is acceptable to all parties should be the main 
objective. He would acknowledge that the parties may be
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unable to form a consensual agreement and reach a decision to 
disagree. However, this should not deter the parties involved 
from engaging in a future discussion with the aim of forming a 
consensus.
A further objection concerns Habermas’ work relating to his 
concept of ‘lifeworld’. Habermas’ (1987) concept of ‘lifeworld’, 
when applied to nursing care, can be criticised on the basis that 
his version presupposes the presence of homogeny between a 
nurse and patient, which may typically be absent. For when 
considering advocacy, one should not presume that the nurse 
as an advocate, could possess the same level of knowledge 
and experience as that of a patient. The patient and nurse may 
come from differing social backgrounds and would normally 
possess differing levels of knowledge with regard to a health 
service.
In answer to this objection, when undertaking the role of 
advocate, the nurse is required to seek an understanding of the
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presence and importance of the patient’s ‘lifeworld’. In this way, 
she should be able to overcome this problem.
Having identified and discussed some of the objections with 
regard to Habermas’ perspective, I will now offer a 
consideration of discourse as a communicative link.
12 Conclusion: Discourse as a Communicative 
Link
Discourse normally occurs as a communicative link between 
people, it is directed towards the achievement of a mutual 
understanding. With regard to one’s lifeworld, a discourse can 
be used as a base, with reference to the prevailing system and 
lifeworld, from where political and social practices can be 
defended and challenged. This chapter has introduced 
discourse ethics ‘D’ and Universalism, ‘U’ and there has also 
been an acknowledgement that ‘U’ can be linked to ‘D’, where 
‘D’ represents a practical application of ‘U’ as a framework for 
the conduct of discourse.
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Habermas (1984) firmly links ’discourse’ to the previously 
identified validity claims, when he states:
‘I shall speak of “discourse” only when the meaning 
of the problematic validity claim conceptually forces 
participants to suppose that a rationally motivated 
agreement could in principle be achieved
Habermas (1984:42)
He also links discourse to the construction of an argument, that 
he suggests, ought to be long enough to facilitate a discourse. 
For Habermas (1995) discourse presupposes valid norms that 
could be met:
‘With the approval of all affected in their capacity as 
participants in a practical discourse.’
Habermas (1995:66)
for example, in the case of advocacy.
The related concepts of communicative and strategic action 
have also been considered with reference to the motivation of 
those that are involved in discourse. Communicative and 
strategic action can both be acknowledged as forms of
200
communication and in this sense are almost interchangeable. 
The difference lies in relation to the potential motivation of those 
involved in strategic action, as opposed to the lack of motivation 
in relation to communicative action. These are linked to moral 
considerations with reference to discourse that have also been 
discussed, for example: Kohlberg’s preconventional level stage 
two of human moral development refers to the purpose of the 
individual and the need for an exchange of information.
At a higher moral developmental level, a link has been made 
between Habermas’ (1995) ‘U’ and Kohlberg’s sixth stage of 
moral development, where there is an acknowledgement of the 
presence of ethical principles by which all humans should be 
guided. The chapter includes four criticisms that can be levelled 
against Habermas’ work and these have been answered. In 
chapter eight, I will offer a description of the Pink case and will 
apply the work of Habermas to it in chapter nine.
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CHAPTER 8 THE PINK CASE
Having described Habermas’ (1984) work on communication, I 
will now give an account of the Pink Case, as illustrated by his 
letters to The Guardian (1990:21). In the paper, he offers a 
description of nurses' working conditions and standards of 
patient care in an elderly care unit of a hospital at night. The 
case is also later detailed in Turner (1992).
1 Graham Pink's Background
In 1952, while on National Service in the Navy, Graham Pink 
qualified as nurse. He subsequently worked at Withington 
Hospital in Manchester and also in Canada, at the Toronto 
General Hospital. He returned to the United Kingdom during the 
mid 1950s and became a teacher, having formed the conclusion 
that nursing did not offer men a career. However, he kept his 
nursing links by undertaking night duty at weekends. During that 
time, he studied for an Open University degree and 
subsequently a master’s degree in education. At the age of fifty, 
he took early retirement from teaching and had an opportunity to 
return to nursing working as a nurse tutor but he found that the 
role did not offer him enough of a challenge. He took a post as
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staff nurse in a clinical area and applied for a post as a night 
charge nurse at Stepping Hill Hospital, on the elderly care unit. 
During the interview for the post, he suggested that the position 
should be offered to another younger candidate who needed the 
salary as he was financially secure and did not need to work. 
Nonetheless the hospital offered Pink the appointment.
Stepping Hill Hospital was classified as a general hospital in the 
Stockport Health Authority. By August 1989, Graham Pink had 
been employed for two years on the elderly care unit at the 
hospital as a night duty charge nurse. The unit was comprised 
of three wards containing 72 beds that were designated for the 
care of physically ill elderly people. The hospital had a general 
manager and an assistant general manager, the latter had 
specific responsibility for the elderly care unit at night, and 
worked on the elderly care unit at least one night per fortnight.
2 The Case
According to Snell (1997), while Graham Pink was working in 
the elderly care unit, he became concerned about the nurse 
staffing levels at night and the resulting care that the patients
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were offered. He felt the need to do something about this and 
decided to write a letter in which he expressed his concerns. 
These were supported by descriptions of nursing staffing levels 
and care in his area of responsibility. The first letter was 
addressed to the Chairman of the Stockport Health Authority 
and was written on 24th August 1989. When writing his letter, 
Pink calculated that on his ward he required three or four nurses 
on night duty. The management of the hospital replied, 
indicating that the ward required one nurse. The Chief Executive 
of the hospital met Mr Pink, listened to his concerns and then 
asked the Assistant General Manager to satisfy himself with 
regard to the staffing levels and nursing care standards on the 
elderly care unit at night. The Assistant General Manager 
offered to investigate the issues that Mr Pink had exposed.
As alluded to in Hunt (1995), at that time and later, Graham Pink 
did not wish to ask his colleagues for support, as he was aware 
that they needed to work for financial reasons and he did not 
want them to jeopardize their jobs.
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Pink sent further letters to the Assistant General Manager, 
indicating the need for a complement of at least two nurses per 
ward on night duty. After five weeks, nothing had changed and it 
was evident to Mr Pink that the hospital's management was not 
going to take action with regard to the staffing levels on the 
elderly care unit at night.
The Assistant General Manager agreed with Pink that there was 
a need for more staff in this and other hospitals; however this 
was placed in the context of the financial resources that were 
made available throughout the hospital. The requirement of 
managers to provide a health service in context with the efficient 
use of available resources is discussed in Wall (1998). The point 
was made to Pink, by management, that if more staff were 
made available to the elderly care unit, this would have affected 
the staffing levels of other wards in the hospital. At the same 
time Pink was thanked by management for bringing his 
concerns to their attention.
Pink subsequently sent letters to the Chief Executive of the 
National Health Service, the Secretary of State for Health and
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the Prime Minister. The response from Whitehall was that 
general management had been introduced in the National 
Health Service and had been charged with the responsibility for 
decision-making at a hospital and clinical level; it was therefore 
not appropriate for the Government to establish nursing 
arrangements in those hospitals. It should be noted at this point 
that Pink had not attempted to contact the NHS Commissioner 
(HMSO 1992a), who was willing to receive complaints from 
health service staff on behalf of their patients.
After having written approximately fifty letters containing twenty 
to thirty thousand words over a period of seven to eight months, 
Pink felt that he was not getting anywhere. He took advice from 
a Member of Parliament and forwarded the letters to the 
Guardian Newspaper (1990). The Guardian acknowledged the 
material's importance and presented the information by 
publishing the letters to tell their own story. The paper received 
a large public response and many people identified with what 
Pink had said.
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Once Pink had publicized the information, his night sister 
colleagues formed a perception that the publicity had cast a slur 
on them and the hospital, which would result in an adverse 
reaction by the relatives of patients on the unit. Pink's 
colleagues felt that he was naive and should have coped with 
the situation. The General Manager wished that the action had 
never happened and that the issue could have been settled 
without press involvement. It would seem useful at this stage to 
describe the content of the management's report.
3 The Report
According to the BBC (1992), the management prepared a 
report to address the staffing issues raised by Graham Pink and 
this was intended to be a detailed and final response. A 
teamwork system was used by the hospital with regard to 
manpower planning and six levels of care were identified as:
1) Dangerous
2) Barely safe
3) Less than adequate
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4) Adequate
5) Good
6) Excellent
The management report concluded that the care given on the 
hospital’s elderly unit at night was designated as ‘adequate’. 
This was defined as ‘Patients receive adequate levels of care, 
although not every need is met’, (BBC 1992). The Health 
Authority concluded that, given the resources that were 
available at that time, standards of patient care were adequate. 
The Authority suggested that this was also the view held by the 
key people that were interviewed.
Graham Pink challenged the Health Authority’s findings that 
patients received adequate care. On the basis that the Health 
Authority’s figures that indicated for the unit as a whole, patient 
care was 0.16% less than adequate -  a figure that could be 
used to justify the need for extra funding of the staff budget. 
According to the night management team, nursing-staff were 
moved from other areas of the hospital to the unit at night and
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the nursing managers and night sisters helped with patient care 
on the unit, as required. It was on this basis that the Health 
Authority defined the level of care as ‘adequate’ and that the 
general manager wrote a letter to Pink, requesting he should not 
become involved in further publicity. It should be noted that 
there were nursing colleagues who agreed with Graham Pink, 
but were concerned that they might be seen to be “rocking the 
boat” (BBC 1992).
After a further incident involving the care of a patient, Pink went 
to the Stockport Express paper, who ensured that he was aware 
of the repercussions that would occur as a result of further 
publicity. Pink was prepared to accept the consequences and 
took the view that the staffing levels on the elderly care wards 
were more important than the personal consequences that he 
could experience as a result of his action, as described in Pink 
(1992). The relatives read of the incident in the local press and 
the patient involved was identified.
This led to the managers taking out a disciplinary action against 
Mr Pink on the grounds of a breech of confidentiality. During
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August 1991, the Health Authority found Pink guilty of gross 
misconduct. As an alternative to dismissal, the employer offered 
Pink a transfer to the community, on the grounds that Pink was 
unable to work in a large organization where he had to relate to 
people. Pink declined the offer, as he felt that this was not 
appropriate due to his lack of training and experience in this 
area of nursing. The Authority then dismissed him for a breech 
of confidentiality. Graham Pink took his case to an industrial 
tribunal and subsequently lost an appeal against his dismissal.
This case study illustrates that both the hospital's management 
and Pink, held a perception that there were national and local 
funding deficiencies in the health service. This was reflected in 
the levels of nursing staff that were made available to care for 
the hospital's vulnerable elderly patients at night. The presence 
of these perceived deficiencies formed the basis of Pink's 
decision to make a stand with regard to the care of elderly 
patients and to make the public aware of the hospital's need for 
more nurses, by going to the press.
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The Pink case highlights a criticism of Gadow’s (1989) approach 
concerning advocacy and the silent patient, as described in 
chapter four. Although typically many of the patients on Pink’s 
unit were conscious, some had Alzheimer’s or other illnesses 
that affected their rational ability. Therefore the same criticism of 
Gadow would apply in this case study; namely, how can a nurse 
accurately gauge a patient’s preferences when they are unable 
to articulate them.
4 Summary
This chapter has described the Pink case, detailing the 
professional background of Pink and the circumstances that 
influenced the case. This can be applied throughout the 
National Health Service and Private Sector and illustrates the 
conditions and restraints that affect the work of nurses. Owing to 
his previous career and resulting financial status, Pink felt that 
he had little to lose by voicing his concerns, a position that few 
nurses occupy. This has to be a consideration, when reading 
the details. Nevertheless, this case is considered as a landmark, 
in that it illustrates the importance of compiling detailed 
information concerning a situation and acting according to one’s
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conscience, even though there may be adverse consequences 
for the individual concerned. Having described the Pink case 
study, in the next chapter, I will apply the work of Habermas 
(1995) to it.
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CHAPTER 9 HABERMAS AND THE PINK CASE
1 Introduction
In this chapter I will discuss the application of Habermas' (1995) 
work on communication to the Pink case study with reference to 
Kohlberg’s levels of moral development, as described in 
Habermas (1995:123-4), and also Habermas’ (1987) work on 
system and lifeworld and his (1984) work on communicative and 
strategic action. I will discuss an application of the previously 
described four validity claims that can be related to Pink’s 
discourse, and will apply the principle of Universalism that can 
be employed as a constraint on argumentation. A similar 
application can be made with regard to ‘ideal speech situation’ 
and ‘advocacy’, as described previously in the thesis. A relevant 
area to begin application of Habermas' (1995) work, is with 
reference to moral development, as discussed in the next 
section.
2 Moral Development
With reference to Kohlberg’s three levels of moral development, 
Pink’s management colleagues appeared able to reach the
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post-conventional and principled level of moral development. 
The basis for this observation rests on the fact that Pink's 
nursing colleagues were able to take a broad view and felt that 
all specialties ought to be afforded a certain level of financial 
resources, with reference to the employment of nursing staff. 
This formula can be applied to the nursing staffing levels with 
regard to patient care, when the available limited resources are 
evenly distributed to the medical, surgical and elderly care 
wards. This is in contrast to the resources being allocated solely 
to one particular clinical area, as in the case of the elderly care 
wards, where those can often be perceived as the most 
deserving.
Pink's colleagues' acknowledgement that the hospital should be 
considered as a united entity that contained the above medical 
and nursing specialties was emphasized, when his night sister 
colleagues moved nursing staff from surgical, medical wards to 
the care of the elderly wards, as the need arose. Furthermore, 
the night sisters raised the nursing staff levels on the elderly 
care wards by working clinically on the unit themselves. This 
acknowledgement by the night sisters, demonstrated their ability
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to think morally at a post conventional level, in that they were 
able to consider and respond to competing claims for nursing 
staff from differing clinical areas. They attempted to increase the 
elderly care unit staffing levels by individually working in that 
area.
With reference to the above case study, Pink in contrast, was 
able to reach a conventional stage of moral thinking, where an 
individual has developed a social consciousness and is aware of 
a potential for action or actions, this having been attained 
through his or her life experience and education. Pink was able 
to make a coherent case for extra financial resources that 
should adequately fund the staffing levels required on the 
elderly care unit and he made an assumption that when 
management learned of the facts, they would respond with swift 
action. In this case study, Pink referred solely to the 
requirements of patients in his care and did not appear to take 
into account that management had to consider the levels of 
nursing staff allocated to his unit, in the context of the hospital 
as a whole, as a response to the then Government’s policy 
towards the health service. He failed to acknowledge that
215
management had to be seen to distribute the available 
resources effectively. Pink's exclusive concentration on his unit, 
demonstrates his conventional level of moral thinking. However, 
Pink could also claim to be universalizing a level six norm when 
he expressed his concern that all of the elderly patients on the 
unit should be given a good level of care by the nursing staff on 
the ward. However, this aspiration did not appear to be attained 
or acknowledged in the case study. One can now apply 
Habermas’ (1987) work on ‘system’ and ‘lifeworld’ to the Pink 
case study.
3 System and Lifeworld
With regard to the Pink case study, Habermas’ (1987) work on 
system can be applied to the then prevailing Conservative 
Government’s policy, of making the health service managers 
responsible and accountable for financial resources, with the 
aim of providing cost effective patient care. Pink found that the 
health service and its management appeared to be hierarchical 
and unresponsive to his internal letters. It was only when he felt 
compelled to publish the letters in the Press, that he had a swift 
response.
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Habermas’ (1987) lifeworld can be applied to the life 
experiences of patients, who may have had little knowledge of 
the health service, how it was run and may also have been in an 
unfit mental state to express their experiences and 
observations. The lifeworlds of Pink and his colleagues can also 
be applied, where colleagues had to work for economic reasons, 
whereas Pink did not. This had an influence on the two parties' 
perception of staffing levels and the subsequent effect of this on 
patient care. Lastly, the lifeworld can be applied to 
management, whose role it was to provide economically justified 
patient care within a health system; this required a certain level 
of staffing to maintain safe patient care. For management, 
Pink’s letters were to be dealt with through agreed procedures 
and management perceived that Pink’s action of going to the 
press circumvented those agreed procedures.
4 Communicative Action
The Pink case study can also be analyzed in terms of 
Habermas’ (1984) theory of Communicative Action. The act of 
communicative action presupposes Pink’s communicative 
competence. As previously suggested, Pink took the view that
217
by identifying his concerns and communicating these to 
management in writing, this would be sufficient to ensure that 
action was taken to remedy the problem.
Pink's view was based on the belief that his communication with 
management should have led to the development of a 
consensus between the nurses and management, that nursing 
staffing levels should have been maintained at an adequate 
level, with the aim of facilitating the required level of patient 
care. This should have included the provision of sufficient time 
for nurses to talk to their patients. It would now be pertinent to 
consider the motivation of Pink and the management, in terms 
of strategic action.
5 Strategic Action
The Pink case can be analyzed in terms of strategic action, for 
this occurs when a person is motivated primarily to influence the 
behaviour of another. With regard to this view, the letters written 
by Pink to the management, government and press can be 
considered as examples of strategic action, as he was trying to
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influence these bodies with regard to the levels of nursing staff 
on his unit.
Strategic action can also be applied to the act of management in 
the Pink study, when they were aware of the need to manage 
staffing levels within the available financial resources and 
resorted to a strategy of moving staff to the elderly care unit 
from other areas of the hospital. This would have been enforced 
at the time, by management awareness of the need to keep 
within a budget. Their posts were based on performance related 
pay, where an inability to manage services within a limited 
budget would have resulted in the managers involved, losing 
their financial bonuses or employment.
Strategic action can also be applied to the press, who were 
motivated to print Pink’s story with the aim of increasing their 
paper sales. They thought that the story would be of interest to 
the public and that the letters did not require an explanation. 
There was a good response to the story from other nurses and 
the public at large, which confirmed they had captured the 
interest of the public. Having considered communication in
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terms of strategic action, I will now consider an application of the 
four validity claims, as previously described, to the Pink case.
6 The Four Validity Claims
The Pink case can be analyzed in terms of the four validity 
claims with reference to Pink, his nursing colleagues and 
management. These are:
a) That Communication Should be Comprehensible
This presupposes the ability of the involved parties to 
communicate in a comprehensible manner and through the 
content and articulation of his speech, Pink was able to fulfil 
this validity claim. The public could understand the content of 
Pink's speech; letters were published in The Guardian and 
identified with the issues that were raised. Pink's nursing 
colleagues were also able to offer a good level of 
communication, as their speech was based on logic and this 
enabled them to form a sound rationale as a basis for their 
speech. Similarly, the hospital's management was able to form 
a coherent case for the content for their speech. The next
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claim, which I will consider with reference to the Pink case 
study, is concerned with 'truth'.
b) The Truth Claim
With reference to the truth claim as previously described, I refer 
to Habermas’ (1995:59-60) ‘existence of states of affairs.’ Pink 
was able to provide factual evidence with regard to the 
verifiable numbers of staff on duty in specific clinical areas at 
night and he was able to document specific clinical incidents 
that arose with regard to the patients on his ward. His 
colleagues were able to offer accounts of incidents that they 
believed were based on truth and were a reflection of the 
staffing levels at the hospital during the night. Management was 
able to offer a justification in support of their communication 
with references to the available resources. This was supported 
by an investigation that had been undertaken into nursing 
staffing levels by management and the tools and procedures 
that were available for use when the management personnel 
sought to interview Pink. A further related validity claim that can 
be considered with reference to the Pink case concerns the 
claim to 'rightness'.
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c) Claim to Rightness
As according to Habermas (1995:60) and as described 
previously, this claim refers to the rightness of actions and the 
observance of norms. The rightness claim can be considered 
from Pink’s point of view, when he perceived that his first action 
should be to draw to his employer’s attention the staffing levels 
on the elderly care unit at night. When there was a lack of 
response from the employer, Pink came to the conclusion that 
by first, approaching the management executive of the NHS 
and then the politicians, at different levels of government, there 
would be some form of response. Then, failing this and as a 
last resort, he published the facts in The Guardian on the basis 
that he was acting for a cause that was right. With reference to 
the rightness claim and his colleagues, Pink had the support of 
some staff at the hospital. They acknowledged the problem and 
the need to do something, although in some instances they felt 
unable to offer direct support for Pink, because of their financial 
obligations, which necessitated their employment at the 
hospital.
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When Pink raised his concerns, some of his nursing colleagues 
took offence and this was based on their perception that his 
criticism implied that they were not doing a good job. They also 
felt that the reputation of the hospital would be diminished and 
that patients’ relatives would become concerned and distressed 
with regard to the content of the publicity. Management 
accepted that there was a requirement for more staff; however 
they took the view that in order to provide extra staff, resources 
would have to be diverted from other areas in the hospital, 
resulting in a staffing deprivation in other clinical areas. It ought 
to be acknowledged that the key norms with reference to the 
Pink case study concern the prevention and relief of suffering in 
the care of the elderly unit at the hospital. Having considered 
'rightness', I will now consider the claim of ‘truthfulness’ with 
regard to the Pink case.
d) The Truthfulness Claim
With regard to the claim to truthfulness, as linked to the 
behaviour of a person and as previously described, Pink’s aim 
was to tell the truth. Part of this equation was based on the fact 
that Pink did not have to work and rely on income from his post
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as charge nurse. Therefore, he did not appear to hold any 
vested interests, although he felt that he had to tell the truth, 
even though management tried to dissuade him from going to 
the press, on the grounds of a potential public loss confidence 
in the hospital. Pink's nursing colleagues also ensured that they 
aimed to tell the truth, although there were some comments 
from them regarding Pink's conception of nursing staffing levels 
and the presence of constraints. His colleagues felt a certain 
amount of betrayal by him, in that they held a perception that 
his account could influence the public's opinion of the hospital. 
With regard to management, they had a vested interest in the 
avoidance of publicity, for the exposure of conditions in the 
hospital would have led to an investigation and a concern with 
regard to their competence. There would have been a 
possibility that the management could have been replaced.
As previously stated, the notion of truth differs from that of being 
truthful, for true communication is based on objective, first-hand 
information and this is in contrast to a truthful claim. Information 
can be passed from one person to another and the individual 
who acquires second-hand information may hold the belief that
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it is true. Having applied the four validity claims, it would seem 
pertinent to apply 'discourse' to the Pink case.
7 Discourse
I will now consider ‘discourse’, as applied to the Pink case. 
Pink’s letters to the management and the act of publicizing them 
were examples of communication. These were aimed at 
fostering an internal understanding of the situation and when, in 
Pink’s perception, this did not appear to occur, he resorted to 
publicity. According to his perception, his claims were based on 
truth and they were considered as right, as the management 
appeared to understand (possibly too well). They were able to 
foresee the negative implications of whistle blowing in terms of 
the hospital’s reputation and the potential effects of this on their 
personal ambition. They acknowledged Pink’s positive intent to 
gain more staff, however they had to take into account 
government policy at the same time, which had initiated general 
management with the remit of effective management of limited 
available resources. The management acknowledged that 
hospitals had to work within the political and management 
system and that this was considered as the norm in the health
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service. The principle of Universalism ‘IT can also be applied to 
the Pink case.
8 ‘IT Universalism
I will now consider ‘IT or Universalism in application to the 
norms of the Pink case. ‘U’ is previously identified in chapter 
eight in this thesis and as previously alluded, can be described 
as a principle where the people involved in a moral discourse 
are able to accept the consequences and side effects, for the 
satisfaction of everyone’s interests. With regard to 'U', a 
principle is proposed with respect to the conditions for a moral 
discussion that ought to occur in an environment that is free of 
constraints. Moreover, stress is laid on the importance of taking 
into account differing points of view, as held by those involved in 
a communication, and the creation of an environment that would 
enable everyone to come to the same decision. This should 
enable those involved to achieve a universal agreement, ideally 
through the 'ideal speech situation.’
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With reference to an application to the Pink case, a norm held 
by Pink can be expressed in terms of ‘U \ for example, the norm 
that there should be sufficient funding of the health service. It 
may then afford the resources to provide nurse-staffing levels 
that would allow for adequate communication between nurses 
and patients, who should then be well cared for. With respect to 
the Pink case and this norm, there was a general agreement 
between the management of the hospital, staff, patients and 
their relatives. There would also be an agreement that Pink 
ought to bring his nursing staffing level concerns to the 
hospital's managers. Having been informed of these concerns 
they should be able to agree with Pink, that extra financial 
resources ought to make available to the hospital's 
management with the aim being to engage extra staff for the 
hospital, in particular the care of the elderly unit.
One can therefore suggest that an agreement existed at this 
level between hospital's management and Pink, with regard to 
the norm that there should be adequate levels of nursing staff in 
the elderly care unit and that in this way, the criteria for 'U' was 
satisfied. Initially there was an agreement between Pink and the
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hospital's management that the grievance procedure ought to 
be observed. Pink exercised his professional right and duty to 
make known his concerns with regard to the care of the elderly 
unit's staffing levels by using the appropriate channels and the 
hospital's management was in agreement with this action.
However, an inability to achieve a valid norm and to satisfy ‘IT 
occurred in the Pink case. This concerned the presence of a 
fundamental disagreement between Pink and the hospital's 
management with regard to action that was required to ensure 
that extra resources were made available, with the aim of 
alleviating shortages of nursing staff in the elderly care unit. 
After pursuing the hospital’s normal grievance procedure and 
perceiving that nobody appeared to be listening to his concerns 
and that nothing was being done to alleviate the situation, Pink 
felt that he had a duty to publicize his observations on the nurse 
staffing levels.
Although there was an agreement between Pink and 
management, that more staff was required for the hospital and 
elderly care unit as a valid norm, the management was not
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prepared to place the information in the public domain. This was 
due to a concern that those in the higher levels of management 
in the health service and Government would perceive the 
hospital's management as ineffective.
In the Pink case, the grievance procedure helped to keep the 
information within the NHS domain, thereby denying public 
access. The above can be applied to the inability of the two 
parties to agree a valid norm concerning the need for publicity 
with regard to staffing levels. The case can also be made that 
the conditions, as according to ‘IT, did not apply in this instance, 
as Pink and the management did not agree to disagree. Indeed, 
there was an absence of any form of agreement between the 
two parties, as there appeared to be little common ground 
between the two, with regard to the perceived requirement for a 
publication of the facts.
From the above discussion one can make the suggestion that 
‘IT can be applied to the Pink case through different levels of 
thought, as for example, on one level, where the conditions of 
‘U’ were met when Pink, his colleagues and management could
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achieve a consensus and an agreement regarding the need for 
more staff, and when Pink and the management could agree a 
consensus on the need to communicate these concerns 
internally within the hospital.
At another level, the conditions of ‘U’ were unable to be met, 
when there was an inability to achieve an agreement and 
consensus with regard to how higher staffing levels should be 
facilitated and could not be achieved. Furthermore, the 
conditions of ‘U’ could not be met with regard to an agreement 
about the need to go to the press. Moreover, there was an 
absence of evidence in the study, that an agreement to disagree 
could be attained. At the end of the study, there appeared to be 
mounting difficulties between Pink and management and there 
was evident difficulty with regard to the aim of the two parties 
understanding each other’s perspectives, although both Pink 
and the management agreed on the principle that there was a 
need for more staff in the health service.
‘IT can be used to identify the acceptability or otherwise, of 
claims with reference to the affected parties in the 'Pink' case
230
study, as for example, patients, nurses and hospital managers. 
For instance, the claim made by Pink and some of his nursing 
colleagues that there was a need for more staff can be 
considered as acceptable, as opposed to how this could be 
achieved. For example, the management’s solution of moving 
staff from other clinical areas was not really acceptable to Pink, 
as this did not fully address the underlying problem of the 
hospital's staffing levels.
The norm for Pink, that nurses should be able to give a good 
quality of care, including having the time to communicate with 
their patients, can be expressed in the terms of ‘U’. Pink made 
his decision to go to the press in order to gain publicity for his 
case that the wards of the hospital in which he worked were 
understaffed. It would seem relevant at this stage, to briefly link 
'U\ as a constraint on argumentation, as applied to the Pink 
case. With reference to the Pink case and Universalization 
which functions as the rule of argumentation (as described in 
Habermas, 1995), the need for an adequate debate regarding 
staffing issues was not fully addressed in this case. Thus the
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lack of a management response encouraged Pink to place his 
story in the public domain.
Linked to the explicit statement of the normative content (i.e. 
Discourse rules), as according to Habermas (1995), the people 
involved in communication, in the Pink case, acknowledged the 
seriousness of the communication. As management limited 
Pink’s communication, the rules of discourse were not fully 
adhered to and this should not have occurred. I will now 
consider an application of the Ideal Speech Situation.
9 Ideal Speech Situation
In application of the ideal speech situation as identified by 
Giddens (1985), those patients who are vulnerable and elderly 
and who are unable to speak for themselves, ought to be able 
access a nurse who is able and willing to speak for them. A 
nurse, as demonstrated in Pink’s case, is able to speak on his or 
her patients’ behalf and is also normally in possession of 
knowledge with regard to the hospital and management system 
and how it works and the nurse is normally aware of the
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procedures with regard to communication. He or she, as 
patient’s advocate is normally capable of acknowledging the 
validity of his or her case and is capable of forming and 
articulating a better argument that should be the foundation of a 
successful advocacy role, as according to the ideal speech 
situation.
Pink was able to articulate the need for more staff on the 
grounds that there were insufficient numbers of staff to deliver 
the appropriate level of care that was required by the patients. 
His argument for more staff was based on factual evidence that 
was gathered from personal sources and later, through the 
management's investigation of staffing levels. The factual 
evidence forms the basis of truth and rightness of this case.
Pink’s communication rested on the validity claims of truth and 
rightness and an argument could not be made against his case 
for more staff. His work background and financial resources 
meant that he did not have to take a post as charge nurse and 
therefore did not have to consider the effect of the case on his 
employment prospects. His previous experience of dealing with
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people and situations informed him of the need to pursue the 
goal of drawing attention to the staff shortages despite personal 
consequences. There was a consensus between Pink and many 
colleagues with regard this, however his night sister colleagues 
and management did not share this view.
Although Pink told the truth, and his case for more staff could 
not be argued against, he failed to provide a better argument on 
the grounds that he considered the staffing levels mainly with 
regard to the elderly care unit rather than that of the whole 
hospital. His seemingly parochial approach failed to take into 
account the issues of staffing that came from considering the 
hospital as an entity. This leaves Pink’s approach to resolving 
staffing issues by resorting to publicity, open to the criticism on 
the grounds that any response offered by the management and 
government could be fragmented and aimed at solving local 
problems, rather than solving the long-term problem of the NHS 
as being continually under resourced. In their response to Pink’s 
case, the hospital’s management appeared to be able to 
acknowledge the need for publicity concerning staffing levels. 
One can now apply 'IT and 'D' to advocacy and the Pink case.
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10 Application of 'U' and 'D'
I will now turn to the application of Habermas’ (1995) definitions 
of ‘U’ and ‘D’ to advocacy and the Pink case. Using Habermas' 
(1995:65) definition and description of 'U', as illustrated in 
chapter seven, those involved in the Pink case should be able to 
come to an agreement. Habermas (1995) suggests that this 
should take into account the views of other people through the 
exchange and checking of individual perspectives, even though 
this may result in an agreement to disagree.
‘U’ can be employed as a critical principle that could be used as 
a test to ascertain whether communication is conducted 
according to the norms of the parties involved. It could also be 
used to identify whether it would be possible to reach an 
agreement that could satisfy the interests of those involved. An 
example being, that the norm for most people in a society is that 
there should be an adequate health service available to care, as 
required.
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Both principles of ‘U’ and ‘D’ can be applied to advocacy when a 
norm held by the majority in a society, that adequate health care 
for the citizens ought to be afforded, is potentially compromised 
by political decision making and consequent management 
policies and actions. The case can be made in support of the 
nurse to act as an advocate on a patient’s behalf, on the 
grounds that the nurse works in the hospital as part of the health 
care system and is aware of the structure and channels of 
communication. There would be an expectation by the public 
that nurses, as part of their caring role, would be able to 
articulate effectively the concerns of the patients, relatives and 
colleagues, by the act of speaking out when it was felt that there 
was a need to do so.
With regard to his case, Pink felt his norm that nurses should be 
able to give good nursing care and have the time to talk to 
patients, was compromised due to a lack of available resources 
that the hospital managers were able to provide. Having 
considered this, he decided that he had to bring his concerns to 
the attention of the management and politicians. When there 
was a lack of response he decided to publish his observations in
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the media, with the aim that something should be done 
regarding the resources that were made available for the 
employment of nursing staff.
11 Summary
In this chapter I have applied the work of Habermas to the Pink 
Case. This has enabled me to link Habermas’ concepts to the 
different actors and their roles within the Case Study, for 
example, the role of Pink and that of his night nursing 
colleagues and hospital management. All of Habermas’ (1984, 
1987 and 1995) work can be applied to this study, for example, 
the conditions that are required for discourse and the validity 
claims. In the next chapter, I will look at an application of 
Habermas’ (1995) work to that of Gadow (1983) and advocacy, 
through the use of another case study.
237
CHAPTER 10 APPLICATION OF PERSPECTIVES
1 Application of ‘System’ and ‘Lifeworld’
There is a clear link between Habermas’ (1987) account of 
system, lifeworld and the notion of advocacy. One should 
acknowledge that a health service forms part of a social system 
and that the staff and patients experience their lifeworld when 
they interact with the health service. This experience will 
normally have an effect the development of professional 
relationships between staff and patients.
A link can be made between Habermas’ (1987) concept of 
‘system’ and Gadow’s (1983) ‘object’ body perspective. For 
example, with reference to a system, as the National Health 
Service, where a Government’s level of financial investment in 
healthcare has an effect on the amount and complexity of 
treatment that is available to patients. The operation of this 
system can be linked to a patient’s object body, in terms of 
whether the patient’s physical problem is assessed as a clinical 
emergency, or whether the person is deemed as a suitable 
candidate for a potentially lengthy waiting list. This may give
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rise for a justification of advocacy, on the grounds that the 
‘system’ may view the patient’s object body as having a non 
life-threatening disease that can be treated at a later date. The 
patient’s perspective however, would normally be influenced by 
his or her ‘lifeworld’ and ‘lived’ body experiences. Therefore, the 
patient may come to a different conclusion and require a form 
of advocacy.
At a societal level, the system and resultant philosophy of a 
society can heavily influence the form that a health service may 
take, for example, as in the United States model, which relies 
heavily on personal insurance to fund its service. This is in 
contrast to the British model, which is based on National 
Insurance of its citizens to fund a service free to all at the point 
of delivery.
With reference to the points made above, the role of advocacy 
in the United States and the United Kingdom has the potential 
to be influenced by the values held by a society. With regard to 
advocacy, the United States of America, for example, tends to
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rely on a patients’ rights model, where the patient is offered 
information and expected to make decisions concerning their 
care and treatment. A third party, in the United States, may be 
interpreted as the involvement of a patient’s lawyer, who is 
normally paid by the patient or their insurance company with 
the aim of legally representing the interests of the patient. This 
system does not normally rely heavily on the presence of 
patient advocacy groups.
In contrast, the British model of a universal state supported 
healthcare does allow for the development and presence of 
advocacy groups, whose role is interpreted as the provision of 
support for patients. To-date, the British system does not 
normally rely as heavily as the United States on legal 
representation of patients.
240
2 Application of 'System’ and 'Lifeworld’ to 
Gadow
The application of Habermas’ (1984) concept of the ‘lifeworld’, 
as previously described, has a resonance with Gadow’s (1983) 
account of existential advocacy. In terms of Gadow’s (1983) 
emphasis on the importance of a patient and their experience, 
she perceives that the patient ought to be the person to make 
informed decisions with regard to his or her treatment and care. 
Gadow (1983) acknowledges the importance of nurses striving 
to offer holistic patient care and as previously identified and 
Gadow offers a detailed account of the patient’s experience in 
terms of having a ‘lived’ body and ‘object’ body.
Gadow’s (1983) description of the ‘object’ body has been 
previously identified and refers to the illness and consequent 
treatment that a patient may have to endure. The illness, 
treatment and their effects can be measured objectively, 
through monitoring the patient’s progress and performing the 
necessary investigations, with the aim of identifying the 
progress of the illness and effectiveness of treatment.
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As previously described, for Gadow (1983), the ‘lived’ body 
refers to patient’s experience and reaction to an illness, the 
accompanying medical examination and associated 
investigations. The patient’s perception of these events would 
relate to the patient’s previous experience of health care and 
the society that the patient lives in and his or her view of life. 
For example, the patient may believe that in British society, one 
ought to expect and accept a certain level of pain, without an 
overt personal response; for example, crying. This may be 
different from a Mediterranean society, where it is often 
culturally acceptable to express an individual response to pain.
Similarly with regard to a system or subsystem (as described 
by Habermas 1987), the fact the fact the British national health 
care system has a policy of not charging its patients for 
emergency health care would have an effect on a patient’s 
perception of the society (system) that they live in. This would 
normally be shared by the ‘lifeworld’ and ‘lived’ body, in terms of 
an expectation that should the patient require emergency care, 
the standard of care offered would not be dependant on the 
health care insurance policy that the individual has (as in the
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case of the United States of America). This knowledge may 
engender feelings of comfort for the patient and this would 
relate to the ‘lived’ body.
With respect to advocacy and the potential for the patients’ 
lifeworld, which will be based on his or her subjective 
experience of life and healthcare, one has to acknowledge that 
the patient’s lifeworld would have an effect on his her 
perception of their illness and care. This would in turn have an 
effect on the patient’s ‘lived’ body experience, as described by 
Gadow (1983).
The link can be made between Gadow’s (1983) work on 
existential patient advocacy and Habermas’ (1995) account of 
discourse ethics. As described previously, the four validity 
claims can be considered as a necessary precondition for 
discourse. The comprehensibility and level of truth with regard 
to the content of a discourse between doctors and patients can 
be linked to Gadow’s existential advocacy, where a competent 
patient normally wishes to have an adequate amount of 
information with regard to his or her ‘object body’ (as according
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to Gadow 1983) that is based on truth. The patient would 
normally trust the doctor or nurse to offer a truthful account of 
the facts. In this context this level of communication would be 
right and serve to enhance the patient’s understanding of their 
problem and required care. The patient would trust the nurse or 
doctor and this can be linked to Gadow’s (1983) ‘lived body', 
where the patient should be satisfied with the level of 
information offered. The patient should be then in a position 
where they can make decisions about their treatment and 
welfare. Gadow's (1983) 'lived' and 'object' bodies can also be 
closely linked to Habermas' (1984 & 1987) work on the 'system' 
and 'lifeworld', where this can be applied to the health care 
system and patients' experience of their illness and treatment / 
care. Habermas’ (1984) perspective forms a firm academic 
basis for Gadow's (1983) account of advocacy, based on the 
experiences of illness and health care that her patient have 
undergone. One can now consider the lifeworld in the context of 
the doctor / patient relationship.
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3 Clinical Application of Lifeworld
With regard to the relationship between a doctor and patient, 
Habermas’ (1995) reference to the lifeworld in terms of context 
and resources can also readily be applied. The ability to achieve 
a consensus could be inhibited by the patient’s potential lack of 
education compared to that typically acquired by the doctor and 
conversely, the doctor’s possible lack of experience of living in 
an economically deprived social setting. It is in this context that 
the concept of ‘movable horizon’, as described by Habermas 
(1987:123-124), can be applied. This would allow the doctor 
and patient to forge an understanding, even though they may 
have come from differing social backgrounds. This 
understanding ought to be facilitated through the doctor’s 
acquired knowledge derived from Cooke’s (1994) ‘expert 
culture’, as applied to medicine. The doctor’s medical school 
curriculum should have embraced the social influences that 
typically underpin patients’ problems, resulting in a more socially 
aware medical practitioner.
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Scambler and Britten (2001:57) make the connection between 
the previously described differing lifeworlds of a doctor and 
patient. Scambler (1987) suggests that attempts made by a 
doctor to understand the patient’s lifeworld are temporarily set 
aside when the patient’s treatment is decided by the doctor on 
the basis of his or her clinical judgment. Nevertheless, for a 
doctor to make an assessment of a patient, there would have to 
be some appreciation of the patient’s lifeworld, for example, 
with reference to the patient’s adverse social conditions that 
have predisposed the patient to a chronic respiratory problem. 
Cooke’s (1994:16) reference to ‘overlapping lifeworlds’ can be 
applied here, when the doctor should seek to understand why 
the patient has developed the problem by employing the 
rationale that the problem is typically exacerbated by the 
patient’s social conditions and that these ought to be addressed 
as part of the patient’s treatment.
Communication problems, according to Scambler (2001:57) 
arise when for example, a doctor ignores a patient’s lifeworld. 
Similarly, this problem is also acknowledged in Gadow’s (1983) 
account of advocacy, as for example, when the doctor or nurse
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does not take into account the patient’s experience of an illness 
or problem, or when the patient’s lifeworld is blocked. Porter 
(1998:145) refers to the ‘colonisation’ of the lifeworld, when for 
example, the health professional, the nurse or doctor, may 
reduce the patient’s lifeworld, in terms of communication, to a 
technical function. For example, concerning the use of medical 
or nursing jargon and abbreviations that the patient may not 
understand. Similarly, according to Scambler (2002:123), ‘the 
voice of medicine’ may have the effect of distorting 
communication and the relationship between a doctor and 
patient, when the doctor has his or her own medical lifeworld 
that may not accord with the wishes of the patient. This 
problem can also be applied to the nurse / patient relationship, 
as described in the following case study and discussed later in 
this chapter.
4 Use of a Case Study
It is my intention to use a description of the fictitious case study 
of Gaynor Jones, with the aim of applying the work of Gadow 
(1983) and Habermas (1995). The case will be made that an 
adjustment of Gadow’s (1983) theory with regard to advocacy 
could occur, when one considers a framework for discourse
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ethics, as proposed by Habermas (1995). It would be useful at 
this stage to begin with a description of the case study.
4a The Case Study
Gaynor Jones is a thirty seven year old married woman who 
lives with her husband Bob, and one fifteen year old teenage 
daughter, Christine, who is at school studying for her GCSE’s 
that she will take next year. Gaynor has one sister, Sally who 
she has not seen for ten years. Gaynor has been admitted to a 
ward with oncology beds, as she had previously been 
diagnosed as having cancer and unfortunately, this has spread 
widely throughout her body. She is in hospital for a general 
nursing assessment that would include the aim of pain 
alleviation until her death.
Her initial bowel cancer symptoms first appeared in the form of 
an altered bowel habit, she had complained to her husband of 
feeling tired, but she had attributed this to her age. She had 
been embarrassed about her disease and felt that she could not 
seek medical advice concerning her bowel habits, as her 
parents had always discouraged her from talking about such
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things because they were deemed as unsuitable for discussion. 
For this reason she had not raised the topic of bowels in 
conversation with her husband.
The diagnosis had been made during a late stage of the 
disease, when Gaynor had started to experience abdominal 
pain and swelling, noticing blood in her faeces. She also felt 
very tired and had made observed that she had lost a lot of 
weight over a relatively short period of time, although she had 
not been on a diet. This had worried her husband, who 
suggested that she should have a medical examination to 
ensure that all was well.
On seeing her General Practitioner, Gaynor had confided the 
true symptoms and the time that had elapsed from their onset to 
the day that she was seen in her G.P.’s surgery. The G.P. 
subsequently arranged a set of clinical investigations with the 
local hospital to confirm the diagnosis. An urgent appointment 
was arranged with the oncologist at the District General 
Hospital, where the diagnosis was confirmed and Gaynor was 
informed of the prognosis. Due to the extent of the disease, the 
treatment that was most relevant to Gaynor’s needs was
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considered by the consultant to be palliative care through the 
use of drugs to relieve pain. She appeared to understand the 
extent of the disease affecting her body and the consequent 
prognosis. She indicated that she accepted this as her fate and 
began to plan for an early death.
Before Gaynor’s admission to hospital, she had confided in her 
husband that, when a severe deterioration in her physical 
condition occurred, it was her wish that her life should be 
terminated. He had indicated to her that he could not agree with 
her desire to end her life, although he could appreciate her point 
of view. One can now make an application of Gadow's (1983) 
'Lived' and 'Object' body to the case.
5 The ‘Lived’ and ‘Object’ Body
With reference to Gadow’s (1983:51-55) ‘lived’ and ‘object’ body 
as described in part three, Gaynor’s sex, age, and the fact that 
she has a physical bowel cancer problem should be the factors 
that ought to be considered. One also should acknowledge the 
progression of the disease and the physical effects that these 
would have on Gaynor in terms of measurable effects. For 
example, the occurrence of unexpected weight loss and feelings
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of nausea, also deterioration in body function with reference to a 
normal ability to self-care. Other symptoms could be a loss of 
physical strength leading to a difficulty in the gaining and 
maintenance of mobility, and physical independence. The 
'object' body will be considered next.
In application to the case study, the above examples of 
Gaynor’s physical problems that relate Gadow’s (1983:51-55) 
conception of the ‘object body’ should enable a nurse who is 
responsible for Gaynor’s care to identify her present and future 
physical problems. The nurse would perceive that Gaynor has a 
diagnosis of cancer in common with many other patients. The 
nurse should then be able to identify the components of care 
that could provide a nursing assessment of Gaynor with 
reference to physical observations and the identification of 
required nursing care with reference to Gaynor’s hygiene, 
dressing, and any other activities that require assistance. The 
nurse should also be able to acknowledge Gaynor’s requirement 
for a referral to other health care professionals, for example, a 
dietician to ensure adequate nutrition and the physiotherapist to
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ensure an adequate programme of exercise with the aim of 
continued mobility.
With regard to Gaynor's disease, when considered in light of 
Gadow's (1983) conception of ‘object body’, this should enable 
a nurse to design an effective plan of care having elements that 
the nurse would consider as common practise for people with 
cancer. There should be an acknowledgement though, that the 
care could be amended as required. This should facilitate a 
flexible approach to nursing care that could be planned and 
implemented according to Gaynor’s needs. But the doctors and 
nurses may expect that Gaynor should make herself available 
on the ward as required for medical examination, clinical 
investigations and nursing care. The referral of Gaynor to other 
professionals would be considered as part of a plan that would 
be based on a holistic nursing assessment of Gaynor. I will now 
turn to an application of the 'lived' body.
As described previously, Gadow’s (1983:51-55) ‘lived body’ 
perspective refers to the bodily experience of a patient who has 
some form of illness or is required to undergo some form of
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investigation. An example of Gaynor’s experience of her illness 
could be an associated pain and discomfort, feeling of nausea 
and tiredness, as in the case of a person who has cancer. A 
barium enema could be cited as an example of an 
embarrassing, uncomfortable investigation that could include 
Gaynor feeling bloated, nauseated and tired. The ‘lived body’ 
perspective would also give prominence to Gaynor’s concerns 
and worry concerning the investigations and disease and she 
may refer to the cancer as ‘growing inside’. She may also 
harbour concerns regarding the amount of pain that she will 
have and the effectiveness of analgesia. Having applied the 
'lived' and 'object' bodies, the next section will offer a 
consideration of Gadow's (1983) existential advocacy.
6 Existential Advocacy and the Case Study
For Gadow (1983), the previously described perspective of 
existential advocacy is interchangeable with advocacy and it can 
be used to determine the nature and form of a nurse-patient 
relationship and be used to clarify the values held by those 
involved in decision-making.
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With regard to the case study, existential advocacy can be used 
to identify the patient’s requirements, preferences and wants. 
For Gadow (1983:51-55), the concept of existential advocacy 
involves the nurse in viewing the patient through a holistic 
perspective and working with the patient to clarify his or her 
wants based on information with reference to both the ‘object’ 
and ‘lived body’, as previously described. In relation to the case 
study, Gaynor’s preferences concerning her physical nursing 
care are quite easily identified and addressed. This would also 
include any referrals to health care professionals other than 
nurses, for example, a dietician. The nursing and care by other 
professionals should be framed on the needs of the patient, 
Gaynor, who should be consulted at every stage to ensure that 
she feels fully involved during her care. This should minimise 
the possibility that Gaynor may feel that there is a loss of control 
and that she has, in effect, given her body to the professionals 
that are caring for her. When taking into account Gaynor’s ‘lived 
body’ experience, the nurse should consider Gaynor’s 
perspective of the disease and associated investigations. The 
nurse should also be aware of the effect of the illness on Gaynor 
through her physical experience of the illness and associated 
investigations. I will now offer a consideration of Gadow's
254
(1983:51-55) position on existential advocacy and the 'lived' and 
'object' bodies, with reference to Gaynor's impending death.
7 Gadow’s Position
I will now consider the views of the nurses from Gadow's (1983) 
perspective with respect to her concepts of ‘object’, ‘lived’ body 
and existential advocacy, should Gaynor wish for any reason 
that her life be terminated.
With regard to the ‘object body’ (Gadow, 1983:51-55), her 
response to such a request would be that the nurse as advocate 
should explore the presence of any physical reasons that may 
lead Gaynor to take this view. For example, a question could be 
posed as to whether she is suffering some form of physical 
deterioration that nursing knowledge and the employment of 
technology could alleviate. For instance, relief of discomfort and 
nausea through the use of an appropriate drug administered at 
a sufficient level to alleviate the problem. The level of nursing 
intervention, for example, with regard to the use of analgesia, 
may need to be increased with the aim of preventing and 
alleviating problems, such as pain. According to Gadow’s
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(1983) perspective, the patient should be encouraged to 
communicate any physical problems that may be encountered 
with the nurse and should be consulted with regard to the care.
With reference to the ‘lived body’, the nurse should take into 
account the preferences of Gaynor and make an effort to see 
things from the patient’s point of view that should reflect some 
of Gaynor’s experience. The nurse should make her or himself 
aware of the factors that may have influenced Gaynor’s 
perception of her illness while taking into account her 
relationship with her family.
With regard to existential advocacy in Gaynor’s case, this would 
depend on the relationship that had developed between Gaynor 
and nurse. For existential advocacy to exist, the nurse would 
have taken a holistic perspective concerning the care of Gaynor 
and her family, therefore both the ‘lived’ and ‘object’ body 
perspectives ought to be employed by a nursing advocate.
The context of the above case study can be used to consider 
Gadow’s (1983:51-55) work on existential advocacy, object and 
‘lived body’. For Gadow (1983), the patient is considered as the
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most important person, whose existence gives reason for the 
employment of nurses and the application of nursing care. 
Gadow (1983) would acknowledge that the role of a nurse is to 
assess the patient with the aim of giving appropriate care that 
could include the administration of medication to alleviate pain. 
She, as other nurses, would acknowledge that a potential 
physiological side effect of some strong analgesics is linked to 
the depression of a person’s respiration and as a consequence, 
death could occur after administration. This would be 
considered as a humane act to be undertaken after consultation 
with the patient, doctors and relatives, with the aim of treating 
pain of not killing the patient.
The nurse would take into account Gaynor’s feelings with regard 
to her illness and may empathise with her position. However, 
the nurse is trained to save lives and to contribute to a peaceful 
death when a life cannot be saved. Therefore Gadow’s (1983) 
emphasis on the ‘lived body’ and the experiences of the patient 
could not form a basis from where the nurse, as advocate, could 
legitimately promote or aid Gaynor’s death. To do so, would be 
to commit an act of murder and this would be unacceptable in a
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society, as in Britain or the USA. For Gadow (1983), any nurse 
who receives such a request from a person like Gaynor should 
acknowledge that a mentally competent patient has a right to 
make known his or her preferences concerning the ending of his 
or her life. Gadow (1983) would hold, that it is right that the 
nurse offers the patient support in his or her decision, but would 
also refer to the legal restrictions that are in place concerning a 
proposed act of euthanasia. Gadow (1983) would therefore 
support the idea that Gaynor should be offered analgesia for the 
relief of pain that may unintentionally result in death. This 
nursing action would accord with the legal position concerning 
euthanasia in Britain at the present time.
Gadow (1983) provides a framework, where the patient can be 
viewed from the existential advocacy perspective and treated as 
an individual. The nursing care that Gaynor requires can be 
linked to her ‘object’ and ‘lived body’. Gadow (1983) would 
acknowledge that the nurse advocate's response to Gaynor’s 
wish to die should reflect the legal position in a society. Having 
applied Gadow's (1983) perspective to the case study, I will now 
do the same with regard to Habermas' (1995) framework.
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8 Habermas’ Framework
I will now describe how Habermas’ (1995) framework with 
regard to first, the application of Habermas’ (1987) system and 
lifeworld, second, Critical Theory, third, the Ideal Speech 
Situation, fourth, the Theory of Communicative Action. Such an 
application could be employed to address the problems that a 
view of advocacy based on Gadow’s (1983) perspective, has 
generated.
For Habermas (1987) the application of ‘system’ would refer to 
the type of society that Gaynor lives in, that is, a society that 
does not legally allow the practice of euthanasia. Habermas’ 
(1987) ‘lifeworld’, (that can be considered as a similar concept 
to Gadow’s ‘lived’ body), can be applied to Gaynor’s experience 
of life prior to the onset of her illness and her experience of 
having the illness, informing her of her feelings with regard to 
euthanasia. This should be considered with reference to the life 
experience and consequent view held by her husband, who 
does not suffer from this illness, and the doctor, who 
acknowledges that to aid Gaynor’s death would constitute an 
illegal act of euthanasia. The views held by the different parties 
involved would be influenced by differing lifeworlds that would
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reflect the experiences and responsibilities of the individuals 
involved. I will now consider an application of Habermas’ (1987) 
critical theory.
For Habermas (1987) the application of Critical Theory may 
help in cases like Gaynor’s. Critical Theory could be used to 
consider the historical and contemporary basis of murder and 
society’s response to the act through for example, the death 
penalty. This should enable an understanding to occur 
concerning the reason for disagreement with regard to the act of 
murder and the resulting severity of punishment.
The application of Critical Theory, to cases as Gaynor’s, may 
serve to aid people, or their representatives who are in a similar 
position, to question the stance taken by British society with 
regard to euthanasia and suicide. McHale states that:
'Section 2 (1) of the Suicide Act (1961) provides 
that assisting suicide is an offence.’
McHale (1998:198)
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It is therefore unlawful to assist someone who wishes to commit 
an act of suicide. The case can be made that in other European 
countries such as the Netherlands, the law has been changed 
with regard to euthanasia. There, killing in certain 
circumstances can be legally condoned, although certain 
restrictions and safeguards have to be applied and observed.
In this context therefore, Critical Theory may be used to 
question the stance taken by a society with regard to its policy 
on euthanasia. This can be done on the grounds that the act of 
euthanasia in certain well-controlled circumstances may be 
preferable to the alternative of a person suffering a long and 
potentially painful death.
Having raised an application of Critical Theory, I will now look at 
an application of the Ideal Speech Situation, Theory of 
Communicative Action, Universalism (‘U’) and Discourse Ethics, 
(‘D’). The rationale for this order of application is related to 
Habermas’ (1995) framework for the conduct of speech, where 
the Ideal Speech Situation can be considered as an ideal 
framework where all of those involved in discussion are able to 
have an equal participation with an opportunity to voice an
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opinion. This can be considered as forming the basis for any 
form of communication and from this base, the Theory of 
Communicative Action can be applied, where those involved in 
communication can achieve a common understanding and 
harmony with regard to their communication. Universalism as 
previously described, can be used to evaluate norms with the 
aim of reaching a universal agreement. Discourse Ethics forms 
the conditions for a practical application of those norms.
Habermas’ (1995) Ideal Speech Situation rests on the four 
validity claims, as previously described and he emphasizes the 
aim of attaining a consensus of opinion between those involved 
in discourse. This should lead to the formation of a consensus of 
opinion between people and form the basis from where those in 
authority may be challenged. With reference to the case study, 
the Ideal Speech Situation could be approximated, if the 
representatives of people who have a terminal illness, as for 
example Gaynor, are able to form a consensus and obtain 
support from other bodies. This could form the basis from where 
the law with regard to euthanasia could be reviewed and 
potentially changed.
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Habermas’ (1984) framework with regard to the Theory of 
Communicative Action can be applied to Gaynor and related to 
discourse that occurs with regard to the case study. As stated 
previously, his theory is based on four validity claims, namely 
those of the communication being comprehensible, that it should 
be based on truth, that it is right and that the people undertaking 
the communication are truthful.
The aim of those involved in communicative action is to reach a 
common understanding and achieve harmony with regard to a 
situation. This can be applied to discussions concerning 
euthanasia where, for example, the discussion may focus on 
the value of life and whether it is right for life to be ended 
prematurely, for whatever reason. The aim of communicative 
action should be to ensure that the participants are able to 
obtain an equal access to discussion and to form a consensus, 
where the outcome of communication can be agreed upon and 
then taken forward. It is at this point that an application of 
Universalism and discourse ethics will be made.
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The four validity claims are the necessary prerequisite for the 
conduct of any communicative action and I will now consider 
Habermas’ (1995) principle of Universalism as a way of 
evaluating the aim of reaching a universal agreement, free of 
constraints, in application to the policy with regard to 
euthanasia.
Habermas' (1995:65) definition of 'U', as described in chapter 
eight, can be used to evaluate the competing norms with 
reference to whether it ought to be possible, given a specific set 
of circumstances, that the act of euthanasia should to be legally 
condoned and be enacted.
The competing norms could be those relating to the sanctity of 
life, as with reference to the Theory of Communicative Action, 
and whether anyone has the right to take life or prevent people 
from taking their own life. This would relate to a society’s stance 
towards life, for example, a society that condones indiscriminate 
murder might view life as cheap and worthless. Another 
example could be a society in which an act of theft might be 
punished with death. By proposing that euthanasia should be 
legally available, it could be argued that contemporary Britain is
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treading a path towards the formation of a humane society. 
Alternatively, by continuing not to acknowledge euthanasia as a 
legal activity, our society could be considered as promoting an 
inhumane policy towards those suffering with an incurable 
illness. It is therefore unlikely that when considering such an 
emotive issue that a universal agreement can be reached, for 
not everyone could accept the consequences and side effects. 
The more likely outcome could be an agreement to disagree 
with the view and that the issue of euthanasia ought to be left to 
individuals who wish to consider euthanasia. This view would 
allow those who disagree with euthanasia to refrain from 
becoming involved.
In chapter seven, Habermas (1995:66) offered a definition of 'D\ 
discourse ethics; where all those who are participating in 
practical discourse, can (or could) approve of the norms that 
can be considered as valid, based on the premise that it is 
possible to justify the choice of a norm.
In application to the case study, the discourse should include all 
those who may be affected, for example Gaynor, her husband 
and daughter and the health care professionals who are
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responsible for her care. The validity claims are considered, as 
a foundation of discourse and claims that the information should 
be comprehensible, truthful and true, are likely to be met. The 
claim that is open to question concerns the rightness of the 
discourse with reference to the current stance taken by British 
society with regard to euthanasia. It would be doubtful whether 
all involved in a discourse concerning Gaynor, could accept the 
consequences of euthanasia and at the same time, the 
consequences of maintaining Gaynor’s life against her wishes. 
To maintain the current policy of supporting life may appear 
inhumane to Gaynor and her relatives, but may be perceived by 
the health professionals as a lawful requirement at the present 
time. It would therefore not be possible to satisfy everyone’s 
interests and the parties involved may reach an agreement that 
they hold differing views. An agreement may be reached that 
society’s stance with regard to euthanasia ought to be re­
evaluated with the view to a possible change of policy.
The application of Habermas’ (1995) framework with reference 
to communication can be used to offer a criticism of a society, 
for example, with reference to its stance on the legality of
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euthanasia. By offering a criticism of society’s approach to 
certain policies, the proponents of the criticism may be able to 
lay the foundations for a change in policy. Having discussed an 
application of Universalism and discourse ethics, I will now link 
the views of Habermas (1995) to Gadow's (1983) perspective.
9 Habermas and Gadow’s Perspectives
First, I will describe Gadow’s (1983) position with regard to a 
nurse who is contemplating assisting a patient with euthanasia. 
Gadow (1983) would hold the view that the nurse as advocate 
should take into account views held by a patient, such as 
Gaynor, and offer support for her decision. For Gadow (1983) 
the patient is the person best placed to make such a decision, 
providing that it is considered as lawful. In Britain, where a 
nurse’s active assistance in Gaynor’s euthanasia is considered 
as illegal, Gadow (1983) would not condone such practice, 
however, would support the nurse in representing the views of a 
patient who wishes to die. Alternatively, in the Netherlands 
where euthanasia is now lawful, Gadow (1983) would condone 
the legal action of a nurse who assists a patient in an act of 
euthanasia. With regard to Gaynor's pain relief, Gadow (1983)
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would support the legal administration of large doses of 
prescribed analgesia on the grounds that it is part of a nurse’s 
role to relieve pain, even though such a dose in some 
circumstances may hasten the patient’s death. This would be 
seen as a possible and acceptable consequence of analgesia 
that is considered as preferable to the patient suffering for what 
could be a short extension of life.
In common with the majority of people, Gadow (1983) probably 
holds a personal view with regard to euthanasia; she has the 
right in a democratic society to a self-expression of this view. 
When considering the role of a nurse as an advocate, she has 
to take into account the norms held by a society, such as the 
USA. For example, it is wrong to commit murder and to perform 
acts of euthanasia even though the cases that attract such 
attention and discussion are often related to people with a 
terminal illness, who are without hope of an effective cure. The 
answer by a society such as the USA to a request for 
euthanasia would be the same, irrespective of the people 
involved.
268
Therefore, I have come to the conclusion that the concerns of a 
patient, such as Gaynor, can only be effectively addressed by a 
society reconsidering its views on euthanasia. From this 
perspective, Habermas’ (1995) framework with regard to 
discourse ethics could be employed with the aim of changing 
the law in a society. With regard to euthanasia, this can be 
considered with reference to Habermas’ (1987) work on 
‘lifeworld’ when there is no hope of an effective clinical 
treatment for an individual’s illness. For the law to be changed, 
an application of Habermas’ (1995) framework with regard to 
society’s stance on euthanasia and the norms with regard to the 
value of life should form the basis of any discussion concerning 
such an act.
Such an ethical discourse should be based on the four 
previously identified validity claims and ought to be conducted 
with regard to the previously described conditions, as according 
to Habermas’ (1995) framework. These are, that those involved 
should have the aim of achieving a mutual understanding and 
harmony, that there ought to be equal access afforded to the 
individuals concerned and that those involved should work 
toward achieving a consensus. The framework could then be
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used as a basis for a criticism of society’s stance towards 
euthanasia with the aim of changing social policy and the legal 
position of society with regard to proposed acts euthanasia.
Habermas (1995), through ‘IT, is able to create the conditions 
for the conduct of discourse, where competing norms can be 
evaluated. This can be considered as a useful basis from where 
discourse can be conducted with reference to the norms of a 
society, for example, with reference to nursing and the National 
Health Service. Gadow (1983) would agree with the need to 
evaluate competing norms and she would consider the conduct 
of discourse as relevant to the interests of patients and that of 
the Health Service.
Habermas’ (1995) ‘D’ refers to the practical application of 
discourse and can also be applied to nursing and the Health 
Service. Gadow (1983) would consider that the patient’s 
decision and preferences are important as these reflect the 
wishes of a patient should be the best person to make these 
decisions, therefore Gadow (1983) would take the view that 
these wishes should be respected. A change of policy by society 
with reference to an act of euthanasia should allow Gadow’s
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(1983) perspective on advocacy to be considered as credible. It 
should embrace the potential that a patient may wish that an act 
of euthanasia should be performed and Gadow (1983) would 
then be able to condone such an act.
10 Summary
It has been my aim during this chapter, to demonstrate that the 
described perspectives of both Habermas (1995) and Gadow 
(1983) can be considered as relevant to nursing. An application 
of Habermas’ (1984, 1987 and 1995) work on communication 
has demonstrated that a theoretical basis can be made for 
communication, in an applied setting. Gadow’s (1983) 
perspective of existential advocacy, taking into account the 
‘lived’ body can be readily applied to the case study and 
Habermas’ work on ‘lifeworld’. The work of both these writers 
adds to an understanding of the basis for advocacy, in terms of 
acquiring an understanding of a patient and their problems. It 
would now seem appropriate to offer a conclusion.
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CHAPTER 11 CONCLUSION
Having considered the five advocacy perspectives, and the 
applied work of Habermas (1995), I will now offer a conclusion 
to the thesis. An introduction to advocacy has been identified 
and I have described the work of two British writers on 
advocacy, namely those of Gates and Teasdale. The British 
view facilitates the occurrence of a broad perspective with 
regard to advocacy and refers to ‘independent’ or ‘citizen 
advocacy’, as described in Teasdale. This allows for the 
involvement of a third party, for example, the services of an 
experienced person who is able to act as an effective advocate, 
or alternatively, an advocacy body and may include an 
involvement of a person or body of people in addition to a 
nurse-patient relationship.
This can be considered as a contrast to the views offered by the 
three United States authors, namely Gadow (1983), Kohnke 
and Curtin (1979). These views are based on the exclusion of a 
third party; instead they focus on the relationship that exists 
between a patient and health care professional, as for example, 
a nurse. An emphasis is laid on the right of patients to make 
decisions concerning their treatment and welfare.
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Having described and considered the work of the five authors 
on advocacy, I have come to the conclusion that of these 
authors, Gadow (1983), through her account and concept of 
existential advocacy and the ‘lived’, ‘object’ body, is able to offer 
the most convincing and sound foundation for advocacy. The 
criticisms that can be made of Gadow (1983) can be easily 
answered when taking into account her advocacy philosophy 
and this can be applied in a variety of situations, i.e. to all areas 
of nursing. I find that her perspective is able to offer a deep, 
sound and coherent academic basis for advocacy.
Gadow (1983), in common with other authors suggests, that the 
foundation for advocacy should rest on the decision made by 
the patient and that any nursing action ought to be based on 
this. The difference between Gadow’s (1983) account of 
advocacy and those of the other four authors lies in her 
description and justification of existential advocacy in terms of 
the ‘lived’ and ‘object’ body, which can be linked to Habermas’ 
(1987) perspective of ‘system’ and ‘lifeworld’ This provides the 
foundation on which Gadow’s (1983) account of advocacy can 
be considered as having been carefully thought out and is hard 
to criticise, on the basis that the patient’s preferences and
273
decision reflect his or her circumstances. Gadow’s (1983) 
philosophy, with regard to advocacy, can be applied worldwide. 
The philosophy can be considered as creditable, as it reflects 
the wishes of the patient or client, rather than that of any other 
person. It therefore follows, that for Gadow (1983), the patient’s 
decision-making should be considered as the most important 
aspect of advocacy.
In the thesis, I have described the work of Habermas (1995) 
with regard to discourse ethics, his work has been applied to the 
Pink case and the view of advocacy, as offered by Gadow 
(1983). Habermas (1995) has set out a theoretical framework 
that can be used to identify the required conditions for the 
conduct of ethical discourse. He allows for the deployment of a 
methodological approach to discourse, where competing norms 
can be evaluated and as stated earlier in the thesis, he has 
created a framework where statements can be tested for their 
validity and effectiveness. I have taken an opportunity in this 
thesis to link Habermas’ (1995) theoretical principles to the Pink 
case, where the framework of ‘U’ and ‘D’ are applied to the 
actions of Graham Pink, his colleagues, and the hospital’s 
management.
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I have also constructed a case study, with the aim of forming a 
link between Gadow’s (1983) perspective on advocacy and 
Habermas’ (1995) framework for the conduct of discourse 
ethics. I have been able to demonstrate that it is possible to link 
the two perspectives with the aim of providing a sound account 
for the basis of advocacy with regard to a situation that may 
occur in any clinical area. The employment of the perspectives 
has enabled me to demonstrate their usefulness when 
considering the circumstances that could lead to the need for 
advocacy and a requirement that one should consider the 
factors that lie behind these.
I feel that I am now able to offer a final comment with regard to 
the thesis. Habermas’ (1995) work on discourse can be used as 
an academic framework that can be employed to identify the 
necessary conditions for the conduct of ethical discourse. This 
framework can then be used to evaluate competing norms with 
the aim of allowing the participants in ethical discourse to come 
to a conclusion that can be acceptable to all. The thesis has 
given me an opportunity to apply Habermas’ (1995) view of 
discourse ethics and his 1987 view concerning ‘system’ and 
‘lifeworld’ to advocacy, through a link with and an application of
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the work undertaken by Gadow (1983) on the ‘object’ and ‘lived’ 
body.
For Gadow (1983), the patient is considered as the person who 
should make decisions with regard to his or her treatment and 
welfare, and the nurse ought to respect the decisions made by 
the patient and her actions as an advocate should reflect this 
view. The application of Habermas’ (1984, 1995) work on 
communication and ethical discourse to advocacy has not been 
previously attempted. This application has a special significance 
in that, as demonstrated by the Pink case study, there is an 
obvious need for advocacy in health care, and this has never 
been greater. In this thesis, I have applied Habermas’ (1995) 
perspective in the context of the provision of a health service, to 
form a deeper understanding of advocacy. It is my hope that 
this understanding of the implications of advocacy should act as 
an aid for nurses, when they consider whether to take on an 
advocacy role.
The application of the work of Habermas (1995) and Gadow 
(1983) has been facilitated as required, through the use of case 
studies and these have enabled me to apply the relevant
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principles to examples that are related to potential problems 
encountered in nursing practise. The application of these 
principles has demonstrated Habermas’ (1995) relevance to 
Gadow's (1983) work on advocacy and through this application 
it is shown that Habermas’ (1995) perspective has direct 
relevance to ethical discourse involving the National Health 
Service and advocacy. Having written this thesis, it is 
acknowledged there is scope for further application of 
Habermas’ (1995) views on discourse ethics and it is hoped that 
this will provide the basis for future work.
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX 1 
AN ADVOCACY FLOW CHART AS ACCORDING TO 
TEASDALE (1998:33. fig. 4.1)
Can client identify 
own wants?
r\<— - ----------*Jh
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self-advocate?
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APPENDIX 2
NURSING AND MIDWIFERY CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT (2002)
• As a registered nurse or midwife, you are personally
accountable for your practice. In caring for patients and 
clients, you must:
• Respect the patient or client as an individual
• Obtain consent before you give any treatment or care
• Protect confidential information
• Co-operate with others in the team
• Maintain your professional knowledge and competence
• Be trustworthy
• Act to identify and minimise risk to patients and clients.
These are the shared values of all the United Kingdom health 
care regulatory bodies.
For further details with regard to the above code, please see the 
Nursing and Midwifery Council Code of Professional Conduct 
(2002:3-10).
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